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Abstract
This is the first documented history of the birth and evolution of the workers’ councils system 
in Yugoslavia and the political conflicts that accompanied it. Straddling fourteen years, from 
the split with Moscow in 1948 to the re-opening of the national question for the first time 
after the Second World War in 1962, this thesis demonstrates that the progressive opening to 
the world market after the Tito-Stalin conflict intensified domestic struggles and centrifugal 
pulls on the federation. Using the archival materials of the ruling Communist Party, 
government and mass organisations, it explains the stages by which the market came to 
dominate the party-state’s mobilising strategies for society and the shop-floor. In Chapter 1, 
the introduction of workers’ councils is shown to have been a measure to reverse the 
extraordinary and democratising mobilisation that followed the break with the USSR, by 
splitting more advanced sections of the working class from those more tied to the 
countryside. Chapter 2 suggests that the umbilical cord set up from the West to ‘keep Tito 
afloat’ allowed the Yugoslav Communists to continue to invest in heavy industry over 
agriculture in order to escape underdevelopment. This created food shortages and massive 
resistance to managerial imperatives on the shop-floor. As the country fell deeper in debt, the 
government intensified market reform under the guise of expanding self-management in 
order to create an export sector. Chapter 3 sets the stage for open factional conflict in the 
leadership by noting the gulf between promise and reality in the workplace and on the terrain 
of complex and uneven domestic development. The main contribution of the thesis is to go 
beyond history as elite conflict and present it also as a process of class struggle with many 
mediating instances between the workplace and the state beholden to the world market.
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Introduction
Yugoslavia was the first country in Eastern Europe to develop a system combining worker 
participation in firms with a regulated market economy. Its non-aligned position between the 
Cold War blocs as well as its unusually complex multinational composition accentuated the 
country’s apparently unique route to development for the most part of the second half of the 
twentieth century. This thesis charts the evolution of the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ from 
its inception, following the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, to its first major economic and political 
crisis in 1961-1962, ending with an uneasy and provisional compromise in the country’s 
fractured leadership as represented by the resolutions of the Sixth Plenum of the Central 
Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The hypothesis put forward is that 
the external pressures, exacerbated in particular by the country’s western tilt in the Cold War 
and the debt trap it fell into as a means of securing independence from the Soviet bloc, 
gradually imposed the competitive imperative of accumulation for its own sake on Yugoslav 
development strategy, making impossible any notion of the polity evolving into a ‘free 
association of producers’. Prices of goods and services, including crucially labour, came to be 
compared to world prices in the search for a viable import-export balance. Efforts to organise 
work and stimulate production for international competition through a participatory economy 
encountered, domestically, conditions of underdevelopment and regional unevenness that 
further distorted the endeavour to attain equitable and smooth growth. Even as the dominant 
faction in the party leadership increasingly championed the pursuit of economies of scale on a 
federal level and on a market basis, for foreign competition, political struggles developed 
over control of assets and strategies towards labour, taking on a regional character but an 
ideological form: the defence of self-management against bureaucratic state centralism.
2Historiography
Titoist Yugoslavia drew much contemporary commentary and claimed a unique position in 
the Cold War set-up on account of its distinctive socio-economic system apparently based on 
a labour-managed economy. The post-socialist historiography, however, has produced no 
single documented study of the system of workers’ councils despite the slow release of 
documents through the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.1 In that sense, the central plank of ‘self­
management socialism’ has been possibly the most high-profile casualty of the wars of the 
1990s in the academic field. The domestic political scene in the 1950s as a whole has been a 
neglected topic on the research agenda since the end of the Cold War, and no comprehensive 
account has emerged.2 *The classical texts on post-war politics in the Anglo-Saxon world 
remain Dennison Rusinow’s The Yugoslav Experiment and A. Ross Johnson’s The 
Transformation o f Communist Ideology? Two subsequent additions dealing with the impact 
of the Tito-Stalin split on domestic elites in the form of Ivo Banac’s With Stalin against Tito 
and Susan Woodward’s Socialist Unemployment dealing with the origins of the economic 
system have acquired the status of authoritative texts.4 Nevertheless, the political histories of 
the period with closest approximation to archival research are the late achievements of
1 An unpublished doctoral dissertation by Olivera Milosavljevid in fact appeared before the collapse, Driava i 
samoupravljanje: ¡949-1956: doktorska disertacija, Beograd, 1987.
2 The most thorough overview o f the decade is still George Walter Hoffman and Fred Warner Neal, Yugoslavia 
and the New Communism, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962. For a short introduction to workers’ 
councils, see Adolf Fox Sturmthal, Workers' Councils: A Study o f Workplace Organization on Both Sides of the 
Iron Curtain, Harvard U.P; Oxford U.P, 1964. The official history is useful but without citation o f documents: 
Dragan Markovid et al, Factories to their workers: chronicle about workers’ management in Yugoslavia, 
Belgrade: [s.n.], 1965
Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, London: Hurst for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1977 and A. Ross Johnson, The Transformation o f Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav 
Case 1945-1953, Cambridge, Mass., 1972.
Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 1988, and Susan Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 
1945-1990, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, c. 1995. So state two authorities on Yugoslav history in 
the form o f Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and 
the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, 312, and John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country, 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000,257, ff. 21
3Yugoslav historians Branko Petranovic and Dusan Bilandzic.5 The post-Yugoslav 
historiography has, in dealing with post-war Yugoslav politics, developed a damaging 
tendency to incorporate archival evidence primarily from the perspective of the nationalist 
legitimation of new states, skewing its vision and preventing it from developing 
comprehensive judgements.6
Moreover, as a leading revisionist historian has pointed out, ‘any work on postwar 
Yugoslavia will suffice’ to illustrate the contention that the new system developed ‘in 
response to popular dissatisfaction and the leaders’ need to find domestic bases of political 
support and legitimacy once they had been abandoned by Moscow’.7 As for the political 
history thereafter, ‘the literature interprets both the actual conflicts over domestic economic 
policy and contests by which strategy was formulated and redefined as fights among leaders 
for personal power (elite conflict); among ethnic groups for dominance or autonomy (national 
conflict); or among layers in the party and state hierarchy for location of power (conflict 
between centre and republics, statism and pluralism, plan and market, conservatives and 
liberals).’8
5 The former’s Istorija Jugoslavije: 1918-1988. Knj. 3, Socijalisticka Jugoslavia: 1945-1988, Beograd: Nolit, 
1988 obviously had access to archival funds but did not directly cite them. The latter’s Historija Socijalistidke 
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: glavniprocesi: 1918-1985, Zagreb: Skolska knjiga, 1985 is more notable 
for its understanding o f economic trends and use of statistical tables.
6 See for an overview o f the works o f  the same authors in Todor Kuljid, ‘Historiographic Revisionism in Post- 
Socialist Regimes’ in The Balkans Rachomon -  Historiography and literature on Dissolution ofSFRY, Helsinki 
Files N o.l 1, Helsinki Commitee for Human Rights in Serbia, Beograd 2002, 7-47.
7 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 64. For the Tito-Stalin split, a useful overview is provided by Jeronim 
Perovid, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light o f New Evidence’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 
Volume 9, Number 2, Spring 2007, 32-63
8 ibid., 33. She refers in the first batch to Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: 
Political Decision Making since 1966, Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1983 and Rusinow, Yugoslav 
Experiment. This list could be expanded exponentially. Some examples include Adam Bruno Ulam’s Titoism 
and the Cominform, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1971, originally published in 1952, or Charles Potter 
McVicker, Titoism: Pattern for International Communism, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1957. In the second 
batch, Woodward cites works that did not deal with the 1950s directly. Thus, Ivo Banac’s The National 
Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984 deals with the 
evolution of national ideologies and their impact on the formation o f Yugoslavia. The viability o f its conclusions 
for Titoist Yugoslavia has recently been challenged by the contention that even inter-war elites did indeed 
overcome their conflicts at least temporarily: Dejan Djokid, Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar 
Yugoslavia, London: Hurst & Co., 2007. The other two works cited deal more with post-1962 Yugoslavia:
4The leading Yugoslav historians did not represent a significant departure from this trend, 
frequently adding an additional layer to the conflict in the form of the clash between workers’ 
councils themselves and actors external to them: fundamentally, self-management against the 
state. Indeed, Petranovic’s account derives most of its material on the self-management sector 
in the 1950s precisely from the only, and unpublished, dissertation on the topic of workers’ 
councils that uses archival documents Drzava i samoupravljanje [The State and Self- 
Management].9 The latter work does not depart from the acceptable political boundaries of 
the academe at the time and indeed makes its central argument that external constraints 
prevented the self-management sector developing significant autonomy, which leading 
political luminaries recognised as a problem and tried to move beyond through legislation 
expanding the share of income at the disposal of work collectives. Moreover, despite sections 
that deal with the relationship between workers’ councils and the state, party and mass 
organisations, the author fails to develop insights about societal and political struggles over 
the role of self-management. Its focus remains resolutely the description of trends as viewed 
from the materials that came from below. This is fruitful and unique but limited.
For, as Woodward points out, ‘the oppositions usually postulated in the literature...do not 
distinguish between systems and policies. A broad conception of policies towards labor does 
make that distinction, for the state (in its new sense) remained a master employer that
Sabrina Ramet Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, ¡962-1991, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992, and Leonard J. Cohen and Paul Warwick, Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic: The Yugoslav 
Experience Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Perhaps a more apposite example is Paul S. Shoup, 
Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1968. 
Finally, in the third batch, Woodward cites Ellen Turkish Comisso, Workers' Control Linder Plan and Market, 
Yale University, London, 1979; Burg, Conflict and Cohesion.-, Deborah Milenkovitch, Plan and Market in 
Yugoslav Economic Thought, New Haven, CONN. -  Yale University Press, 1971; and Rusinow, Yugoslav 
Experiment. A novel addition to this group would be Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and 
Legitimation, 1918-2005, Washington, D.C.: Bloomington, IN: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 2006 
Milosavljevid, Driava i samoupravljanje
5periodically reorganized society in the adjusting to problems of capital...’10 Central is her 
claim that: ‘Yugoslav exceptionalism was not the country’s system of worker self­
management or its multinational state but its international position -  its attempt to retain 
socialism at home and a vigilant national independence while being open to the world 
economy, which required constant adjustments in the use of labor and organization of 
employment.’11 One of the leading economic historians of the Balkans summarises 
Woodward’s argument admirably: ‘[she] blames liberal principles, what she calls the Slovene 
model, for prompting Yugoslav policymakers to bow repeatedly to Western pressures and 
reign in investment and imports, thus contracting employment, in order to close a series of 
surging deficits on current account. She blames the resulting “stop-and-go” policies on a 
“Faustian bargain” first struck with the West in the early 1950s, namely to receive external 
aid or credit in return not just for defiance of the Soviet bloc but also for the stabilization of 
external accounts (pp. 223-27).’12
The same reviewer characterised her work as pertaining to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s as
‘sufficiently imposing to deserve a detailed answer from the Western mainstream’.13
)
Nevertheless, there were two major criticisms of her account. The first came from the said 
review, which sided with ‘Yugoslav economists’ and ‘standard Western accounts’ to argue 
that: ‘[f]or the first 15 years of Tito’s Yugoslavia...neither her assumptions nor her evidence 
are very persuasive...she argues that the Leninist economic ideology of the NEP 
period...rather than Stalinist imperatives of total political control informed Yugoslav 
economic policy before and even during the 1948 and 1955 split with the Soviet Union. So 
said Edvard Kardelj and a few other party leaders at the time. But beyond citing them,
10 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 65-66
" ibid.., 28
12 See John Lampe’s, ‘Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy o f  Yugoslavia, 1945-1990,’ in The 
Journal o f Economic History, Vol.56, No.3, 1996, 724
13 ibid.
6Woodward offers no...evidence.’14 A second problem, coming from a more sympathetic 
commentator, lay at a conceptual level: ‘[i]t is unclear in the final analysis whether 
Woodward is arguing that the international system was the source of many of Yugoslavia’s 
problems, including unemployment, or whether the problem was in fact the decision to 
embrace (and to stick with) the Slovene model, a decision that could be said to have 
exaggerated both the power and the costs of regional socioeconomic diversity, as well as the 
destabilizing interventions of the international economic and political-military order.’15
More revisionist works appeared after Woodward’s account, with more access to archival 
materials, and suggested modes of overcoming some of the problems with her approach. 
These were Carol Lilly’s Power and Persuasion and Melissa Bokovoy’s Peasants and 
Communists.I6 Both stressed state-society relations and human agency in contrast to 
Woodward’s structuralism. Neither dealt primarily with strategies towards labour but they did 
provide accounts, respectively, of transformative strategies in relation to the consciousness of 
different sections of the population, and the development of the countryside. One of their 
important insights pertained to the malleability and pragmatism of leading politicians, which 
suggested that policy-making was more fluid and creative than either the early or standard 
accounts, or indeed Woodward’s account, allowed for. Another valuable finding was that 
popular negotiation and resistance to policies from above had significant impact on the 
rulers’ course of action. To quote Lilly: ‘the evolving form and content of CPY rhetoric 
revealed party leaders who, even before the split, were not just ideologues committed to a 
Marxist-Leninist vision of the future but also very practical power politicians, willing and
14 ibid.
Valerie Bunce ‘Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy o f Yugoslavia 1945-1990’ in The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), p. 951 
Carol Lilly, Power and Persuasion: Ideology and Rhetoric in Communist Yugoslavia, 1944-1953, Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2001., and Melissa Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, Politics and Ideology in the
Yugoslav Countryside, 1941-1955, Pittsburgh, Pa.: University o f Pittsburgh, 1998.
7able to modify their policies in response to unexpected events and reactions from below. 
Likewise, the populace was more influential and effective than assumed.’17 Bokovoy 
similarly denounced the facile ‘use of blind adoption of ideology as the explanation for more 
than a decade of ideological debate, political confrontation and conflict, peasant resistance 
and rebellion, and individual soul-searching [which] leaves no room for the actions of 
individuals.’18
These insights form the basis for a challenge to Woodward’s somewhat strained attempt to 
demonstrate the continuity in the thinking of the Communist leadership over several decades 
that her critics use to devastating effect. Both Lilly’s extensive research of the materials of 
the Party and its mass organisations, and Bokovoy’s sophisticated presentation of policy 
debates in various state forums, detect important shifts, manoeuvres and turning points that 
eluded both standard accounts and Woodward’s challenge. These are in fact important 
pointers and instruments to rescue Woodward’s passage to the 1960s by modifying her 
version of how elites made policy, even though both Lilly and Bokovoy are at pains to 
express affinity to Woodward’s claim that 1948 was not as central to policy-makers as 
previous accounts held, and to her attempt to present the interlude between 1948 and 1950 as 
relatively exceptional in its radicalism in relation to the preceding and succeeding periods.19
This thesis takes on Woodward’s use of two independent variables, domestic labour and 
foreign capital,20 to pursue the corrosive effects of the world market on domestic affairs. 
Nevertheless, it concedes that any attempt to elide criticisms of the kind levelled at 
Woodward needs to do more to explain the gap between theory and practice in the 1950s in
filly . Power and Persuasion, 3
Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, 155
Billy, Power and Persuasion, Chapter 7; Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, Chapter 5
To use Lampe’s expression in ‘Socialist Unemployment...’, 724
8relation to the existence of a market economy than to assert, as Woodward does, the perennial 
‘dissonance between elite ideology and elite capacity’.21 Put differently, it was not the case 
that the Yugoslav Communists decided on adopting NEP and then kept it in reserve during 
the 1950s even when it appeared conditions dictated more Stalinist methods, for its full 
flowering to later unfreeze once conditions had changed and it was possible to ditch 
Stalinism. Rather, those who made the strategic choice to follow policies akin to those later 
dubbed ‘reform Communism’ in East Europe and to even go beyond them have to be shown 
to pursue debates, create coalitions, respond to pressures from below as well as pressures 
from outside the country, just as much as their opponents, in order to renew their base in 
power and create a following for their choices. Sometimes, it is necessary to show that they 
had to change completely their approach or make compromises in order to respond to 
changing conditions. Much of that would clearly have included not just state-society relations 
but also inter-elite dealings and contests. It is therefore necessary for any approach trying to 
overcome Woodward’s weaknesses, while not returning to the status quo ante, to incorporate 
or directly rebut aspects of the standard historiography in order to explain how and why the 
Yugoslav Communists ended up experimenting with an open economy in the 1960s even as 
this led to more and more industrial conflict.
Personal recollections, memoirs and diaries, biographies of leading Communists and 
interviews with key actors help to shed light on these developments, choices and struggles. 
Indispensible memoirs that give some indication of the dynamism and informal nature of 
decision-making are two written by Tito’s close associates, members of the inner leadership 
for much of the time under question, Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo.22 The
Again, this is to use Valerie Bunce’s phrase in a direction different from that intended in ‘Socialist 
Unemployment...’, 951
The former was Agitprop chief and wrote several lively and worthwhile texts, although frequently unreliable 
on particulars. For his post-war experiences before his fall from grace as Tito’s highest ranking dissident see:
9memoirs of Tito’s closest companions and rivals for succession for much of this time Edvard 
Kardelj and Aleksandar Rankovic are of less value, with the former concentrating on foreign 
relations in the early years and the latter on the final two years of the factional show-down in 
the mid-1960s.23 The definitive biography of Tito is still to be written but Vladimir Dedijer’s 
classic from the 1950s remains influential and Geoffrey Swain’s recent attempt, based in part 
on archival research, is phenomenally good on Tito’s formative political experiences and also 
foreign policy, which are indispensible to understanding various domestic choices.24 Recent 
studies of Yugoslav foreign policy also suggest that despite the ideological aspects of Tito’s 
behaviour, he was never ready to give up independence and could only accept closer union 
with the East on his own terms.25 Dijana Plestina conducted a study in the 1980s based 
largely on interviews with relevant economic policy-makers and their attitudes to regional 
policy, which remains a unique and valuable contribution.26
Economic accounts and sociological studies of self-management provide important 
background information. The Yugoslav system, indeed, spawned an entire literature on the
Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis o f the Communist System, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1983; The Unperfect Society: Beyond the New Class, London: Methuen, 1969; Rise and Fall, San Diego: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985; Druzenje s Titom, Harrow: Aleksa Djilas, 1980. For a useful biography, see 
Djilas: the progress of a revolutionary, Hounslow: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983. Tempo was a flamboyant 
figure who held key posts in the army, industry, economy as a whole and the trade unions in this period. The 
second volume o f his Revolucija koja leie  - Memoari, 2 Volumes Beograd, Komunist, 1971, gives much more 
sense o f economic goings on than Djilas who appears not to have paid particular attention to policy-making.
Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences—The Struggle for Recognition and Independence the New Yugoslavia, 1944- 
1957, London: Blond & Briggs in association with Summerfield Press, 1982. Aleksandar Rankovid, DnevniCke 
zabeleSke, Beograd, Jugoslovenska knjiga, 2001. Neither has earned a scholarly biography, although the opus of 
Dejan Jovi6 is unique in taking Kardelj’s political thought seriously. See especially ‘Communist Yugoslavia and 
Its “Others”*, in Lampe and Mazower (eds.), Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth Century 
Southeastern Europe, CEU Press 2004; ‘Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism, From Tito to Kardelj’, in 
Dejan Djokid, Yugoslavism: histories o f a failed idea, ¡918-1992, London: Hurst & Co., 2003., and Jugoslavia, 
Driava koja je  odumrla: Uspon, kriza ip a d  Cetvrte Jugoslavije (1974-1990), Samizdat B92, Beograd 
Vladimir Dedijer, Tito Speaks: His Self Portrait and Struggle with Stalin, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1953, complemented by the third volume o f  documents published after Tito’s death, Novi prilozi za biografiju 
Josipa Broza Tita, Rijeka: Zagreb: Libumija; 1981. and Geoffrey Swain, T ito-A  Biography, I.B.Tauris 
&Co. Ltd,London, 2011
See especially Svetozar Rajak, Reconciliation, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War, 
London: Routledge, 2011. See also for relationship with the West: Keeping Tito Afloat: the United States, 
Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997 
Dijana PleStina, Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences, ed: 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992
10
so-called labour-managed firm, which is an indispensible source on various micro-economic 
trends but remains problematic in so far as it too frequently involved model-building for 
which the Yugoslav experience provided a test-case rather than development of typologies of 
the really-existing system.27 The self-critical retrospective by Saul Estrin and Milica Uvalic 
admitted that the ‘literature offered only modest insights into the operation of the Yugoslav 
economy, primarily because Yugoslavia did not satisfy many of the basic assumptions of the 
model. The socialist features of the Yugoslav economy remained dominant, suppressing 
many of the elements of economic democracy.’28 Put pithily, the theory never ‘said anything 
about government policy’.29 Various other economic studies all too frequently had the 
diametrically opposite flaw, for they were fixated on berating the Yugoslavs for not 
implementing free markets enough.30 David Dyker provided a more thoughtful version, 
providing a well-researched assessment of some of the similarities in effect but differences in 
mechanism between Yugoslav and Soviet economic policy in the post-war period,31 while 
Svetozar Pejovich pursued legislation through the 1950s and argued that ‘the Yugoslav 
experiment has increased the scope and freedom to innovate and has supplied incentives to 
innovate since 1953’.32 Regional unevenness famously blighted the Yugoslav economy, 
invariably blamed on the lack of coherent strategy to develop the less industrial areas.33 Few 
economic histories tried to systematically work out the impact on the Yugoslav economy of
27 The literature here is significant but for the works o f  such authors as Ward, Vanek, Horvat and Estrin, see the 
overview provided by Howard M. Wachtel, Workers ’ Management and Workers ’ Wages in Yugoslavia: The 
Theory and Practice of Participatory Socialism, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1973.
Saul Estrin and Milica Uvalic, ‘From Illyria towards capitalism: did labour-management theory teach us 
anything about Yugoslavia and transition in its successor states?’ in Comparative Economic Studies (2008) 50, 
663-696
29 See Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 15
30 See for instance: Harold Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism: Theory and Practice, Oxford, Clarendon, 1984; Ljubo 
Sire, The Yugoslav Economy under Self-management, MacMillan Press, London, 1979; and Joseph
T.Bombelles, Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia, 1947-1964, The Hoover Institution o f War, 
Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 1968.
David Dyker, Yugoslavia: Socialism, Development and Debt, Routledge, London, 1990 
Svetozar Pejovich, The Market-planned Economy o f Yugoslavia, University o f Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1966 122
See PleStina, Regional Development. See also F. E. Ian Hamilton, Yugoslavia: Patterns o f Economic Activity, 
Bell, 1968.
11
international factors.34 The best overviews remain those produced by the Yugoslav 
economists themselves.35 As for sociological studies, the tendency was for the study of single 
workplaces or comparison of several to establish the view from the workplace, without 
establishing wider sociologies of power relations.36
The emphasis in this thesis is, to once again borrow Woodward’s terminology, ‘to restore 
attention to what [this account] considers...conflicts to have been about -  at base, about a 
search for the optimal development of material life and the corresponding organization of 
social life, then about control over economic resources, and only in that context about the 
political instruments necessary for those goals.’37 There were several key instances, therefore. 
First, in relation to accumulation for the sake of development,38 this thesis posits that the 
Yugoslav Communists certainly were consistent in seeking outside sources of capital as a 
sine qua non for emerging from what they perceived as underdevelopment. When the source 
of aid moved from East to West following 1948, this led to a shift from indirect forms of 
competitive accumulation to ever more direct forms. Put concretely, the Yugoslav search for 
modem industry forced the country into a debt trap, which forced an ever greater orientation 
towards the world market. All investments, goods and services began to be valued from that 
perspective. Crucially, debates on the wage system, closely tied to the self-management 
sector, became directly tied to the balance of payments issue and to comparisons with labour
34 See Woodward, Socialist Unemployment., Chapter 7.
See Branko Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, The First Labor-managed Economy in the Making, 
White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1976; Rudolf Bidanid, Economic policy in Socialist Yugoslavia, London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973; DuSan Bilandiid, Stipe Tonkovid, Samoupravljanje, 1950-1974, Zagreb: 
Globus, 1974
See for contemporary instances, Jiri Kolaja, Workers ’ Councils: The Yugoslav Experience, Tavistock 
Publications, London, 1965; and Vojin Hadiistevid et al, Tendencija i praksa neposrednog upravljanja radnika 
u ekonomskim jedinicama, Institut druStvenih nauka, Beograd, 1963. Later classical statements were similar: 
Josip Zupanov, Samoupravljanje i drustvena moc: prilozi za sociologiju samoupravne radne organizacije, 
Zagreb: NaSe teme, 1969
37 ibid., 33
M. Haynes and R. Husan, ‘Whether by Visible or Invisible Hand: the intractable problem o f Russian and East 
European Catch-up’, Competition and Change, vol. 6, no.3,2002, 269-287
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productivity on an international scale. This all led to a set of economic reforms in 1961, 
which amounted to the first attempt to develop an export-oriented economy.39
Second, each major adjustment to the international scene necessitated a different mode of 
organising the workplace and the polity. Relations with the shop-floor and the working class 
institutions followed both the imperative to accumulate and to transform society. The market 
replaced administrative and extensive labour mobilisation as the dominant expression of the 
‘politics of productivity’,40 while the ‘politics of mobilisation’ moved from attempts to attain 
a state capable of moving ‘all of society’s resources towards a common goal’ to more 
narrowly political, participatory and educational methods to achieve less grandiose but more 
intensive aims.41
Third, changes to industrial and state-society relations provoked different sections of the 
working class to actively negotiate and resist the imperatives of higher echelons. Relations 
were fundamentally conflictual, and fought over control of the work process and its fruits. 
Pressures from below duly affected the terrain on which political struggles were conducted, 
especially since the Communists saw themselves as both guardians of development and social 
transformation. Different groups and echelons within the elites began to emerge with 
different emphases about how to respond to new situations. Splits opened over whether to 
emphasise economic or political methods, centralisation and decentralisation, material or 
moral rewards, gradualism or radicalism, elitism or populism, pedagogical or exhortative 
forms of persuasion, persuasion or coercion, participation or mobilisation. Yet these followed
39 See Diane Flaherty, ‘Economic reform and foreign trade in Yugoslavia’, in Cambridge Journal of Economics 
1982,6,105-143
For the classic rendition in the Soviet case, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of  
Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politics o f Mobilisation: Ideas, Power and Terror in Inter-war Russia, 35. 
See more generally, 1-57
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certain patterns. Fearful of East and West, leading Communists anxiously monitored for signs 
from less skilled workers of potential weakness towards equalising tendencies and populist or 
centralising political actors, who could potentially develop pro-Soviet leanings; similarly, 
they shut down overly liberal tendencies within the leadership for fear of losing Party 
dominance among the more skilled or the directors and opening the door to the return of 
multi-party democracy or private property, which could all too clearly creep up through 
social-democratic tendencies. A third potential danger came from syndicalist or purely 
working class elements but because of the overall weakness of the working class, the task for 
the various actors remained to prevent an independent political line forming in the unions. 
This tendency remained latent throughout and indeed contributed more to the politics of the 
1950s than has hitherto been recognised.
Fourth, with time it became clear that these patterns had begun to tend towards the creation of 
fixed formations, or factions, a dominant market reform wing and a subordinate conservative 
political wing of the ruling Party. These represented in turn heterogeneous forces but 
unambiguous dividing lines from each other, following a major market reform of the system 
prompted by domestic pressures from below and the Hungarian Revolution. The reform came 
into effect only at the start of 1958, yet instantly caused the first open labour strikes in the ; 
post-war period. These rocked the edifice and forced the different coalitions into ways of 
forestalling pressure from below, which multiplied divergences between them over time and, 
with market reform intensifying regional imbalances, caused serious tendencies towards 
régionalisation of the factions, with more developed regions preferring greater 
decentralisation and less developed more centralisation. The unions under new leadership 
took a market reform line but on a federal ticket, pushing for further liberalisation. This was 
attained in 1961 and they were promptly sidelined in favour of more regional actors
14
following the first post-split recession and the inability of either wing to win a decisive 
mandate in head-on collisions in 1962.
The Yugoslav Setting
Before moving on to the sources and thesis structure, it is necessary to briefly outline the 
institutional and regional mosaic that characterised Yugoslavia through much of this period. 
The country itself was created after the First World War and united territories of vastly 
diverse historical, socio-economic, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, national, religious and political 
traditions. Its north-western section comprised formerly Austro-Hungarian lands. Serbia and 
Montenegro had been independent states before unification, while the southern regions had 
until just before the First World War been parts of the Ottoman Empire. The question of how 
to govern such a multinational country dominated its inter-war existence with Serb-Croat 
relations being particularly fractious and with more widespread resentment at perceived 
Serbian domination informing the worldview of many opposition forces.42 The Second World 
War swept the country away and its resurrection following the war was largely the 
achievement of the multinational character of the Communist-led partisan movement. Its 
promise of federalism ensured that the country retained a level of complex constitutional 
design intended to prevent the resurgence of any hegemonic project threatening, as the 
Communists perceived it, the newfound ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ established through 
common struggle against the invaders and their domestic allies.43
42 r
See particularly Banac, National Question., and Djokic, Elusive Compromise. See also Aleksa Djilas, The 
Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
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A general overview is now provided by Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler's New Disorder, The Second World War 
in Yugoslavia, Hurst & Company, London, 2008..
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The federal structure went through several major metamorphoses, moving from a Stalin- 
inspired constitution in 1946, through a new self-management Constitutional Law in 1953, 
towards a new constitution in 1963. The federation remained throughout this period the 
ultimate political and economic actor, whether directly through ministries and directorates or 
indirectly through setting the budget and control of investment, while the component parts in 
the form of the republics, as well as lower echelons of local government, underwent constant 
reforms, sometimes at bewildering pace. Whereas before 1952, during the so-called 
administrative period, the state played a directive role through nationalisation, an obligatory 
national plan and a unified budget, the period after came to be characterised as the 
decentralised epoch. The comparative importance of local government increased through the 
1950s and its initial atomisation began to give way to consolidation through the decade. One 
of the main authorities on the process summarises some of the major trends for the 1950s: 
‘The new economic philosophy stressed that the means of production and the output achieved 
belonged neither to the workers, nor to the Federation, Republics or communes, but “to all of 
them in accordance with the social functions represented by each.” Accordingly decision­
making power in the economy was divided between the workers’ collectives on the one side, 
and the organs of the Federation, Republics and local government on the other. It was a very 
complex relationship, regulated by the mechanisms of planning, budgeting, management and 
auditing.’44 Social self-management extended rights of participation and management from 
the workplace to a myriad of social institutions and local self-government, passing authority 
from career officials to elected groups of experts and citizens. The workplace retained special 
representation on the parliamentary level since the Council of Producers to which workplaces 
elected delegates was one of the houses of the bicameral Federal National Assembly.45 The
Frits W. Hondius, Yugoslav Community of Nations, Mouton, The Hague, 1968,213
See ibid., 192-194.
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entire edifice was kept together by means of legislation: ‘Whatever withered away, 
legislation as a function of the State certainly did not.’46
The role of the Communist Party (after 1952, the League of Communists) also underwent 
significant alteration after the war and the split with Stalin. The same occurred to the various 
mass organisations that the Party had built before or during the war to involve the masses in 
the struggle for power. This most famously included the Popular Front (after 1953, the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia) which became the umbrella of the mass 
organisations after the Communist take-over of power. It co-ordinated their work and 
conducted mass political work. The trade unions also became part of the Popular Front and 
played a key role in industrial relations throughout. At first, the leadership of the Communist 
Party sought to use the apparatus at its disposal to seize power and eliminate all opposition, 
though it is probable that the Communists in Yugoslavia held greater popular support than in 
most other European countries. It also saw the panoply of mass organisations as a 
transmission belt for mobilising the masses for the tasks of development and social 
transformation. After the self-management reforms of 1950, most of these organisations had 
to formally separate from most sources of power from the top downwards. They had to lead 
more by persuasion than command. Their hierarchical structure began to give way to more 
territorial-functional divisions. Nevertheless, they retained a monopoly on the key leavers of 
federal power and assured themselves of representation in all the organs of self-management. 
The leading bodies of the Communist Party remained the top decision-making forum in the 
country, to which the state, as well as the political organisations, remained subordinate. All of 
the organisations under the Communists reflected in their instances of organisation a similar 
make-up to the state, with federal, republic and local bodies, with power flowing up and
46 ibid. , 216
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down as constitutional changes dictated. The unions had industrial branches as well as 
regional boards, such that they retained for a long time a more federal and vertical component 
to their structures, which repeatedly came under attack. Their umbilical connection with the 
organs of self-management in the workplace, as co-initiators with the government of the first 
directive on the establishment of workers’ councils in industry, their supervisory role over the 
system of self-management, and their role as initiators of elections to workers’ councils make 
them a remarkably under-researched component of the Yugoslav power relations.47
Sources
Through much of this period, therefore, until the final years, initiatives in socio-economic and 
political relations tended to come from the federal leadership even if they had to respond to 
pressures lower down. Documents pertaining to the major forums of the party-state where 
decisions took place or were debated are uneven in their accessibility, preservation and 
quality. Their usefulness is best categorised according to periods. For the period up to 1953, 
major state decision-making forums were available. This thesis in particular consults the 
papers of the Federal Economic Council which co-ordinated the work of the economic 
ministries and policy-making forums. The role of the Economic Council was central to the 
First Five-Year Plan and the birth of the self-management system. Its papers were exceptional 
and form the backbone of much of the early part of the thesis. On the level of the Party, the 
funds of the Politburo (later the Executive Committee), the Central Committee Plenums and 
the Organisational Secretariat, remained the major sources, although the Politburo materials 
were often simply notes of decisions taken and are entirely missing for the key year 1953,
For a more detailed explanation see Lilly, Power and Persuasion, Chapter 2. For a superb study o f reform in 
the 1960s, see April Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: The Changing Role of the Party, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982. For the struggle for power in the immediate post-war period, the only detailed 
work remains Vojislav KoStunica and Kosta CavoSki, Party pluralism or monism: social movements and the 
political system in Yugoslavia, 1944-1949, Boulder: New York: East European Monographs; 1985
18
apparently because materials close to the leadership were kept to a minimum and dispersed in 
view of the threat of the USSR.48 The archival materials relating to Tito’s office have become 
available but are sparse on self-management matters. More time would have yielded better 
results but the fund is sparingly used for the purposes of the thesis. Unfortunately, funds 
pertaining to many key decision-makers remain thin, unavailable or without classification, 
including over 90 boxes of Kardelj’s office in Belgrade. Most key actors have since died or 
are in advanced old age, making interviews extremely difficult or unreliable.
By comparison, the leading bodies of the Popular Front and trade unions provide much more 
of a sense for the dynamism of policy-making in relation to the self-management sector. 
While for the post-1953 period, government papers become hard to come by, with only texts 
of laws rather than records of discussions littering the various forums of the Federal 
Executive Council, debates in any case frequently found their way into the leading bodies of 
the Party and mass organisations. Since major turning points came to be discussed in the 
Executive Committee sessions and Central Committee Plenums, the reasoning behind 
decisions and concomitant debates can often be detected. In the post-195 8 period, it is 
exclusively the Party bodies that become the focus of study, since the funds of the mass 
organisations stop rather abruptly in 1959-1960. Nevertheless, the exceptional quality of the 
materials, particularly the key debate in the Executive Committee in spring 1962, provide 
such wealth of information on the reasoning of different tendencies and factions, that a 
chapter based solely on these appeared entirely suitable.
The State, Party and mass organisations had their feedback mechanisms which indicated 
more than intra- and inter-elite conflicts. They often captured the dynamic of state-society
48 See also Preface to Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, esp. xii
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relations. While for the early period, echoes of stirrings from below frequently registered 
even at the highest levels, as the Five-Year Plan envisaged massive labour mobilisation and 
necessitated close supervision of the labour process, this became more difficult to detect post- 
1953. Instead, the papers of the Party Organisational-Political Secretariat attached to the 
Party Central Committee and the records in the Plenums and Presidency of the Central 
Council of the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions in particular become central to 
understanding the context in which decisions took place. Reports from union branches on 
their own activity and the activity of the workers’ councils gave some sense of industrial 
relations. Major gaps remained given the narrow purview of many union activists, such that 
newspaper reports and the works of contemporary observers often aided attempts at major 
informed generalisations.49 Some documents have also apparently been lost such that Olivera 
Milosavljevic, who alone worked on many of the same union materials, kindly provided 
copies of key texts relating to the first draft of the directive setting up workers’ councils.
This thesis consulted in addition daily or weekly publications that gave some sense of daily 
activity or what the emphasis of what policy-makers wanted lower echelons or the public to 
know. Thus newspapers like the Belgrade daily Politika and weekly NIN complemented the 
Party and then Socialist Alliance paper Borba and the union voice Rad. The official 
theoretical organ of the Party Komunist and other official or semi-official publications like 
Partiska izgradnja, Socijalizam and Nasa Stvarnost, as well as academic journals like 
Sociologija and Ekonomska politika based in Belgrade, and Ekonomski Pregled from Zagreb, 
gave a broader sense of intellectual trends and social life, though they are rarely directly 
cited. The contemporary publications of policy-makers, social scientists and politicians, often 
cited by historians, as well as memoirs, served to plug gaps for thinking at the top. Forays
49 n  ♦
Particularly useful was the work o f Benjamin Ward, ‘From Marx to Barone: Socialism and the Postwar 
Yugoslav Industrial Firm’, PhD Diss., Department of Economics, University o f California and Berkley, 1956.
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into government publications like the Sluzbeni list and Statisticki godisnjak provided raw 
legislation, verification and clarification about the claims of various historians, and acted as a 
(poor) substitute for lack of general social histories of the period.
Thesis Structure
The thesis takes a broadly chronological approach and is divided in three chapters. The first, 
concentrating on the years 1948 to 1952 but with a section on 1945-1948, establishes that the 
system pre-1948 did not amount to a separate road from the USSR either in terms of where 
the leadership thought it was going or in terms of its practice, and that a separate road only 
arose with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the nascent Soviet bloc. This insight is 
necessary in order to establish distance from the revisionist accounts which appear too keen 
on studying continuities across 1948 sometimes in the face of major evidence to the contrary. 
Certainly, the discontinuities in approaches to the international market, to labour 
mobilisation, and to the pattern of political conflict and rule all emerged against the 
background of the break with Moscow. The realisation that a turn to the West alone could 
provide long-term security led to the restructuring of the economic edifice inherited from 
Stalinism. This necessitated ideological cover and self-management provided it. 
Nevertheless, the choice of self-management was not merely a whimsical decision or derived 
from the texts of classical Marxism. Rather, it was a response to the strength of labour on the 
shop-floor as a result of the exceptional level of mobilisation in 1949 that led to the inability 
of the party-state to impose its will on a highly mobile and self-conscious working class. 
Struggles over the role workers’ councils would play developed between the unions and the 
government that resulted in several compromises ever less favourable to the union side. 
Between 1950 and 1952, with economic recession and demobilisation of the body politic, the
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choice for gradualism, markets, decentralised elitism and persuasion appeared entirely 
rational and contrasted with the pre-1948 period. The reforms duly demanded changes in the 
mode of work of the Party and the mass organisations. This necessitated a radical push on the 
ideological front that set the stage for the new forms of political conflict among the elites at 
the Sixth Party Congress and the associated call for ‘the withering away of the Party’.
The second chapter, which charts events from 1953 to 1958, begins by reinterpreting the 
crisis surrounding the fall-out from the Sixth Party Congress both above and below. Indeed, 
by stressing the latter, with the associated fear among top Communists that the faulty 
mechanisms of the new economic system were giving rise to disintegrative tendencies that 
pulled local demoralised Communists and threatened the rise of an alliance of populist 
directors and the peasantry, the Djilas case which followed the Congress by just over a year 
proved to be the culmination rather than the beginning of a new process at the top. This 
reinforced the need for political methods, discipline, administrative intervention in the 
economy and extreme caution and gradualism. Changes to the economic system managed not 
to alleviate the structural problems of rising urban population and falling agricultural 
production and necessitated drastic re-orientation. The pace of re-orientation was, however, 
outdone by the building of pressures of below such that nerves became jittery among the 
Yugoslav Communists in 1956 when the Hungarian Revolution threatened to spill over from 
below rather than above. Acceleration of reform therefore followed, conditioned by the need 
to overcome equalisation tendencies on the one hand and the change in terms of aid from the 
West from a grant to a loan basis on the other. At this delicate moment, the emerging market 
reform coalition feared the rise of a centralising and populist reaction to the demands from 
below. Consequently, different actors and echelons within this coalition in the party-state 
began to act to re-engage popular constituencies with the market reform wing but they did not
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do so in synchrony, massively raising expectations on the shop-floor by organising the first 
Congress of Workers’ Councils. Just as the new market-oriented reforms came into force in 
1958, though, so the first labour strike broke out, bringing the unity of the party-state into 
question and provoking a conservative reaction.
The third chapter, somewhat shorter than the preceding two in view of the different array of 
evidence at its disposal, maps the rise of factions in the party-state from the first labour 
strikes in early 1958 to the open breakdown in relations in the federal apex in early 1962. Its 
stress is on showing the re-shuffles within the factions, showing the rise of regional actors 
and their displacement of more all-Yugoslav ones. This followed the inability of either wing 
to win a decisive victory in 1961-1962. The market reform coalition did take more advanced 
positions, with the unions having acted as a battering ram for the reforms up to 1962. Their 
role, however, began to be eclipsed as it became clear that the reform wing in the Party in 
Slovenia in particular was prepared to begin to mobilise independently to gain advantage. As 
the most export-oriented and richest republic, Slovenia had an interest in furthering the 
economic reforms of 1961 rather than moderating them. Meanwhile, the conservative faction, 
despite its ambition to centralise political controls as the way out of the crisis, began to 
visibly withdraw from the federal arena as well, with the chief federal representative of the 
conservative faction complaining about threats to the unity of his home republic, Serbia. This 
in effect suggested that, when tested, the various wings downplayed their commitment to all- 
Yugoslav solutions and hoped to use republic levers to attain federal goals. Thus, without 
giving up on the goal of winning the country to their own conception, both wings had chosen 
to use a method diametrically opposed to their end. That could only bode ill for the future of 
the unity of the country.
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Chapter 1 — ‘Factories to the Workers!’ 1948-1952
Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the period between the formal expulsion of Yugoslavia from the 
Cominform in June 1948 to the zenith of the reform project in November 1952 at the KPJ’s 
Sixth Congress. It first sets out the case for viewing the break with the USSR as a point of 
rupture. Prior to 1948, political radicalism and economic technocracy characterised the 
leadership approach. Nevertheless, the first Yugoslav five-year plan encountered severe 
difficulties even before confrontation with the Soviet Union erupted. The return of 
hierarchies in the party and mass organisations, the intensification of the transformation of 
the countryside and the resort to extraordinary labour mobilisation began even before the 
exchange of letters with the CPSU leadership. So did forms of decentralisation as the scaling 
down of the five-year plan proved necessary. These processes all escalated after the break as 
the Eastern economic blockade and military threat necessitated the re-orientation of trade and 
defence policy, particularly between the Second and Third Plenums of the CC KPJ in January 
and December 1949. Guarantees of Yugoslav sovereignty at the United Nations in late 1949 
combined with domestic exhaustion of radical labour mobilisation to persuade the Yugoslav 
leadership to pursue a more moderate approach.
Self-management in the form of advisory workers’ councils had first appeared as an idea in 
the spring of that year during the concerted campaign by the centre to provide moral 
incentives to undermine bureaucratic resistances to the plan at lower levels of the party-state.
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As it emerged in experimental form some time later, however, at the turn of the year, 
following the concerted attempt to reverse the mobilisation of the summer and autumn, self- 
management instead amounted to an assault on the power of labour on the shop-floor. Its 
official inauguration in mid-1950 furthermore served to ideologically justify massive 
reductions in public sector employment. Nevertheless, self-management was more than 
simply an ex post excuse for pragmatic tactical measures to recover macroeconomic balances. 
Resting, as it did, on the explicit undertaking to devolve economic and political power in an 
anti-statist direction and towards decentralised actors, it implied also the gradual recalibration 
of microeconomic incentives, collective and individual, moral and material, positive and 
negative, away from the one-sided preferences of the preceding period. Self-management 
resembled a new social contract based on market socialism. The transformation of the state, 
party and mass organisations duly followed to decentralise initiative, prioritise persuasion 
over coercion and strengthen legality over arbitrariness. Yet all this depended on the 
resumption of growth.
The KPJ leadership was in fact banking on future receipts of economic and military aid from 
the West, which duly came to be negotiated in mid-1951 and received in ample supply from 
mid-1952, as the basis for this new orientation. It envisaged in the future an open economy of 
worker-run enterprises with minimal state interference. Reality acted as a brake on these 
ambitions, however. The perceived weakness of the Yugoslav economy in the face of the 
industrialised and militarised blocs, and the pursuit of national independence, recommended 
the pursuit of import-substitution and the building of heavy industry as the basis for future 
development. Domestic regional tensions, exacerbated by decentralisation and market 
measures, impaired the creation of economies of scale and in fact demanded some 
recentralisation to create a functioning internal market. That militated against regional
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redistribution where no geopolitical or economic returns were obvious. Raising labour 
productivity, moreover, could not occur on the basis of perpetual self-sacrifice and coercion, 
yet the imperative of completing the heavy industry projects diverted scarce resources away 
from the production of consumer goods. Moves to incentivise economising, innovation, 
training, effort and better organisation of work did take place but remained limited as the 
country continued to experience recession. Yet, despite the external balance of payments 
developing into a problem, regional tensions simmering and social apathy spreading, the KPJ 
convened its Sixth Congress to proclaim its own transformation in line with the new 
decentralised market socialist system.
Part I-Before the split with Stalin: 1945-1948
Before considering the evolution of the Yugoslav system after the break with Stalin, it is 
necessary to establish its main features pre-1948 in order to explain levels of continuity and 
discontinuity. This period was indeed a formative one and marked the rise up the hierarchy of 
younger party members loyal to Tito at the expense of pre-war and wartime rivals. The 
changeover in April 1946, as this section demonstrates, had as much to do with conflicts over 
development strategy as with personal enmities. While neither was monolithic, the dominant 
group in the inner party leadership certainly took a more independent line towards the USSR, 
appearing more willing to rely on domestic sources of accumulation than its more regionalist 
opponents. More than that, it was the comparative radicalism and populism of the former 
faction that distinguished it from the more gradualist and technocratic group. The five-year 
plan commencing in spring 1947 reflected the strength of the radicals. It called for rapid 
industrialisation but gradualism in the countryside; and fiscal rather than administrative
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methods in running the economy but political and hierarchical forms of labour mobilisation. 
The predominance of the priorities associated with Tito’s group was clearer in the 
ambitiousness of the plan than its mechanisms. Soviet planners in fact deemed the plan over- 
ambitious. As 1947 progressed, moreover, emerging East-West tensions made procurement 
of essential imports difficult for the Yugoslavs. This forced ever greater reliance on coercive 
and political techniques towards town and countryside alike. The KPJ continued to trust in 
the USSR, and indeed carefully cultivated a close relationship with Moscow. For the Soviet 
presence mattered in world affairs, and the geopolitical security it provided increased 
domestic policy latitude for Belgrade. With the beginning of the quarrel, however, that 
latitude ended and the almost total exclusion of the pro-Soviet minority from the party 
conditioned immediate policy choices further towards radicalism.
‘Renewal ’ and the April Crisis: towards NEP
Partisan forces led by the KPJ alongside elements of the Soviet army liberated Belgrade in 
October 1944.1 This gesture perhaps more than any other symbolised the new brotherhood in 
international relations on which the KPJ hoped to found its new state following a devastating 
war. The treaty of friendship signed between Yugoslavia and the USSR in April 1945 even 
before the cessation of hostilities in Europe deepened that impression.2 The reality on the 
ground, however, was that direct Soviet aid for immediate post-war reconstruction was 
limited. The Soviet Union had suffered massively in the war and its priorities were elsewhere. 
Yugoslavia instead relied on supplies and services from the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) worth $415.6 million from the start of the
1 See Pavlowitch, Hitler’s New Disorder, 215-238
2 Peroviö, ‘The Tito-Stalin Split’, 39
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programme in April 1945 to its termination in June 1947.3 Nevertheless, that was not enough 
by itself to make up for the tremendous material and human losses in the war, among the 
highest in Europe: one in nine had died, 3.5 million had been left homeless, production was 
running at less than a third of pre-war capacity with tens of thousands of skilled workers and 
professionals killed, and the permanent destruction of significant industrial and transport 
infrastructure made political administration in an already complex setting a major challenge.4 
The KPJ therefore had to look to domestic sources of accumulation to renew the country. 
This would involve exhorting and coercing workers and peasants to unpaid labour and 
extensive self-sacrifice. Yet the Party also sought to widen its following and secure a 
mandate to govern. Therein lay its early and intractable predicament.
This was particularly obvious in the period until the elections in November 1945 but 
continued until April 1946. The Communists’ relationship with the working class in 
particular was contradictory. The KPJ experienced significant turbulence from below as the 
end of the war brought enthusiasm for change. The raised expectations of the population did 
not always translate into energies and directions that the Party could channel. Thus when the 
Central Committee of the KPJ decided to call for the establishment of a single and united 
trade union in late 1944,5 it could hardly have expected that the actual top-down formation of 
the United Trade Unions of Workers and Employees of Yugoslavia (JSRNJ) in early 1945 
would lead to the empowerment of the shop-floor against management, professionals and the 
state itself. The Communists hoped that the establishment of the minimum wage, social 
security and guaranteed state-directed supply of consumer goods, inaugurated at the Second
Lampe, John R, Russel O. Prickett, LjubiSa Adamovié, Yugoslav-American Economic Relations since World 
War II, Durham, M C - Duke University Press, 1990,21
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Plenum of the JSRNJ, would engender more enthusiasm for tasks of reconstruction.6 This 
was not to be the case. A meeting of the Politburo in August 1945 complained that 
production was falling, productivity declining and workers giving themselves wage rises 
amid the failure of guaranteed state provisioning to prevent price rises on the black market.7 
The opposition too had begun to organise, and shocked party leaders singled out a priest 
being elected secretary of a regional union branch as especially odious.8 They worried too 
because a well-known pre-war social democrat had had to be ejected from the founding union 
conference in Serbia lest he organised against the KPJ.9 The local party organisations in 
general appeared to be unreliable, defiant of management and taking advantage of corruption 
in government.10 A trade union report in January 1946 described the situation troubling party 
leaders:
‘Many local union heads have disabled the productive apparatus and brought 
production to 70—50% of its normal capacity, instead of working with the 
management of the enterprise in working out enterprise plans, they fired and hired 
workers, staff and managers, according to what the workers decided at meetings.
They showed no care in relation to experts or organisers of production. For them 
every manager was good if he did not demand of workers to come to work on 
time, [did not] prevent them leaving work early, prevent them going slow on the 
job, who did not ask for justification for their absences, and similar. Many 
responsible people in the economic-managerial apparatus -  in order to gain cheap 
popularity became bad union functionaries. They wanted to be tribunes of the 
oppressed but ended up as charlatans. ’11
The inability of the KPJ to stamp its authority on the union movement endangered the 
electoral campaign of the Communist-dominated Popular Front. The leadership feared that 
radicalism would alienate more moderate allies. One newspaper article entitled ‘Work in the 
unions should not come at the expense of work in the Front’ warned that ‘[t]he elaboration of
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a particular programme of the working class would play into the hands of those who want to 
break up the Popular Front’.12 As the election came closer, though, the union paper became 
ever less neutral, attacking the Democratic Party candidates or elaborating on why the unions 
could not be neutral about who controlled the state.13 Once the electorate had 
overwhelmingly returned a Popular Front government, albeit in conditions not entirely free 
and fair,14 the Communist hierarchy dominating the unions passed over to the offensive. It 
tried to assert itself on the shop-floor in accordance with the wishes of the KPJ leadership. 
Indeed, the Politburo had concluded the previous August that it wanted changes to a law 
passed in July 1945 that had created the office of the workers’ representative (poverenik), to 
be elected in each enterprise and empowered to be in ‘permanent contact with state 
organizations, the management of the enterprise and the union branch’.15 The provision was 
to be abolished but that would not occur until mid-1946 with the Basic Law on State 
Economic Enterprises.16 Thus the union believed it had to impose itself in the elections of 
January and February 1946 for the new office of workers’ representatives. The result was to 
further antagonise the working class and earn the union official indictments for ‘voluntarism’: 
the press reported that local union branches failed to consult the workforce when composing 
lists of candidates for the elections, provoking workers to present opposition lists of their 
own.17
State power was in Communist hands, then, but state-worker relations were increasingly 
fractious as the unions planned to move from the more political tasks to the more economic
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ones laid down by the August Politburo meeting: ‘raising...discipline and developing shock 
work and [socialist] competition.’18 The JSRNJ leadership announced a competition in 
honour of May Day.19 It was in scale to be greater than the minor competitions hitherto 
organised locally to overcome immediate problems. They now had to follow the six-month 
plan compulsory for all industry drawn up in December of 1945, which meant that the point 
was not to increase production by extending working time but to perform more complex 
economic and organisational tasks of wider significance by targeted storming. Lowering costs 
of production through better organisation and intensification of work, establishing norms, 
economising on costs and increasing care for social property were goals that the Federal 
Economic Council set for the unions.20 The results economically were uneven across 
branches but the projected overall figure for growth was achieved.21 2
Nevertheless, while a strategy towards labour was forming in economic terms, it was not 
developing without serious problems. The Third Plenum of the JSRNJ held in June 1946 took 
a retrospective look at the success and perspectives of emulation and shock work. It took 
the position that these methods had proven successful and ought to be extended and 
regularised with bi-annual culminations for May Day and the Day of the Republic in 
November.23 Yet the period’s relative success held primarily in terms of output but not its 
transformative goals. Thus while workers had apparently increased production, they had 
predominantly done so on an extensive rather than intensive basis.24 Often, this was because 
of their own strength on the shop floor: they wanted material gain for their work and so they
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sabotaged the setting of norms to generally lower them and earn better for overtime.25 That 
attitude wreaked havoc on attempts to reduce costs, plan production and raise the overall 
standard. Moreover, the union apparatus did not find it easy to adapt: ‘before, we organised 
the sabotage, today we have to organise emulation’:27 so the union often took the side of 
workers against management in disputes or even tried to run production instead of organising 
mobilisation;28 it was unprofessional or slack in collecting evidence for use by higher 
organs; and often shared popular beliefs that hard work or technical innovation should be 
rewarded over improvement in work organisation.30 Overall, the union leaders agreed that a 
more holistic approach had yet to be attained as political and cultural-educational work had 
suffered at the expense of narrow economic efforts.31 Workers had to accept the goals of the 
reform for it to work.32 Some apparent pre-war members in the leadership did express 
concern that worker protection had lost priority for union work, showing that attitudes were 
slow to change even at the top.33 Poor co-ordination with the state,34 friction with enterprise 
directors35 and poor working conditions lent some credibility to their views though.36
The KPJ was, therefore, encountering problems in the political and economic spheres. Its 
fundamental belief that its rule was tantamount to rule by the working class, and its 
expectation that workers would begin to act selflessly and according to plan, had run into 
manifest trouble. Workers fought back against attempts to impose party-state control over the
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labour process in much the same way as before the war. The KPJ found itself suffocating
self-organisation and self-initiative precisely where it had fostered it before. Even on a more
basic level, the truth was that the KPJ, following years of rural guerrilla war, no longer had
deep roots in the urban areas. On the contrary, its base was in the peasant army, whose
members were not uncommonly hostile to workers. Annual party reports from the republics
and regions to the federal centre revealed that the party stood better in the countryside than in
working class areas. The report for 1946 from the most developed republic, Slovenia, was
illustrative of the dilemmas faced and was indeed damning. It is worth quoting at length:
‘One of the chief weaknesses of our Party is that we don’t have Party people 
[Partijaca] in the industrial centres. This weakness is felt in the whole work 
and quality of the Party. In industrial centres...party organisations are 
numerically and politically very weak. The CC itself did not pay enough 
attention to this. In Maribor where there are 17,000 industrial workers, there 
are hardly 430 members of the Party. In the car factory in Tezno where 1200 
workers are employed there are 25 members but of these only one has been 
recruited from the factory and he is a white-collar worker [namjestenik]. Party 
leaderships in these centres reduced their activity to discussion with the few old 
social democrats and opportunists who actually have no significance, while the 
shock workers and other good workers are left to their own devices. Besides 
this, the opinion holds among our activists, functionaries and partisans that “all 
these workers who are not in the Party are opportunists, for had they been 
conscious enough, they would not have been in the factory during the war but 
would have become partisans.” Such theories are usually spread by white- 
collar workers who by accident, by chance, came to the partisans and joined 
the party. Now they jealously guard their positions in the Party and fear the 
admittance of workers.’37
Notwithstanding the explanation that all ill came from infiltrated class suspects, there was a 
basic understanding that the KPJ as a whole faced an uphill struggle to renew its own 
purported base in view of its sectarianism on the shop-floor and its frequent managerial role 
in relation to the mass of workers. The situation was indeed dire in less industrially advanced 
regions than Slovenia: factory cells numbered 99 of the 967 Party cells in Macedonia,
37 AJ 507-V/25-15, ‘Centralni komitet Komunistiine Partije Slovenije Centralnom Komitetu KomunistiCke 
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containing 1783 workers of a unionised workforce of 35077,38 in Banja Luka in Bosnia ‘cells 
in enterprises are very meagre and frequently only the management are Party members’,39 
and the Montenegrin party ‘gathered many peasants, which it did not succeed among the 
workers:’ it contained a total of just 863.40 The report from Serbia does not survive, while the 
report from Croatia did not give membership figures but laconically stated that the ‘work of 
the union organisations is not yet in the firm grip of the Party’ which gave rise to ‘the old 
attitude of workers and certain union officials towards the state...manifested in the raising of 
unrealistic demands in relation to work and frequent theft’..41
By contrast, the reports noted the Party’s closer, albeit even more complex, relationship with 
the peasantry. It appeared that the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonisation in August 1945, 
alongside other measures like the liquidation of peasant debt in October, had temporarily won 
the Party layers of support in the countryside. The figures were indeed not insignificant: 
797,000 hectares went to 316,415 peasants and their families, of whom 136,454 had been 
landless or were colonists, and almost half as much land went to state farms and agencies as 
well as general co-operatives.42 The Party recognised the complexities of the countryside and 
was sensitive to local variations. Thus the Party report on Tuzla in Bosnia described a 
situation in which land redistribution encountered among the three main national groups 
historical memories stretching from the Ottoman period through pre-war Yugoslavia to the 
recent World War: ‘the law on colonisation and the law on agrarian reform had an important 
effect on the popular masses and in a positive sense. Some Muslim villages are an 
exception...and in large part the Croatian masses, which are under the strong influence of the
38
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Catholic clergy. Among the Serbian masses we felt strong activity and acceptance of the Law 
on agrarian reform.’43 The Montenegrin party complained that the small-holding peasantry 
which constituted the vast majority of the population was trying to manipulate the good will 
of the authorities. Many families, unjustly according to reports, sought to gain poor peasant 
status in order to get food aid or gain an extra plot of land in the redistribution of land estates 
in more fertile areas like Vojvodina.44 In areas where living standards were comparatively 
better and land reform had not impacted on patterns of ownership significantly, by contrast, 
the KPJ lost ground to traditional foes: ‘because of the weakness of our organisations and the 
fact that in many local organs of power there are kulaks, wealthy peasant traders and such­
like...differentiation in the village has not occurred and is not recurring, except that little bit 
which is due to agrarian reform and administrative [coercive] measures.’ This was the 
situation in the Stajerska region of Slovenia.45
What support the Communists had gained through the war effort began to be refracted by 
class and regional variation within the peasantry, as new political and economic realities 
began to emerge after the war. Moreover, while land reform and abolition of peasant debt had 
proven on balance popular, measures taken to feed the cities proved to clash with peasant 
ambitions for autonomy and self-advancement. Food requisitioning had had to cease already 
in the early summer of 1945 and attempts to get peasants to sell for fixed prices on the open 
market had strengthened private sellers leading to abandonment of that method by the late 
summer.46 The Economic Council therefore resorted to state-enforced compulsory sales at 
fixed prices, which in turn had to be backed by legislation criminalising speculation, black­
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marketing and sabotage.47 Moreover, large-scale population movement as internal refugees 
from within the country and colonists being settled where large landed estates had been 
broken up, as in Vojvodina, made already problematic issues like housing and transport, 
devastated in the war, all the more difficult to resolve.48 Following the winter of 1945-1946, 
the demand for economic development began to depend on the resolution of policy towards 
the countryside where increasing tension was evident.49
The Yugoslav leadership consequently keenly awaited plans for longer-term development 
from the Planning Commission. These had been long in the making, as even early economic 
forums set up before the liberation of the country envisaged movement towards planned, 
state-led development in alliance with the Soviet Union.50 The first year of renewal had 
focused on the revitalisation of key objects and the ordering of the country after the chaos and 
destruction of the war but still lacked coherent direction.51 As government faced the second 
year of renewal with a restive population, urgency and perspective counted all the more. Yet 
the plans that did finally arrive in late March 1946 foresaw more of the same: growth from 
existing capacity and administrative mobilisation of labour to sow new land in the spring.52 
The Politburo met on 27 March to discuss foreign policy and the economic plan. The minutes 
for the meeting were taken in extreme shorthand and it is consequently difficult to reconstruct 
the deliberations. The result was clear however. Republic leaders all complained about the 
state of affairs in agriculture and Tito concluded that ‘the plan of economic renewal is 
worthless’.53 The Politburo recorded that there was consensus that economic direction had to
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change. It envisaged more market freedom for the peasantry and asserted that it was 
necessary ‘to regulate the price of industrial goods, organise better distribution, open public 
works and give the peasantry necessary credits’.54 The chief economic policy-maker, Andrija 
Hebrang, did not attend the meeting but the Politburo agreed it would need to discuss the 
details of how to proceed.
A crisis in the leadership erupted just three weeks later resulting in Hebrang’s removal from 
the Politburo and position as head of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry. The 
long-term ramifications of this change were enormous since they led to the rise of more 
radical economic figures who would preside over the introduction of the new economic 
system several years later. The origins of their radicalism became clear during the clash with 
Hebrang that started in 1946 but only ended with his arrest and execution in 1948 following 
his decision to side with Stalin against Tito. The showdown with Hebrang had in fact been 
brewing for some time. Djilas recounts in his memoirs that Hebrang visibly felt increasingly 
excluded as decision-making in the Politburo concentrated in an informal inner circle around 
Tito.55 Djilas also alleges that Hebrang had taken what Tito would have considered 
nationalist positions, defending Croatian interests in post-war discussions over internal 
borders and opposing the construction of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway.56
The crisis in April erupted after Tito vetoed Hebrang heading a delegation to the USSR. 
Hebrang had sent notes to the Soviet government in September and February seeking joint- 
stock companies in excavation, energy and transportation systems. The Yugoslavs suddenly 
narrowed the purview of talks to bilateral shipment of goods for 1946 and postponed talks on 
collaboration for an unspecified later time. By downgrading talks, Tito could remove
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Hebrang as head of delegation and send the trade minister instead. This baffled the Soviets, 
and their ambassador to Belgrade Anatoly Lavrantiev tried to discuss the issue with Hebrang 
and Kardelj.57 His conversation with Kardelj did not relieve his anxieties,58 so he returned to 
complain to Hebrang the following day. Hebrang tried to reassure Levrantiev but he was 
rattled by his sudden demotion. News had trickled to him too that Tito had told a top military 
leader and close confidant that ‘Andrija cannot go to Moscow, he is presiding over an 
incorrect economic policy. He is presiding over state capitalism.’59 Hebrang surmised that 
Tito was suspicious that the Soviets had begun sending telegrams addressed to him and not 
just to Tito and Kardelj as hitherto. Hebrang decided to raise the issue with Kardelj when 
Levrantiev left. He tried telephoning but Kardelj was not in. Exasperated, Hebrang then sent 
Kardelj a rambling letter that Kardelj promptly handed to Tito.60 Djilas notes that Hebrang’s 
chosen method, ‘a letter, even though both men were in Belgrade’, could only be read as a 
challenge to the Politburo.61
The Politburo duly met two days later to deal with Hebrang but not before Tito had managed 
to invite Levrantiev to explain that the postponement of economic talks had only occurred so 
that Tito himself could go to Moscow. Not only did he want close economic co-operation 
with the USSR but he also desired widening military links.62 The historiography has not had 
recourse to the debate at the Politburo, even though it has been recognised that the minority’s 
‘marginalization on the choice of strategy began here’.63 The minutes of the discussion,
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difficult to decipher due to its note-form, reflected a tense situation. The majority went to 
pains to downplay differences in relation to the USSR and instead chose to put economics at 
the heart of the matter, while the minority played foul and alleged lack of democracy in the 
leadership. This appeared to correspond to the two sides’ respective past experiences of each 
other but the reasoning of the majority in particular was instructive about its strategic 
thinking.
The majority continued where it had left off at the 27 March Politburo meeting. Tito opened 
the meeting somewhat defensively by pre-empting criticism of lack of democracy and 
confirming he had no confidence in Hebrang’s role in the economy.64 Characteristically, he 
let Kardelj explain the majority line. Kardelj chose immediately to dismiss ill faith towards 
the USSR, explaining that the postponement of talks pertaining to the mixed companies had 
been motivated by the decision to allow Tito to travel to the USSR himself after the Paris 
Peace Treaties later that year.65 Meanwhile, Hebrang’s running of the economy was not 
‘taking enough care about political consolidation in the country’.66 Kardelj cited policy 
towards the peasantry as proof explaining that, while Hebrang had been ill, his staff had taken 
matters into their own hands and used ‘the methods of war communism’ which had brought 
‘stagnation’.67 68By contrast, Kardelj argued without elaboration in favour of the adoption of 
‘NEP-like politics [nepovskupolitiku]\6i Djilas followed, asserting that the major flaw in the 
economy was ‘the disharmony between the enthusiasm of the masses and the leadership.’69 
He accused Hebrang and the Finance Minister Sreten ¿ujovic, who would also declare for
‘Quarrels over development strategy’ on 74-83, apparently claiming to be citing the minutes o f the April 1946 
Politburo meeting. The document is not contained in the volume.
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Stalin in 1948, of inadequate preparation of economic materials for leadership discussions, 
presumably also as a way of pre-empting accusations about lack of internal democracy. The 
chief political commissar in the army Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo got embroiled at this 
point since he apparently felt he had not had much support from the leadership in his reform 
of the army. He had talked to Hebrang before the Politburo meeting, raising accusations that 
he himself exhibited lack of communication with leading comrades.70
The recorder made patchy work of Hebrang’s own response but the thrust of his argument 
was clearly that the Central Committee acted undemocratically, since it rarely met and could 
not provide a general outlook to its various commissions and sectors that had become 
‘cocooned’ within their particular own work.71 There was no criticism and self-criticism in 
the leadership, he continued,72 and admitted he himself was unhappy with the economic 
situation but whether the policy was socialist or capitalist he did not know.73 The minutes 
have an aside showing the embattled head of the Economic Council had even raised the issue 
of disloyalty to Moscow directly: ‘it is too bold and farfetched to say that Andrija is 
conducting politics for the USSR, and Tito for England....?’ Hebrang finished by repeating he 
could not see how he could remain in office if Tito did not have confidence in him. This 
amounted to an attack on Tito since, according to contemporary understandings of 
democratic centralism, refusal to hold office signified open disagreement with the line and 
therefore insubordination.74 Hebrang received support from Zujovic, who interrupted mid­
way to claim that comrades ought to have the right to pose questions.75 Significantly, ¿ujovic 
made no substantive points, unlike Hebrang.
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By this point, the Politburo session became more heated as it became clear that no 
compromise was on offer. Two factions had come into being and were now in the open. 
Accordingly, chief of secret police Aleksandar Rankovic brought the first round of discussion 
to a close by ominously warning that Hebrang’s behaviour had not been seen since ‘the 
purge’, a reference to the stabilisation of Tito’s hold on the Party on his appointment in 
1937. More than that, Rankovic informed the Politburo that the writing of such a letter as 
had given rise to this case by any rank-and-file member would have resulted in nothing short 
of expulsion.76 7 His criticism of Tempo was comparatively light and restricted to the latter’s 
sparse communication with Tito:78 the majority had visibly settled on isolating Hebrang and 
¿ujovic. That tactic was clearly working and Blagoje Neskovic who headed the Serbian 
government, stated that he too was in disagreement with Hebrang.79
The minutes then descend into extreme short hand but discussion apparently moved on to 
¿ujovic, with Tito and Kardelj both attacking him for his stance on inner-party democracy 
and his running of the country’s finances.80 Kardelj repeated Tito’s charge of ‘state 
capitalism’.81 Tito then returned to Hebrang to assert that ‘since he was liberated [from Nazi 
internment], he had always run into conflict with the party line in Croatia’ and that Hebrang 
was too ‘comfortable’ in his economic role.82 He made short shrift of Zujovic’s repeated 
statement that there was wider discontent over the quality of economic meetings saying there 
was clearly no unity in the Central Committee and that this ‘could not be glossed over’.83 In
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the final stages, new Politburo member from the Army, Ivan Gosnjak, added his voice in 
support of the majority.84 Rankovic concluded the case against the minority and raised the 
spectre of ‘deeper issues’ which, if not dealt with, would become a ‘looming danger’.85 
Realising his time was up, the chief accused still asserted that he ‘cannot be reprimanded for 
not following CC policy’86 but muttered darkly about the ‘discontent in the peasantry but also 
in the proletariat’.87 Hebrang nonetheless accepted that the letter had been a mistake.88
The short-term results of the episode are relatively well-known. The Politburo convened a 
special commission to investigate the matter. Hebrang received a strict reprimand and was 
removed from the Politburo.89 Hebrang also lost control of the Ministry of Industry and the 
Federal Economic Council but not the Federal Planning Commission.90 The Politburo ratified 
the recommendations of the Committee and explained that this gave Hebrang the chance to 
make amends.91 The wider party would not be informed of this episode and the case was 
closed.92
The longer-term results of the Hebrang controversy took some time to become apparent. This 
was because the use of terminology from the debates of the 1920s in the Soviet Union was 
‘confusing’, as one of the key participants would admit several years later.93 The inauguration 
of Kardelj’s ‘NEP’ to replace Hebrang’s ‘war communism’ was more than a metaphor and 
less than a desire to directly emulate the Bolshevik experience of the 1920s. According to the
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authoritative textbook on the history of the Bolsheviks by Stalin, the development of 
socialism went through defined phases: after the Civil War period came NEP, then ‘socialist 
industrialisation’, then ‘collectivisation’ and finally ‘the struggle to complete the building of 
the socialist society’.94 Yet the KPJ never publicly spoke of NEP. Thus, standard 
interpretations explain the policy shift by looking at industry and agriculture separately. This 
approach reflects Johnson’s close reading of the texts of speeches by leading Communists in 
the period after Hebrang’s demotion. He interprets subsequent coded attacks on ‘state 
capitalism’ and those who ‘attack our permanent class allies -  the poor and middle peasant’ 
in the press as the pronouncements of the victorious faction against gradualism in industry 
and collectivisation in the countryside, positions he concludes must have been held by 
Hebrang and Zujovic.95 The decision of the two ministers two years later to opt for Stalin 
gave the standard interpretation some retrospective weight. As Ivo Banac in his meticulous 
and authoritative study of factions in the KPJ before 1948 concludes, ‘Hebrang’s alleged 
pursuit of a Soviet...economic model is far from proven. His go-slow attitude was perhaps as 
much a reflection of his economic realism (and of advice from such prewar liberal 
economists as Mijo Mirkovid) as of dependence on Stalin’s regional strategy.’96
These accounts fail to explain the Politburo decisions on 27 March, however. These reflected 
the serious difficulties the KPJ was experiencing in agriculture and its realisation that further 
reliance on coercive measures in rural areas to feed the cities would constitute grave political 
risk. References to NEP were therefore proof of realism and not just radicalism. Resistance to 
collectivisation, as revisionist historians have shown, in fact later became common to Kardelj
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and Hebrang over the period 1946-1948.97 What emboldened the majority in its radicalism 
over the same period was that it came to believe that it would not have to follow a narrowly 
‘stagist’ path but could merge and skip stages, in part by relying on the USSR, in part by 
implementing new strategies to mobilise labour.
Beyond NEP: The Five-Year Plan and the politics o f productivity before the Split
The risk involved in the new Yugoslav approach to industrialisation was two-fold. Firstly, it 
overestimated both the domestic capacities at its disposal and the aid it would eventually 
receive. Secondly, it underestimated how the failure to make a leap at one stage of 
industrialisation could qualitatively worsen prospects in successive phases. Preparations for 
the five-year plan took place over the second half of 1946 and the early months of 1947. They 
consciously departed from the preceding premises of slow growth in industry, which had 
concentrated on already available budget revenues to lift plan and transport. Instead, they 
expected that voluntary labour, often demobilised soldiers, could fill important gaps, up to 
three quarters of the value of the objects that still needed to be renewed before the start of the 
plan.98 Symbolically, the March Politburo meeting had decided to concentrate on public 
works. This ultimately included the construction of the famous Belgrade-Zagreb highway but 
included other projects.99 Such work could act as a prelude to the establishment of an 
accelerating push, combining several phases from Stalin’s Short Course all at once, and 
providing for progressive leaps towards modernity. At that time, what appeared most to 
embolden planners was the apparent aid forthcoming from the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia.100 Having visited Poland and Czechoslovakia in the spring, Tito travelled
g8 See Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, Chapter 3 
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next to Moscow from 27 May to 8 June. He headed a wide-ranging and high-ranking 
delegation, and signed a significant agreement on the establishment of a variety of joint-stock 
companies, technical assistance for the economy, and supplies for the Yugoslav army and a 
long-term loan for the Yugoslav military industry.101
The disagreements at the top thus only intensified. Radicals felt emboldened and the 
gradualists attempted to adapt to the new realities but to restrain and correct what were 
rapidly becoming megalomaniacal plans akin to Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan. This became 
obvious most sharply in regard to contemporary debates about the relationship between 
agriculture and industry, which commentators have broadly depicted.102 Alignments over 
policy continued to be fluid and disharmonious however. Revisionist historians have 
provided probably their most noteworthy and fruitful challenge to standard accounts by 
elucidating the shifting plans of the period. Key to the understanding of the process towards 
the preparation of the five-year plan was the appointment of Boris Kidric to the position of 
president of the Economic Council instead of Hebrang. He had thereby become ‘the principal 
architect of the early postwar economic structure’.103 Kidric was the head of the Slovene 
administration after the war and received his training in a brief crash course in Soviet 
economics just before his appointment to federal government.104 *Under him, a progressively 
reformed and rejuvenated Economic Council played an ever more important role in economic 
policy. Its purview remained checked, however, by the Planning Commission under Hebrang 
and the Agrarian Council presided over by the controversial Vaso Cubrilovic, one-time
102 ^'kianski, ‘The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage o f  the Cold War...’, 114-115
103 °^*lnson> Transformation of Communist Ideology, Chapter 8, was among the more perceptive.
Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, 55
Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 20
45
member of the group that assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and of the pro- 
government wing of the inter-war Agrarian Party.105
All three groups, following the change in line after March and April, agreed that agriculture 
should play an important part in the financing of industrial take-off. The methods by which 
this would occur were only broadly settled though. Certainly, ideological commitment 
dictated that preparations for the plan had to start in the industrial sphere as the dominant 
sphere of production. Reorganisation of the economy in anticipation of Soviet aid duly began 
shortly after Hebrang’s demotion. The government passed a series of laws from May to 
December 1946 cumulatively designed to reorganise the state apparatus to enable it to 
perform the tasks envisaged by the plan that was being elaborated by the Planning 
Commission. Crucially, the government brought industry and finance under almost total state 
ownership and control, provoking U.S. wrath over loss of assets in the process.106 107Melissa 
Bokovoy summarises well how the various factions broadly saw the relationship between the 
state sector and agriculture, quoting Alexander Erlich’s respected study of Soviet 
industrialisation debates: ‘the leadership borrowed Nikolai Bukharin’s vision and envisioned 
that the “commanding heights [would] gradually absorb the backward economic units.” They 
believed that the “incentives of market production would lead small producers, especially 
agriculture, to increase yields and market produce or services and to cooperate with or join 
the modem, lean public sector at their own pace.”4107
The mechanisms of this process were not clear and never coherently stated, though, but 
evolved over time according to which group gained the upper hand. The Economic Council
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was the seat of radicalism and dominant in setting the overall agenda for the economy. At 
first it accepted the change in line at the Politburo, passing an amnesty law to pardon those 
who had violated collection orders. It then moderately relaxed the purview of collection 
orders giving more autonomy for agricultural producers to go on the market.108 Yet KidriC 
and his associates responded to the failure of agricultural collections in 1946, which had been 
expected increase because of stimuli to agricultural production, by limiting republican and 
local discretion in determining the size of the obligation in March 1947. This followed a 
direct confrontation between the Politburo and the Serbian party leadership, which held two 
thirds of the sown land in 1946 but did not fulfil its collection obligations: it was guilty of 
concessions to the kulak.109 While this position started from the standpoint that surplus 
existed and that the problem was collection, the Agrarian Council’s position saw these 
measures as overly punitive and pushed production contracts as a stimulus.110 The Economic 
Council acceded to the change but in turn insisted on price ceilings to prevent speculation.111 
Thus it was already clear that the Kidric group was abandoning stimulus in agriculture as its 
primary goal in agriculture and instead hoping to use price controls in favour of industry to 
provide inputs for accumulation.112
Moreover, in the battle for investments, KidricS rejected Hebrang’s and Cubrilovic’s pleas to 
decrease disparities between industry and agriculture: when finally adopted in April 1947, the 
plan expected industry to develop to 4.9 times the pre-war level on the basis of 41.6 percent 
of total investment, while agriculture could expect only 7 percent of investment in order to
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grow 1.5 times.113 The Planning Commission and Agrarian Council did, however, gain the 
upper hand in terms of forms to be implemented in the countryside. They resisted state 
measures they saw stifling peasant enterprise and successfully sponsored various types of 
specialised co-operatives. By September 1947, Kardelj had arbitrated skilfully to implement 
his own vision that represented a compromise position between the two factions: this 
amounted to general agricultural cooperatives fusing credit, buying-selling, processing- 
producing and work tasks but based on private ownership of land.114 Kardelj stated in April 
1948 that the general agriculture cooperative was the ‘lowest type’ of amalgamation in the 
countryside but that it did represent ‘an organisational basis for the further development of 
higher forms of socialised agriculture, i.e. the peasant work co-operative’.115 Even as late as 
the latter half of 1948, after the split with Stalin, and despite the fact that KPJ member 
Mijalko Todorovié replaced Cubrilovic as Minister of Agriculture, the dominant line on the 
countryside remained that the general agricultural cooperatives would continue to grow 
gradually and continue to be preferred to collective farms. The focus was on consolidating 
and improving internal organisation amid the dearth of capital, supplies, transport 
infrastructure, fuel, machinery and investment.116 Indeed, cooperatives continued to grow 
moderately in economic terms throughout the period. In 1948 their turnover was almost three 
times their value in 1945, albeit on a comparable proportional rise in the number of co- 
operators.117 The state farms meanwhile also trebled in size over the same period but were 
forced to introduce the brigade system of labour to fulfil export targets.118
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The compromise growth path in agriculture was, however, barely providing the resources 
needed to keep up with the rise in the number of industrial workers. The calculation had been 
and continued to be that aid would allow the Yugoslavs to build both heavy and light 
industry, the latter as an aid to agriculture but also as a source of foreign currency for imports 
of capital goods. Greater balance between heavy and light industry, as the Yugoslavs realised, 
in fact departed from the Soviet experience. Yet it depended on Soviet help. This was clear 
from the first meeting of the Economic Council chaired by KidriC in July 1946 to discuss the 
overall direction of the five-year plan in 1947. Kidrid had to stamp his authority by 
denouncing the preceding period and its ‘state capitalist’ deviations, so he made a point of 
explaining that the first year of the projected five-year plan would be different to the Soviet 
one because the Soviets had had a different economic structure and that their period of 
preparation had been longer.119 He proceeded to hammer out what became the mantra in 
public appearances over the following period:120 that the organisational and financial forms 
prevalent in the economy entailed capitalist ‘forms’ of accumulation that were at odds with 
the ‘content’ which was social accumulation by way of the state sector.121
To remedy this situation, he suggested transitional forms and indicated how the Yugoslav 
plan would differ from the Soviet. First, the plan would be an amalgam of individual plans 
which would progressively be co-ordinated. Second, the plan would need to follow the 
‘profitability [rentabilnost] of every price’ in order to indicate which sectors could provide 
accumulation at the existing level of the economy. On this point, Kidrifi added: ‘A further 
example of that which orientational approximate figures should give us is the example of the 
analysis [about] what level of accumulation would be possible with the help of the
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p d in e ’, 1-2
,2 i ^ee Boris KidriC, Privredniproblemi FNRJ, Beograd: Kultura, 1950.
‘Zapisnik sa sednice Privrednog saveta odriane 18. jula 1946 godine’, 2
49
development of the food processing industry. Comrade Kardelj agrees with our opinion that 
we should not go down the same path as the Soviet Union in regard to the development of 
heavy industry. That is why the path of contemporaneous investment in heavy and light 
industry is valid, since we, unlike the Soviet Union in that period, are not isolated but have its 
support.’ Third, Kidrid insisted on the abolition of income tax on state enterprises but its 
maintenance for the private and cooperative sectors as a source of accumulation. Marking a 
break from the preceding period, Kidriò also suggested that republic governments should 
retain income from republic enterprises as limited decentralisation apparently marked part of 
the break with ‘state capitalism’.12 23
The conclusions of the meeting, as laid out by Kidriò again, went even further. Despite 
repetition, their strategic perspective makes them worth quoting at length:
‘In further discussion comrade Kidrii expounded on several important questions about the 
direction of the development of our industry. Political and economic circumstances dictate 
the ever faster development of our industry. The path of our industrialisation, like its tempo, 
will not be like in the Soviet Union. Accumulation [in our country] is considerable. The 
treaty with the Soviet Union will even more speed up its tempo and contribute to its 
development. We shall throw one part of our industrialisation at that which industrialises our 
peasant production, since that corresponds to our conditions and needs with particular regard 
to the needs of our external trade. The riches of our agriculture are huge and with the 
development of our food processing industry we will be able to give our external trade 
potential for strong export of agricultural goods to foreign countries. The tempo of our 
industrialisation should be quick. Political circumstances force us down this road. The
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question of electrification should be viewed not from the point of view of the needs of 
Yugoslavia but of the needs of the whole Balkans. That is what political circumstances 
dictate. Our people’s republics should develop specific special industries (for example 
fisheries in Dalmatia and textiles in Slovenia) and in that way give the republics opportunities 
for accumulation...After a short discussion, in which minister Nikola Petrovic underlined the 
need to plan the sowing of those agricultural products which we shall be able to easily export 
in two years’ time, the conference was ended.’124
The line connecting agriculture with industrialisation was therefore not a simple one of 
transferring surplus from the one to the other sector but a more complex and circuitous one. It 
presumed that Soviet aid would allow for investment that would lift both the industry deemed 
necessary for the establishment of national and in part regional independence but also 
industry that would lift agriculture and allow for imports of capital goods by increasing 
exports. Each aspect of that plan depended on the others and the failure of one would upset 
balances. Thus, the non-arrival of Soviet aid would endanger the diversification of 
investment, which in turn would disable the lifting of light industries connected to 
agriculture, which in turn still would retard agricultural growth, negatively impacting on the 
ability of agriculture to supply the mounting demands of the growing urban centres, thereby 
slowing the pace of industrialisation.
While that had not appeared a likely scenario in the latter half of 1946, it became ever more 
realistic as time passed as geopolitics exerted contradictory effects on economic ties. Namely, 
clear differences in priority emerged between the Yugoslavs and the Soviets in regard to 
regional politics during Tito’s visit to Moscow in May and June 1946. Aside from trade and
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military ties, the two countries discussed Balkan integration, which had been a long-term 
ambition of the left in the Balkans but had come to be mooted seriously by the Communist 
Parties only during the Second World War.125 126Stalin pressed for a slower tempo in regard to 
Yugoslav ambitions to incorporate Albania while Tito argued against federation between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, to Stalin’s dissatisfaction.125 The result was closer bilateral 
relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR but weakening regional integration in the 
Balkans. Yugoslav designs to integrate the Yugoslav and Albanian economies did lead to a 
treaty in November 1946, which foresaw harmonisation of economic plans, co-ordination 
bodies, customs union, and the equalisation of the Albanian currency with the Yugoslav.127 
Yet regional politics caused more friction with the USSR as time passed. Albania became the 
site of a soft power contestation between Yugoslavia and the USSR from the early summer of 
1947,128 while Tito then performed an abrupt turnaround on relations with Bulgaria in August 
1947 by signing of the Bled Protocol envisaging the development of Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
relations on the Yugoslav-Albanian model.129 Moscow secretly but sharply rebuked Tito and 
Dimitrov for their move, setting the scene for further contestation in early 1948, ultimately 
resulting in the open split in June 1948.130
As foreign policy tensions increased over influence in the Balkans, economic relations 
stalled. Only two minor joint-stock companies came into existence: the Soviet-Yugoslav 
Danube Shipping Company (JUSPAD) and a Soviet-Yugoslav Civil Aviation Company
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(JUSTA).131 Moreover, trade marginally fell in 1947 in comparison with 1946 between 
Yugoslavia and its principal partners in Eastern Europe, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, while only 5 percent of credits promised actually arrived and imports from Western 
countries rose by over 8.132 This in part was the result of domestic difficulties in all these 
countries, which had to some extent been exacerbated by the rise of West-East tensions 
through 1947, especially after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.133
Despite frictions, the Yugoslavs continued to hope until early 1948 that the delays and 
setbacks in the development of economic relations would be overcome. Extensive signals did 
exist that Yugoslav-Soviet relations continued to be warm throughout 1947. The trade 
agreement with the USSR alone, formally negotiated in 1947, pledged industrial plant and 
equipment to the tune of $135 million in credit. Further to that sum, several People’s 
Democracies headed by the Soviet Union had offered $5.5 billion in credit over the period 
1947-1951 to cover the five-year plan. It was only in the spring of 1948, moreover, the 
Soviets had postponed trade talks with Yugoslavia until December of that year.134 Perhaps 
most importantly, whether a ruse or genuine initiative on the part of the Soviets, the 
Cominform meeting in autumn 1947, when Zhdanov made his famous ‘Two Camps’ speech, 
met with great Yugoslav enthusiasm. Geoffrey Swain has persuasively argued that this was in 
large part due to the Yugoslavs’ belief that Zhdanov had supported them throughout: 
‘Zhdanov made a short speech and supported our stance.’135 The issue, as they saw it, was not 
simply one of international affairs but class struggle.The Yugoslavs pursued the Popular
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Front ‘from below’ to explain the failure of the French and Italians to defeat manoeuvres to 
oust them from government in early 1947: they had stifled mass strikes and could only expect 
to be weaker as a consequence.136 More than that, the Yugoslavs accused Polish leader 
Gomulka of ‘state capitalism’ just like Hebrang.137 The Politburo recounted that Stalin had 
picked Belgrade over Prague as the seat for the Cominform.138 Kardelj telegrammed to Tito 
about developments in Poland where the Cominform was meeting so that Tito could deliver a 
hard speech at the opening of the Second Congress of the Popular Front in Yugoslavia 
insisting on mobilisation ‘from below’ as the key to the period both domestically and 
internationally.139
The undertones of their foreign policy radicalism remained central to the break itself. In 
March 1948, the Yugoslav Politburo for the first time expressed frustrations with Soviet 
unreliability and heavy-handedness, following Soviet ire over unannounced Yugoslav 
movement of troops to Albania.140 Stalin had decided to bring the Yugoslavs to heel by 
forcing federation with Bulgaria, which led the Belgrade to see Sofia as a ‘Trojan horse’.141 
So while interests underlay both Soviet and Yugoslav moves, the Yugoslavs appeared critical 
of Soviet reluctance to antagonise the US in the Greek Civil War: ‘They had advised the 
Chinese Communists to somehow find peace with Chiang Kai-shek. But it became clear that 
they [the Chinese Communists] had been correct. They [the Soviets] want to reach some 
position with the Americans to maintain peace.’142 Since it had become evident that relations 
were heading towards rupture, the Politburo began downward revisions of their Five-Year 
Plan to scrap investment in light industry, since the USSR had told them that it would no
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longer stand by the military aid agreement and they wanted to keep their army battle ready.143 
An exchange of letters between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships followed over the 
following months and the KPJ Central Committee expelled Hebrang and Zujovic who took 
the Soviet side and who again came under accusation for being defeatist in regard to the five- 
year plan. Even then Tito insisted that the KPJ had not acted against internationalism when 
insisting on building the Yugoslav economy: ‘On the question of the economy, my position 
and the position of the other comrades has been that our country should show what it can do 
with its own forces. I thought that that would be a big and beautiful step for the progressive 
movement in the world. [He gives the] examples of Burma and other countries.’144
Thus, while such an interpretation added to the understanding of Yugoslav boldness in 
international relations that provoked Stalin and led to the split in early 1948, its implications 
for domestic policy have remained uncommented on.145 Yet the impact of the Yugoslavs’ 
interpretation of the impact international relations in this period would have on their own 
domestic policies helped determine their radicalism. They had reason to believe that Soviet 
and Eastern aid would come, so they had rational grounds to believe that to keep on in their 
domestic politics by mobilising from below would impact on the geopolitical strength of the 
bloc and ultimately feed back into their own development efforts. That meant that they 
continued to improvise even as difficulties plagued their efforts through 1947. The 
difficulties were not only the impact of unpredictable external twists and turns on domestic 
policies but the dysfunction of the Communists’ apparatus on the one hand, and on the other 
hand the strained viability of their policies and institutions caught between the struggle for 
renewing legitimacy and raising productivity in an uneven and backward setting.
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This precise conundrum became obvious at two meetings with diametrically opposed views. 
The first, chaired by Kardelj, was the Economic Council meeting in June 1947 in the 
presidency of the federal government, which discussed problems in foreign trade and 
concluded that the hyper-centralisation and unprofessionalism of the trade apparatus 
imperilled exports. Relying on initiative ‘from below’ and departing from Soviet ‘forms’, 
while strengthening state oversight, appeared to be the preferred remedy at that point in 
time.146 The second meeting, by contrast, was when the Politburo met in January 1948, again 
to examine setbacks in foreign trade. The leadership spread the blame more evenly by that 
point, identifying the situation as worst in the port areas, where there were problems with 
loading materials on to ships. A myriad of reasons existed for this, apparently, but the 
minutes singled out the unions as the main culprits.147
The politics of productivity indeed became more contested as the period progressed. 
Extensive mobilisation eclipsed efforts to intensify work. Elements of coercion also appeared 
in areas with low industrial capacity and the need to lift industry quickly. Within this mosaic, 
volunteer labour brigades took centre stage. One revisionist historian has argued that from 
mid-1946, set-piece construction projects like Br£ko-Banovidi Youth sucked in tens of 
thousands of youth mobilised through political youth organisations to lift infrastructure in the 
country and transform youth values.148 The KPJ hoped that enthusiasm and propaganda 
would move young people where material reward and advancement could not be offered. 
This was apparently overwhelmingly the case in the early stages but became challenging as 
post-war wave of fervour began to subside.149 Lilly argues that leading figures in SKOJ
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clashed repeatedly as those with wider competencies began to realise that youth work overall 
was suffering as a result. She appears not to be correct that this led to real downgrading of the 
brigades in late 1947.150 That would ignore the continued centrality to the Plan of such 
- gargantuan schemes as the construction of the ‘Highway of Brotherhood and Unity’ 
connecting Zagreb and Belgrade151 or the ‘first phase of the building of New Belgrade 
[which] lasted from 1947 to 1950...[and where] 142.000 builders, mostly between 14 and 25 
years of age, took part in the action.’152 Coercion, acts of resistance and absenteeism 
increasingly accompanied voluntary and youth labour brigades, however, causing unease at 
the top.
A somewhat more complex but unmistakably similar tendency was visible in industry. This 
process corresponded first to preparations and then adjustments to the five-year plan. The 
situation on the industrial front necessitated several significant and more lasting 
reconfigurations than was necessary in the completion of one-off mobilisations around public 
works. The state tried to induce efficiency by strengthening vertical policy transmission belts 
but also desired to ensure it could control access to employment and incentives to raise 
productivity more directly. The former set of changes largely depended on the state 
apparatus, while the latter depended more on employment strategies. The first change was the 
creation of a planning and administrative system on the Soviet model in June and July 1946. 
The state apparatus was rebuilt to include a middle administrative level (glavne direkcije) 
such that planning did not remain an activity in government offices but reliant on enterprises 
for execution.153 Next, budgetary units became autonomous but had to balance their budgets
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on a quarterly basis, under the close supervision of financial authorities concerned to make 
sure that monetary circulation reflected real growth and did not leak money to the private 
sector.154 Finally, local government represented the locus of decision-making in relation to 
employment and consumption.155 Changes in regard to employment, meanwhile, sought to 
limit the labour market and tie wages to direct productivity increases, thereby also abolishing 
the union role in collective bargaining;156 tie labour and cooperatives to their locality insofar 
as that was possible in order to inhibit the private sector employment opportunities for those 
leaving the village;157 and establish the system of guaranteed supplies and ‘factory 
economies’ as KidriC called them,158 as a way of maintaining minimum material benefits and 
comforts as an incentive both to prevent labour turnover and to raise productivity.159
Having set up the basis of their system, then, the Yugoslav Communists moved to raise 
productivity from existing capacity against mounting problems. The principal revisionist 
work on industrial relations in the period 1946-1948 has subdivided the biennial according to 
three policy priorities: rationalisation after the drying up of UNRRA aid from mid- to late 
1947, late 1947 to spring 1948 as preparation for war amid East-West tensions, and finally 
the remainder of 1948 as the politics of military self-reliance following the break with the 
USSR.160 While crucial from the perspective of understanding general trends, this account 
presumes that macroeconomic policy adjustments had an automatic effect on the shop-floor. 
Such unmediated consequences did not materialise. Rather, as demonstrated by developments 
in the union movement between the fourth and the sixth plenums, held respectively at the end 
of 1946 and the beginning of 1948, mobilisation of the workforce followed a more complex
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and autonomous path whereby continued appeals to initiative from below came to be slowly 
complemented by further attempts to strengthen the transmission belt against the lower 
echelons of the party-state but without major success. Planned industrial increases and the 
recovery of living standards among industrial workers did occur but without adequate 
intensification of labour. Workers continued to resist norms, while fluctuation and the 
struggle for new workers for certain industries necessitated the partial introduction of 
coercion. The plan necessitated further absorption of labour from the countryside for the tasks 
of the following year but agriculture, deprived of investment but relied on for exports, was 
not making the necessary leap. By the end of 1948, then, progress without rupture on the 
chosen road was increasingly looking impossible.
The KPJ leadership throughout the period encountered resistance from local party-state 
hierarchies and suffered from faulty information-gathering mechanisms such that it relied on 
initiative from below to storm against the scepticism of local cadres and achieve excessive 
targets. Nor was this in contradiction with the constant attempts to increase the power of the 
apex:161 the common opponent that the summit tried to sandwich was most frequently the 
middle bureaucracy. Thus when Kidri£ addressed the fourth plenum of the unions, rather than 
‘adding his voice’ to the minister of labour’s ‘reading the riot act’ to the union,162 he required 
emphatically action from below to help the state: ‘I can emphasise that we, losing a great deal 
of time on the preparation of plans, in the operational implementation of the tasks of the day, 
would have made many more errors [than we have] were the unions not admonishing us in 
timely fashion...were precisely the workers not watching over the implementation of 
operational tasks.’163 While he did appeal for more effort among industrial workers for
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raising productivity, cutting costs and assuring accumulation, since the imperatives of foreign 
trade demanded it (and ‘it is an old truth that that which you acquire abroad you must first 
pay for in blood at home’),164 he also emphasised the need, if the plan was to be successful, 
for new cadres to rise from the ranks of the working class to man machines and run 
factories.165 Returning to the common guerrilla war motif of the time, Kidrid ended with an 
exhortation: ‘only if our worker functionaries understand correctly what this is all about will 
they be able to stand at the head of the activated masses and contribute as much to our new 
life on the economic front as did the partisan first-fighters [prvoborci] contribute in the 
National Liberation Struggle.’166 The plenum itself echoed these intonations but not without 
revealing serious strains. It met in order to generalise competition and shock-work as the 
method to achieve the five-year plan. Discussing the need for implementing norms in order to 
succeed, some union leaders noted how unpopular this drive had proved, with the unions in 
danger of being seen as the enemy by ordinary workers.167 168Nevertheless, the dominant 
sentiment was that skilled and unskilled workers wanted to compete but that they constantly 
had to break the resistance of reluctant bosses, often with the help of the union.
By the time of the sixth plenum in early 1948, the KPJ still faced similar problems as it had 
done in late 1946. The problem was that it could offer little but more of the same. Workers 
confronted the extension of the working day and bad conditions in efforts to achieve the plan, 
as Kardelj himself admitted in the Federal Assembly. For him, the remedy was no longer to 
be sought principally from below but from the strengthening of oversight mechanisms from
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above over recalcitrant enterprise directors and local authorities.169 This subtle modification 
also somewhat resulted from the lack of success in rationalising production that Kardelj 
asserted in the Assembly but that had been the subject of a union consultation in March 1947 
and the fifth union plenum in November 1947.170 The completion of the plan had again relied 
on extensive rather than intensive increases in work such that the sixth plenum witnessed the 
major reorganisation of union structures to enhance the ability of higher union bodies to 
concentrate solely on questions of production, while devolving issues seen as less important 
at this stage, like cultural-educational work, to lower bodies, under the guise of 
démocratisation.171 172That did not appear to stifle worker enthusiasm: in 1947 67,029 workers 
received shock-worker status, while the campaign to introduce norms at the end of 1947 
allowed that number to rise spectacularly to 105,016 in the first half of 1948.
Yet the same problems that had plagued production in 1946 and 1947 continued to arise in 
1948. The union newspaper still complained at the end of April 1948 that ‘rationalisers’ did 
not receive due recognition, just as the third plenum in mid-1946 and as the union 
consultation of spring 1947 had done.173 Despite improvement, unrealistic norms, too, 
blighted attempts to offer real material stimulus to raising productivity and the unions were 
often slow in effecting real change or even sided with workers.174 Fluctuation between 
workplaces, or between town and country, also hit production as it impacted unevenly on
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different industries.175 There was evident strain to supply growing demand in the cities while 
maintaining control over the countryside. Tito explained to the first jamboree of shock 
workers in Serbia in February 1948 that special measures taken by the government to allow 
variable prices for agricultural goods would not hit workers because the state would continue 
to provide a now increased ration as guaranteed state supply.176 Judging by the press, the 
unions started a campaign around the issue of guaranteed supplies for much of the spring.177
As the split moved into the open by mid-1948, however, coercion began to play a greater role 
in industrial relations. Drafted from the army to the ministry of mining, Tempo recounts that 
the ubiquitous planning instrument of the times, the telephone,178 was ringing from the day he 
arrived with demands for coal. One evening, he telephoned a particular mine to find the 
director still there at ten in the evening, ‘a sign he took his job seriously’. Tempo asked him 
whether he had served in the army and, on getting a positive response, told him: ‘plan 
assignments must be completed...we are in a war for industrialisation.’179 This martial spirit 
pervaded newspaper reports in the run-up to the union congress in October 1948. Various 
competitions and stories from production dominated headlines.180 Already in May, in fact, the 
Federal Government had created a state directorate to replace the unions as the main body to 
canalise new labour power to where it was needed. By September, the Bosnian government 
had formed its own section in order to deal in particular with the labour shortfalls in the
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mines. This facilitated the process of the ‘robbing’ of the mines and forests that Tempo 
presided over in order to maintain industry and exports after a summer when Kidrii had 
personally gone touring industrial hot-spots in an apparent emulation of Stalin’s ‘Urals- 
Siberian’ method.18 82
The First Congress of the United Trade Unions of Yugoslavia took place as all the mass 
organisations were following the first post-war KPJ Congress in July 1948. The atmosphere 
was still one which lacked clarity. The leaders had obviously not made their minds up how to 
respond to the crisis following their expulsion from the Cominform. Famously, Tito had 
littered the closing of his speech at the KPJ congress with odes to Stalin and the congress 
floor had greeted these with warm approval and chanting of ‘Tito-Stalin’.183 With economic 
relations still not totally cut off with the East, the domestic situation was clearly strained but 
not yet dramatic. Dispatches from the US Embassy in Belgrade over the early autumn did 
nonetheless note alarm in the population over food rationing.184
KidriC thus struck a more sombre note addressing the Congress than he had done at the 
Fourth Plenum. He acknowledged the difficulties of 1948 which he described as the ‘most 
difficult year’ of the five-year plan both for the tasks it had envisaged but also for the 
unforeseen foreign trade difficulties that had arisen.185 He asserted the Yugoslavs would 
prove their allegiance to socialism by redoubling their efforts on the five-year plan. To 
achieve this, though, he talked of the need to raise productivity and mechanisation in industry 
and to bring agriculture ever more into the socialist sector by way of cooperatives. The
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ambiguity over whether Kidric was pushing for collectivisation remained since he did not 
define which form of cooperative he meant. Since both the ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ forms in 
Yugoslavia were referred to as cooperatives, his praise of the Soviet Union made it appear he 
was in favour of an offensive. More than that, Kidrid appealed for self-sacrifice, promising 
that life would improve in the future and that concrete measures needed to be taken to ensure 
the quality of goods and secure guaranteed state supplies. The immediate task, however, 
implied the departure from the approach of broad industrialisation, of completing everything 
up to ‘100%’. In what was effectively the first public admission that the plan would be 
downsized, Kidrid stated that in 1949 ‘we will concentrate on the key objects of the Five- 
Year Plan’.186
The leadership also had to formulate a coherent response to Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the 
Cominform. It continued to appeal to mass mobilisation and self-sacrifice but its rhetoric took 
on a tone of national pride rather than more class-based anti-imperialism. Whereas Tito had 
spoken to the first assembly of shock workers in Serbia in February about the Marshall Plan, 
and linked it to Western belligerence,187 Kidrid in his speech to the unions in October took a 
more pedestrian approach by exposing Soviet lies point by point, in synchrony with Tito’s 
well-known decision not to treat the split with the USSR as an ideological issue but a threat 
to national sovereignty. Both appeals were populist but it appeared that the early 
‘sectarianism’ towards new members had given way to what would later be decried as 
‘opportunism’ on account of the appeal of the national: the KPJ opened its gates to new 
members who rose in number during 1948 from 285,000 to 483,000,188 the vast increase 
occurring from when the split appeared likely to the leadership to be definitive in April to
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December.189 The proportion of workers had increased by only two percent though, while the 
leadership increasingly had to deal with a sizeable inner-party opposition loyal to the 
USSR.190 To win workers to ever greater exertions against ever greater odds, then, the KPJ 
found it easier to present sabotage not as an act against socialism but as treason against the 
homeland. The ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ faced a struggle for survival from its inception, 
therefore, not just in the international arena but on the shop floor.
P a r tii-  The 'extraordinary year ’ 1949 and the origins o f workers ’ self-management191
The note of patriotism had been struck days after the split had been made public as the party 
paper Borba initiated a mass ‘people’s loan’ to finance the Five-Year Plan in July 1948, 
noting that ‘the state has not turned for a loan to foreign capitalists, who impose on weaker 
nations onerous conditions, but to its own people...’192 Not only did the Yugoslavs have to 
deal with perceived and real hostility in the West but also increasingly from the East. Stalin 
imposed a de facto blockade which began to slowly take effect and became almost total by 
the close of 1948.193 Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian non-delivery of 
material, plant and equipment worth in excess of 2 billion dinars had set the stage for a 
projected eightfold reduction in mutual delivery of goods between Yugoslavia and the USSR 
for the year 1949.194 Consequently, the government envisaged the mass increase of workers 
in industry by double in the space of six months.195 It was probably this in particular that led
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to the careful acceleration of collectivisation without ‘dekulakisation’ that started with the 
Second Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1949: additional demand for food and 
other factors of production from agriculture dictated the need for greater agricultural output 
and the KPJ calculated that dekulakisation would hurt production.196 The realisation that the 
industrial plan for the first quarter of 1949 was lagging, however, detonated an extensive 
labour mobilisation that started in the summer and reached new heights in the autumn before 
unceremoniously dwindling out in the winter months. Rather than the promise of U.S. aid in 
August prompting the decision to stop the extensive labour mobilisation, it would appear that 
dissatisfaction with the results achieved by the Yugoslav variation of Stakhanovism, chaos in 
the countryside resulting from the mass campaigns and the geopolitical security attained 
through election to the U.N. Security Council played a more important role.
The notion of workers’ councils did not arise at the end of the year, moreover, as the standard 
historiography has had it, but first emerged as an idea during the campaign against enterprise 
managers and the middle administrative level in the economy in the spring. The first draft of 
the law and the first consultations with the unions took place in late summer but appeared to 
have been delayed at least in part by the Stakhanovite offensive. The implementation of 
councils on an experimental basis from late 1949 until its official inauguration in mid-1950 
took place in a context very different from the inception of the idea: slackening of labour 
mobilisation, increasing unemployment and the restoration of managerial hierarchy. Its 
immediate impact could therefore not be of major mobilisational significance even though 
that had appeared to be the initial intent. Rather, its overriding importance at this stage was to 
be an ideological legitimation for political and economic change in the context of 
international realignment and domestic retreat.
196
Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, Chapter 5
66
Towards a Yugoslav Stakhanovism
Congresses and ceremonial assemblies accompanied the second half of 1948 as the KPJ 
leadership realised it had to re-engage its constituency and strengthen its institutional capacity 
to mobilise people and resources on a mass scale.197 The first congress to take place had been 
the KPJ’s Fifth Congress. This was most likely because the party apparatus was still the most 
loyal and effective force at the disposal of the leadership. The decision to re-assert the 
primacy of the Party within the Popular Front coalition appeared calculated to take the wind 
out of the sails of the Cominform, which had accused the Yugoslavs of having liquidated the 
Party in the Front. Nevertheless, the huge influx of new members over the following six 
months could not but dilute the effectiveness of the Party. Complaints about the unevenness 
of Party cells on a local level cropped up in early reports of the Organisational Political 
Secretariat of the CP Y.198 More disturbingly, republic leaderships grew ever more confident 
in asserting their autonomy from the Federal apex.199
The situation prevailing in the Front, pre-eminent among the mass organisations because of 
its role in the war, also prompted Politburo discussion in mid-October 1948. This followed a 
June 1948 plenum of the Front at which its general secretary and Politburo member NeSkovic 
had argued that its main weakness was an economistic approach to mobilisation without 
politics.200 In the Politburo, NeSkovic went further. Problems he listed were similar to those 
being experienced on the level of the Party but evidently more advanced: the Front was 
politically weak and faced political opposition from the Church in Slovenia; in places,
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voluntary labour resembled ‘feudal’ work relations; trade unionists detached themselves from 
the work of the Front; in several Republics organisational failures made recruitment 
inadequate or even basic cells on a local level, as in much of Croatia, entirely non-existent.201 
He repeated these issues again in a November Plenum of the Popular Front, arguing that ‘we 
too often value mass voluntary work only from its immediate material effects...often, our 
comrades on the ground work in such a way that of ‘voluntary’ work, only the name 
remains...consciousness [consciousness] towards work in the interests of the construction of 
socialism is neglected.’202 The leadership of the Popular Front listened to admonitions by top 
Communists that ‘liquidation of these phenomena -  the underestimation and neglect of the 
Popular Front -  is our first and most important political task today’.203
Not only politics was missing but also coordination of work. The initial response to mend this 
problem was the linking of the mass organisations horizontally by way of advisory councils, 
as decided on 1 September,204 and vertically: ‘Kardelj’s reform...had legislated district 
branches of the party’s control commission on September 25, the commissariats...were also 
resurrected on October 18 to give party members in the militia and security 
forces...supervisory roles in the execution of federal tasks.’205 Labour conscription took on 
an increasing role moreover. Yet throughout 1948, different regional patterns emerged in 
terms of mobilisation. Slovenia managed to work out rough numbers of available surplus 
labour in the countryside by the end of October 1948 while Bosnia where some of the most 
intense mobilisation occurred through 1949 did not have anything but estimates throughout
2U1 AJ 507-, III/37, 3
202 ‘Organizacioni problemi narodnog fronta -  référât druga Blagoja NeSkoviéa’, in Borba, 21 November, 1948 
5
203 Kardelj, ‘Protiv potcenjivanja i zanemarivanja rada u narodnom frontu’ (Iz govora na sednici Saveznog 
odbora NF, 27 novembra 1948), in Problemi nase socijalisticke izgradnje: Drzavna i privredna izgradnja, Vol. 
I
204 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 128
ibid.; AJ 507-V/l, ‘O nekim organizacionim problemima’
68
the year.206 Fluctuation was in fact massive: ‘for every 100 workers employed in permanent 
positions, 587 workers had to be recruited and, on average, another 300 members of special 
Popular Front brigades and 70 members of the League of People’s Youth...’207 Mass 
volunteer projects also stretched supply lines and increased fluctuation. The Central 
Committee saw the construction of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and New Belgrade as such 
priorities that it envisaged the participation of 160,000 young people in the projects and 
banned the use of volunteer youth brigades anywhere else throughout 1949.208 In the event,
4
they managed some 197,000.209 210Despite this, poor working and living conditions doubled the
rate of desertion in the Belgrade works, totalling 1,000.2I° Finally, there was expenditure of
an unforeseen type, in both the productive and non-productive sector, of state funds: ‘In all
departments, as in the federal, so in the republic and local organs and enterprises, the
phenomenon of the brutish breach of socialist legality and plan-related discipline in terms of
the wasteful spending of funds earmarked for consumer goods has established itself. This
phenomenon...has started in some cases taking serious proportions and has become an anti-
211plan and anti-state, enemy activity and the sabotage of the execution of the Plan.’
For leading policy-makers, therefore, lack of political capacity and disproportions in the 
economy became the most obvious emanations of crisis. At a series of meetings in late 1948 
and early 1949, leaders clashed over what aspects of the crisis to emphasise. Susan 
Woodward provides a sophisticated analysis of this period in particular in claiming that for 
the federal leadership the ‘primary problem of enforcement of policy...now lay with the
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republics.’212 Tito argued at an inner cabinet meeting in his private quarters (‘sastanak kod 
druga Tita’) on 18 December 1948, in anticipation of a Central Committee Plenum scheduled 
for January 1949, that the foreign exchange crisis ‘required the centre to give priority to 
imports for projects “that contribute to capital production -  heavy industry, mining, transport 
and the army”.’213 The strictest centralisation of foreign trade would therefore curb republic 
autonomy in that regard. Instead, the federal leadership wanted them to concentrate on 
supplying the basic needs of the population, which required them to orientate towards 
investment in articles of mass consumption, enforce compulsory purchases from the kulak 
and cut budget deficits by reducing the civil service.214 *Furthermore, the government imposed 
ceilings on republic investments and demanded personnel changes. Finally, ‘[t]he shortages 
of necessities and the unauthorised monetary expansion..., the leaders said, gave them no 
choice but to centralize control over supplies and ration goods temporarily.’
This account is important but nevertheless exaggerates when it claims that: ‘[f]or KidriS, 
centralized control over distribution posed a serious problem because it threatened the 
fundamental instrument of economic incentives to producers...’.216 Abandoning centralised 
control of distribution was certainly a goal in the long run,217 and that was in fact 
revolutionary because it started from the premise that the law of value operated even within 
the socialist sector, an admission the Soviets were not to make until 1956.218 Nevertheless, 
the greatest immediate threat from the leadership’s standpoint was the increasing imbalance 
between town and countryside, and its implications for the erection of heavy industry. Thus, 
Kidri£ in fact insisted on lowering the ‘purchase’ fund in the state sector as a counter measure
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to the higher ‘commodity’ fund in the private sector. For him, excessive spending in the state 
sector in particular endangered the plan. Kidrid explained that higher than warranted 
expenditure in the state sector emboldened capitalist elements in the countryside. That was 
because higher payments not tied to real rises in production saw funds leave the state sector 
for goods from the wealthy agricultural private sector at black market prices. Over the longer 
run, that starved the state sector of funds for future production crippling any challenge to the 
private sector. Kidrii was, therefore, defending the practice of centralised control of 
distribution in the immediate term while the state was still locked in combat with private 
elements in the countryside and was unable to out-produce them. The state’s combination of 
guaranteed supplies through compulsory purchases and a limited market with variable prices 
for different agricultural commodities, reinforced by a growing and mechanised cooperative 
sector, amounted to a set of aggressive tactics against the private sector. It sought to 
simultaneously stimulate and capture higher amounts of surplus from the private sector, 
ensuring higher rates of investment and gaining competitive advantage. By contrast, the 
People’s Democracies, and the system under Hebrang and ¿ujovic, with nominally freer 
markets amid a sea of peasant small holdings, according to Kidric, had stronger private 
elements in the countryside, lower supplies and lower real wages, and a lower rate of
• J \ Q
investment.
Despite having to take a step backward in its plan as a consequence of its international 
isolation, then, the majority in the leadership perceived its strategy as a continuing offensive 
at an altogether higher level of advancement towards socialism that their erstwhile allies. The 
republics upset these plans because in view of the ‘the change in the social structure and 
proportionately in the quantity of consumption’ their investments had ‘an incorrect
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tendency...to produce machines, not articles of mass consumption.’220 Additionally, the
republics represented the weak link in the chain, not from a narrow financial viewpoint, but
from the standpoint of materials and labour ‘because the republics have wide plans’ (as
opposed to the narrow plans focusing on key objects, as the federal leadership had).221 This
led to ‘completion between enterprises, fluctuation of workers, etc’,222 which in turn upset the
balance between ‘purchase’ and ‘commodity funds’. The key continued to be increasing
output and cutting costs in industry, while providing goods from agriculture. Kidriô affirmed
to the Central Committee plenum that increasing output while cutting costs of production: ‘I
think that, especially in regard to coal and foreign trade, that is the imports of raw materials,
industry must above all give its maximum contribution to our economy, and not expect from
coal and foreign trade that they will...in this period help it in some way.’223 This was to occur
on the basis of storming. Kidriô, in his summing up, agreed with the federal minister for
mining about the need for a proactive approach to opening new bases for production of raw
materials, which, he claimed, the republic leaders had ignored in discussion and which the
federal minister for mining had solved through the use of the brigade system of labour.224 To
maintain the industrial working class, guaranteed provisions had to go up by 30 percent.
Agriculture had to give more, and state control had to somehow increase. Edvard Kardelj’s
concluding remarks in the set-piece discussion on ‘The Peasant Question’ is worth quoting at
some length because it places the collectivisation drive in the context of industrialisation:
‘Comrade Tito has correctly noted that what we have set out today, at the 
Plenum, should not be understood as some great turn [this is an implicit 
reference to Stalin’s ‘Great Turn’] in our country...In that sense, it is also 
correct what comrade Plavi [Mijalko Todorovic] has said, that this year is in 
fact the year of the broad preparation for the mass collectivisation of the 
country, a year which will, in that regard, if we work correctly, bring us such 
significant results that we shall, next year, with a greater degree of
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mechanisation, be able with full force to descend on that task...It is clear that 
we would, if we were to implement Soviet experiences, in the last analysis, 
emerge victorious. Our path is, after all, the very same path, but there are 
things that we could and must avoid. We have to avoid the negative 
[economic and political] consequences of that great turn from the individual 
to the collective, which came to the fore in Soviet practice. It is for that 
reason that we think that that transition stage, those transitional forms [co­
operatives and collectives], can in our case be broader and that the crossover 
by the peasant can occur in several stages. Why should we be afraid of 
granting certain concessions to the middle peasant, who as of yet cannot 
decide over whether he should join a co-operative...The problem of 
collectivisation is for us, today, above all the problem of the middle peasant, 
of the small peasant too, but above all of the middle peasant. And the poor 
peasant, who has a little bit of land and who is by his psychology already a 
proletarian, should be sent to industry to work there, because he will be able 
to blend in with the rest of the working class.’225
Even in retreat, the Yugoslav Communists maintained their firm commitment to making
offensive leaps. From the rich variety of makeshift measures developed to maintain a high
level of accumulation and investment, the urgency and sharpness of the reorganisation of the
federal arrangement to aid planning, and the extreme delicacy of the urban-rural balancing act
at a time of socio-political transition, it must be clear that Tito and his closest associates were
staking much political capital on a very bold and risky gamble in extremely fraught
circumstances. They had avoided desperate moves in any direction for fear of popular
dissatisfaction but they had also realised that, all factors on the international stage being
equal, they had until the following year to attain the foundations of their industrial take-off.
Their plans depended on exact execution.
It was precisely this that the Yugoslav Communists soon found they could not secure. The 
Economic Council held two major conferences, the first in February and the second in March 
that confirmed that the plan was stalling and found the weakness was policy towards labour. 
At the February meeting, KidriC posited vertical controls as the solution: ‘The President [of 
the Economic Council, Kidrii] stresses that it is necessary to reach equilibrium between
225 ibid., 87-92
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purchase and commodity funds and to change attitudes towards this important question. Up to 
now nothing has improved in this regard: wages are still being increased, categorisation is 
being implemented against the law, there is no struggle against fluctuation...Coordination of 
the struggle across the front -  from the ministry to the enterprise will guarantee its 
success.’226 *Nevertheless, the discussion appeared to suggest problems would persist. The 
Minister of Heavy Industry complained that there was no central enforcement of norms and 
tariffs such that workers moved to republics where their skills levels would automatically 
move up and entitle them to greater pay. The Minister of Mining went even further and 
admitted his ministry had no reliable statistics on labour. He merely noted that recent
227legislation had increased wages by 30 percent in an attempt to overcome labour shortages 
but productivity had gone up only 12 percent. Similarly, the Minister of Finance complained 
that local enterprises paid more than federal enterprises in an attempt to keep workers. In 
formulating his conclusions for the meeting, KidriC appeared to realise political problems lay 
ahead. He therefore omitted calls for political campaigns and urged rather a legalistic 
approach according to which wage rises and categorisation inimical to existing tariffs should 
be countered on the basis of their illegality. Thus he suggested that it was necessary: ‘to link 
up with the Party and the union organisation, explain that this is not about decreasing wages, 
that is standards, but about the improvement of the state of affairs on the basis of existing 
legislation.’229
The meeting in March brought out little novelty until Kardelj spoke. The presence of Deputy 
Prime Minister at the meeting highlighted just how important the issue was becoming for the
226
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federal government. Kardelj made an initial short speech complaining that inflation was 
becoming alarming, a formulation which upset the Minister of Labour from Slovenia. Kardelj 
accepted in the concluding speech that the situation was not out of control but continued:
‘This situation not just from the standpoint of the fulfilment of the plan but 
from the standpoint of raising the standard of living is in indeed alarming. We 
are not talking about decreasing wages but of grasping the whole wage fund 
system in our hands, so that we alone can decide where it needs to be decreased 
and where increased. In that regard, it should be taken into consideration that 
we shall probably decrease the overall sum because it is above what it ought to 
be according to the regulations in the directive. On the other hand, there are 
great differences between one factory and another, one republic and another. I 
am not an adherent of the idea that we should have strictly unitary, equal wages 
in every factory, branch, etc, since we have factories and branches we need to 
devote our attention to. We need to have that in mind in our politics of 
remuneration.’230
This more subtle analysis did also appear to take the political moment into consideration: the
need for clarity of explanation could not be underestimated. For Kardelj continued uneasily:
‘The director who says that in his factory norms are over-fulfilled by 50-60% of workers is 
committing a crime against the economy and against state if he does not fix those norms. We 
have to set up such a system that makes the directors feel responsible and feel they can be 
called to account. They at the moment do not feel sufficiently called to account, and we now 
have countless examples where the trade unions are fighting for wage reductions, and the 
directors for wage increases. One should ask oneself how workers will view such trade 
unions. I think it should not be the trade unions that do the fighting for lower wages, that 
should be for the directors, while the trade unions can agree with the director and help him by 
explanation and agitation among the workers.’231
This fear for the political apparatus led Kardelj to suggest that directors would need to use the 
law rather than material incentives to keep workers, while other issues that needed attention 
included restoration of standing for internal hierarchies and upward mobility within firms, 
and better conditions of work and life.232
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The problem of the inefficacy of the trade unions represented a major political challenge to 
the authority of the order and not simply an economic one. The scope of the problem was as 
yet unclear. Still, it could be discerned, given that Arsov, the Labour Minister, had posited in 
the same discussion that the mobilisation of the labour force was being fulfilled at a rate of 
‘45-50%’ of the Plan while the production plan was reaching ‘over 90%’.233 If some 70 
percent of workers were over-fulfilling work norms in mines,234 and as KidriC had explained 
at the start of the March conference, directors competed for labour and paid higher wages and 
bonuses than the Plan allowed for by anywhere between 15 and 30 percent of the national 
fund, then workers probably had obtained some power on the shop-floor. It appeared that 
the leadership had a contradictory attitude to the enterprise directors, both frustrated with and 
dependent on them. Kardelj’s suggestion that managerial positions needed to be respected 
and that workers needed to have incentives to move up, while unions needed to be removed 
by a degree from production tasks, indicated that the government was worried that it had 
comparatively little control over the workplace in comparison with previous years and few 
remaining mechanisms to restore its authority. Indeed, several weeks later KidriC hosted 
Djuro Salaj, head of the now renamed Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, who 
blamed directors for union inability to tackle problems illustrated by the story he recounted to 
KidriC: ‘[i]n Zagreb, workers refuse to make furniture for our embassies in Paris and London, 
even though they are offered in addition to their normal wage an extra of 12.50 dinars per 
hour [roughly the average tariff wage]. There are some workers who earn...40-45.000 dinars a 
month.’236 The task was no easier for union official Lazar PlavSic in late April 1949, when he 
moved the key-note speech at the Ninth Plenum of the now renamed Confederation of Trade
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Unions of Yugoslavia (SSJ) to explain the need for balancing ‘purchase’ and ‘commodity’ 
funds. For months previously, the union paper had reverberated with Kidrii’s radicalism from 
the Second Plenum of the CC KPJ. Such headlines as ‘Consciousness and Commitment 
Defeated the Storm: The Heroic Work of The Sailors and Workers of the Shipworks in 
Split’,237 ‘Incorrect Bearing in Relation to Shockworkers, Rationalisers and Innovators in 
some Enterprises in Macedonia’,238 and ‘The New Products of our Industry: Furnace for 
Casting Bronze Built Out of Domestic Materials’239 PlavSic tried by berating examples of 
enterprise bullying or impropriety towards good workers before bring up some instances of 
incorrect setting of norms in firms.240
The situation duly worsened throughout April. The Yugoslav Army complained about lack of 
materials and control over enterprises,241 the Economic Council felt moved to explicate that 
recruitment to the labour force had to be voluntary242 and then also passed measures tying 
guaranteed supply to individual discipline in order to reward rooted workers and penalise 
fluctuation.243 Reports from the building of the Belgrade-Zagreb ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ 
highway noted that only a third of the necessary draw wells were functioning, that the draw 
well borers had left the worksites after failing to secure wage increases, and that drafted army 
labourers had achieved a productivity four times as great as the work collective ‘Autoput’.244 
By the last week of the month, realising that production was ever more dependent on imports
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for which there were limited funds, the Economic Council had to conclude that ‘the plan [in 
light industry] is being executed worse with every passing day’.245
This began to lead to a new approach. As the Economic Council saw at the beginning of May 
the need to draft more workers into heavy industry and denounced as criminal the continued 
irrationality of the distribution of skilled labour, with not enough in heavy industry,246 the 
tone became ever more desperate. It was in this context that the tide turned towards 
radicalism and it was in this context that the first implicit mooting of councils surfaced in the 
early summer. Ever more, the leadership expressed frustration with the bureaucratic 
tendencies of the directors and increasingly looked to mobilisation from below as the way 
forward. In the second week of May, discussion between economic policy makers and trade 
union leaders brought out frustration in regard to lack of materials as a result of a lack of 
imports and continued:
‘The second type of difficulty we have faced in the execution of the plan is in 
that many of our directors have approached the question of workplace 
organisation in a bureaucratic way, there was no consultation with the workers, 
even though it would frequently take just slightly improved organisation of the 
work process to help get rid of other difficulties, as well as of the lack of the 
labour force.
That is why it is necessary for trade union organisations and workers to 
propose new ways of organising the labour process, so that the labour process 
is conducted with maximum efficiency. On these questions it is necessary to 
develop the initiative and advocacy of trade union organisations and work 
collectives.
Further, it is necessary to struggle against fluctuation of the labour force, and 
for tightening work discipline, and that by means of democratic struggle on the 
initiative of workers.’247 *
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Moreover, the Economic Council reports persisted with the theme of initiative from below. 
At a conference of production in the light industry sector in mid-May, directors again came 
under attack:
‘It is necessary to say a few words in regard to the relation of notable people in 
the directions and enterprises towards the work collectives. Consultations with 
work collectives are very rare and frequently the way appeals are delivered to 
work collectives to execute the plan is improper. It is becoming apparent in 
practice that the director is becoming a right gentleman [gospodin covek]. 
Doubtless, it is necessary to raise the authority of the director and to prevent 
the development of anarcho-syndicalism in the firms, but we should also avoid 
falling into the other extreme, as is the case today, that mobilisation should 
happen only via the director and not to the correct extent by way of the entire 
work collective. However, often not even the director mobilises enough and 
that director, who relates to the work collective in a bureaucratic manner and 
who alienates himself from the work collective, often does not understand the 
conditions and the possibilities of completing the plan.’248
Almost simultaneously, at a consultation of the union leaders called to discuss the
experiences of the preceding six-month period’s experiences in socialist competition, similar
complaints about bad treatment of shock workers surfaced on the part of the representatives
of the metal workers and of the miners.249 Leading on from this, Kardelj offered at the end of
May the first full-blown onslaught on bureaucracy in an address inaugurating a new middle
tier of local government in the National Assembly, which was later published as a pamphlet
entitled ‘The Power of the Popular Masses’. In it, he argued that bureaucratic-administrative
methods of management hampered the possibility of the broad development of mass
initiative. Referring to long-dormant workers’ consultation committees that had existed in
law and fact before the start of the five-year plans, he argued: ‘This undeveloped spontaneous
form should be further developed and transformed into a permanent form of the direct
cooperation of workers in the management of our enterprises.’250
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On the economic front, though, the situation remained tense, as the planning mechanisms of 
the centre could not even collect the necessary information to implement its own measures. 
Thus, on the same day as Kardelj’s speech, the Economic Council concluded that its attempts 
to account for the state of the wage fund could not succeed in June since only a third of the 
necessary documentation had reached it in time. On preliminary results, the growth in the 
wage fund had again significantly outstripped the recruitment of labour in all the republics for 
which information could be obtained. Consequently, the republics all had to form emergency 
headquarters to oversee labour recruitment in June.251 *At the start of that month, a meeting on 
the completion of the Plan in heavy industry highlighted the need to tolerate a twelve hour 
day to reach targets. Some debate followed over whether additional labour recruitment was 
necessary for the plan to be completed, with suggestions that two labour brigades be formed 
to help in the electrification sector of the plan. One member of the Economic Council argued 
that the existing workforce could reach the Plan targets with increased productivity. KidriC 
appeared to have resolved to formalise the search for alternatives from below by concluding 
the meeting with a novelty:
‘The comrade President [KidriC] pointed to the situation in the directorates at 
which it is a frequent scenario that at trade union conferences, when the 
directors get up and claim that because of the lack of materials and other 
difficulties, the Plan cannot be fulfilled, workers regularly get up and disprove 
the claims of the directors. That indicates that the directorate cadres have 
become bureaucratised. Taken generally, the directors of the directorates have 
largely become a brake in industry. That is why we urgently need to form work 
councils \radne savete1 where they have not been formed and to hold regular 
meetings of the collegiums and the work councils.’
This first mention of ‘work councils’ should be understood as the first, embryonic form of
what later became permanent, legally-empowered units of political and economic power in
Yugoslavia: worker councils. They were not, however, the finished product. At this stage, the
name ‘work councils’ suggested the formalisation and generalisation of consultation forums
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as Kardelj had announced at the end of May. Their conceptualisation at this earliest stage, in 
fact, reflected the dilemmas over the reaching of Plan targets of the preceding six months. 
Still one in a panoply of strategies to mobilise labour, existing alongside brigade shock-work, 
socialist competition and at times the militarisation of labour, ‘work councils’ promised a 
non-coercive, participatory and ideologically pregnant method of raising productivity 
generally, creating cadres on the job, stabilising the workforce by formally giving workers a 
stake in the productive process, and controlling directors. While the promise existed to cut 
bureaucratic costs in the state machine, to reinvigorate party legitimacy in the eyes of the 
working class and establish a clear differentiation from the USSR, none of these appeared in 
the first instance as the primary motivation. More than that, ‘work councils’ were not the 
‘workers’ councils’ only came to be adopted in experimental fashion in December 1949 and 
remained a subsidiary industrial strategy in substance and form until June 1950. Although the 
first steps towards the formalisation of the councils (saveti) as opposed to consultations 
(savetovanja) occurred in late summer, these legislative initiatives remained in the shadow of 
the shock-work push to cope with the dislocation of industry in view of the blockade and the 
military threat from the Soviet Union.
The Antinomies o f Yugoslav Stakhanovism
The all-out push in the autumn followed the creeping decision in mid-year to prioritise 
agriculture, the military and exports to fund imports of technology and equipment crucial for 
the priority projects of the Five-Year Plan.253 Though the exact nature of the investment and 
the exports shifted as the year passed according to season and the stage of the Plan, as did the 
subsequent priority targets, the overall shift in the tempo of mobilisation in the second part of
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the year entailed an increasing labour imbalance within the state sector itself, as was revealed 
in the Economic Council on 8th June:
‘/The question of labour was not posed at Jasenice [ironworks] alone but 
everywhere. For the month of June 50,000 workers are necessary /current 
average is 49,000/, and by the end of the year we will need 63,000./
According to a report by the Ministry of Labour so far somewhat less than 
2,000 skilled workers have volunteered [for employment in enterprise-level 
production in heavy industry]. The situation is especially bad in...Slovenia and 
Serbia...In...Croatia and BiH [Bosnia and Herzegovina] the situation is 
somewhat better, so that we may be able in June to fulfil the plan for the 
recruitment of skilled labour.
Comrade Lesko§ek [Ministry of Heavy Industry] announces that what they 
need is not just skilled but also unskilled labour, as they currently have to use 
labour brigades, and worker productivity is therefore low.’254
The bifurcation between skilled and unskilled labour, present in this report, came later that
year to be interpreted as a deeper imbalance between the need for short-term mobilisation and
long-term stabilisation of the labour force in the conditions of peripheral
underdevelopment.255 At this, point, however, the Economic Council decided in mid-June to
concentrate labour power on ‘priority objects’, moving them from local- and republic-level
objects to priorities set at the federal level, and at the end of June re-iterated the message as a
matter of urgency.256
When the miner Alija Sirotanovic visited Kreka to engage in an inter-mine competition a few 
days after the Economic Council had first complained of labour imbalances, the imminent 
intensification across the board of shock-work soon became clear.257 This visit by the labour 
brigade led by Sirotanovic from the Breza mines produced nothing out of the ordinary: its 
endeavours to induce higher productivity through socialist competition echoed the ‘udamik
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mood’ of the times, as the trade union newspaper carrying the report itself suggested.258 
Nonetheless, the achievements of individual miners began to splash the front pages of 
newspapers for weeks and when Sirotanovic beat Stakhanov’s record for coal removed 
during a single shift by 40 tonnes on 24 July, the ‘Alija Sirotanovic Movement for Higher 
Labour Productivity’ spread like lightening across Yugoslav industry.259
It was in the heat of that battle and some two months after Kidriô had first spoken of ‘work 
councils’, on 1st August, that, without a preceding trace, the Committee for Legislation of the 
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia sent a first draft of the ‘Law of the Workers’ 
Councils in State Enterprises’ to the Central Council of the SSJ for circulation among the 
trade union leaderships.260 Unfortunately, the fund of the Committee for Legislation was not 
available to researchers so that deliberations around the law remain unknown. Nevertheless, 
its view of the role of workers’ councils was considerably less radical than the role of the 
Stakhanovite campaign across Yugoslav industry at that time. The draft law itself was a 
somewhat dry and conservative document, somewhat in contrast with the later directive 
circulated in December 1949. It had four sections: ultimate goal and its institutionalisation of 
the workers’ council (I), its functions (II), its relation to the director (III), its election (IV) and 
its inner functioning (V).
The document foresaw the councils as essentially advisory bodies albeit with policy-making 
power over social welfare (where directors had failed according to the Economic Council) 
and veto power over the business plan of the enterprise as well as over aspects of the labour
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process (where workers had recently shown greater initiative than directors). Yet it went 
further. Among the many roles assigned to the councils, the most transformative saw the 
council as an organ that could advise on and carry out oversight in regard to ‘the full use of 
capacity and the correct distribution of labour power and the distribution of workers between 
groups of enterprises’.261 62 Though vague, the latter part of the competencies suggested in a 
circumspect manner that ‘[n]ew firms might be developed by existing firms’ as ‘[i]n 
principle, in a market economy, new firms should emerge spontaneously as profitable 
opportunities arise’.263 At least in theory, therefore, the draft law recognised some of the 
conundrums pertaining to the market in factors of production by raising implicitly a possible 
solution in terms of socialist conceptions of ownership.264 265
Still, the council was there more to facilitate than manage and could not participate in the 
everyday running of the enterprise. That remained the purview of the director. The director 
could not challenge the workers’ council in its own competencies unless by appeal to a higher 
body which had primacy over both.266 267Projecting resistance to the whole process on the part 
of the directors, the draft law required them ‘to ensure the participation of the workers’ 
council of the firm in the management of the firm within the boundaries set by this law’. 
While the director had to account for the execution of his or her duties to the regular sittings 
of the workers’ council under Article 7, he or she could not put themselves forward for 
election to the workers’ council under Article 8. Regular council meetings would take place 
only at quarterly intervals.268 Rather nebulously, the rights of the trade union branch at the
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workplace did not change as a result of the law.269 Yet the workers’ council was set to combat 
bureaucracy and to take over from the unions the organisation of socialist competition.270
In the period 8-18 August, several republic and industrial branches responded to the call for 
comments and recommendations with varied suggestions for alteration. These came in three 
major categories: more or less camouflaged concern over the fate of the trade union; disquiet 
over the continued powers of the directors and higher management; and largely technical 
issues frequently tied to the task of the day: improving labour productivity. Almost every 
trade union response made remarks that fell broadly in the first category: the Textile 
Workers’ Union suggested that Article 9.3 ought to be amended such that the council be 
elected at the yearly AGM of the union branch in the workplace;271 the Timber Workers’ 
Union suggested a moderation of the language expressing the role of the councils in regard to 
socialist competition under Article 3.5;272 the Croatian union leadership suggested Article 7.4 
ought to be amended to allow not just the director but the branch union president to be 
present at council meetings;273 and the union leadership of Serbia also suggested it disliked 
the liberal wording of Article 3.5.274 The second category evinced responses only from the 
union leadership from Serbia and the Railway Workers’ Union. Both questioned the 
hierarchical links in the draft law.275 The former union leadership complained about the right 
of the Administrative-Organisational Management (AOR) of the enterprise under paragraph
269 ibid, Article 17
270 ibid., Article 3.5
‘Centralna uprava Sindikata radnika i nameStenika industrije tekstila i odjeée Jugoslavije: Centralnom odboru 
Saveza Sindikata Jugoslavije, 8. Kolovoza 1949.’ private copy kindly provided by Olivera Milosavljevié
‘Centralna uprava radnika i slu2benika industrije drveta Jugoslavije: MiSljenje po Nacrtu Zakona o radniCkim 
savetima -  Centralnom odboru Saveza sindikata Jugoslavije’, date illegible, private copy kindly provided by 
Olivera Milosavljevié
‘ Savez sindikata Jugoslavije, Glavni odbor za Hrvatsku -  Savez sindikata Jugoslavije, Glavni odbor.
11.Vili. 1949’, private copy kindly provided by Olivera Milosavljevié
4 ‘Savez sindikata Jugoslavije, Glavni odbor za Srbiju, Centralnom odboru SSJ, 13.VIII.1949’, private copy 
kindly provided by Olivera Milosavljevié
275 ibid., and ‘Sindikat ¿elezniékih radnika i slu2benika Jugoslavije Centralnom odboru SSJ, 13.VIII.1949.’ 
private copy kindly provided by Olivera Milosavljevié
85
three of Article 9 to call a council meeting.276 More radically, the Railway Workers’
leadership complained that it was unclear under what conditions that right could be exercised
but it went further. It suggested that the council was too important to meet quarterly and
pushed for a monthly meeting under Article 11. It then made a broader criticism:
‘From this draft it is not clear whose organ the workers’ council is: that of the 
skilled management or of the trade union organisation, but with regard to the 
relation of the administrative-organisational manager and the director of the 
firm to the workers’ council, it looks more like an organ of the skilled 
management, and that can be seen from the following:
The director of the firm does not have to agree with the measures and advice of 
the workers’ council and decisive is the ruling in any dispute of the 
administrative-organisational manager. The administrative-organisational 
manager has the right to suggest the election of a new workers’ council or of 
certain of its members, the director has the right to call an extraordinary 
meeting [of the council] etc. Similarly, nowhere in the draft is the relation 
mentioned between the workers’ council and the management team [struCni 
savet] or their necessary co-ordination. Because it is possible for the directors 
of enterprises in regard to the solution of the most important questions to turn 
to the management team, all the while attempting to isolate the workers’ 
council, and in that way [to] make impossible the participation of workers in 
the managing of our economy.’277
Echoes of this withering criticism appeared in some of the other documents, too, alongside 
the Croatian union leadership’s plea for the ‘correct distribution of women’ and care for new 
workers,278 or the Communal Workers’ Union suggestion for the provision of administrative 
space and employees for the workers’ councils in order to prevent workers being taken away 
from the production line overly long.279 The Croatian union leadership itself and the Textile 
Workers’ Union both suggested that the council needed to report back to the entire workers’ 
collective to make its work ‘common property’ as the counsel of the former put it.280
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Union resistance to the draft probably had as much to do with fear of loss of influence as with 
the perception that this influence was essentially empowering the director via mechanisms 
subordinate to the director. Since the prevailing mood was against directors at this point in 
time, it is probable that union warnings found sympathetic hearing in the political leadership. 
Perhaps more importantly, the unions were the chief mobilising institution in a massive and 
crucial but short-term campaign central to fulfilling the plan and the creation of workers’ 
councils was not an imminent task. Upsetting the unions at this stage could not have been in 
the interests of the party-state leadership. Whatever the designs for workers’ councils, 
compromise with the unions appeared to be the rational course to take. While this remarkable 
discussion retreated from view in the following months, most union proposals found their 
way into the famous December directive. The tempestuous production drive, however, 
continued to dominate the press and the policy-making forums of the mass organisations.
This was at least in part because of external pressures. The gaze of the KPJ leadership of 
necessity turned to international issues. Ever since late April, there had been a slow 
rapprochement between the West and Yugoslavia in the diplomatic field. It had included 
tortuous ‘negotiations over economic issues and normalisation of political relations’. 
Soviet reaction to a westward opening on the part of the KPJ, meanwhile, included intensified 
internal sabotage and external pressure. A Politburo meeting in late May discussed the 
weaknesses of the party organisation in Croatia in the face, especially, of Cominformist 
sabotage, a situation Tito defined as ‘characteristic of the whole country’.* 282 Border incidents 
also increased exponentially as the summer progressed and an hostile exchange of notes took
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place between Yugoslavia and the USSR following Yugoslav cessation of aid to the Greek 
partisans and the resulting de facto isolation of Albania, as well as on account of Yugoslav 
action against White Guard immigrants in Slovenia.283 * By August, the situation had 
apparently become acute for the Yugoslavs. Twice in that month, Sava Kosanovic, the 
Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.S. ‘pled with Secretary of State Acheson...to speed action on 
Yugoslavia’s loan requests to the IMF, IBRD, and U.S. Export-Import Bank (including Tito’s 
poignant request for toilet articles along with mining and agricultural machinery).’ When 
the Ex-Im Bank decided to extend a credit of $20 million to Yugoslavia on 25 August,285 and 
the American and British foreign ministers warned Moscow in public over its intentions in 
the Balkans on 24, 28 and 31 August,286 the Yugoslavs turned to securing their sovereign 
position in international relations.
The Politburo duly convened at the end of August to discuss the international situation and its 
impact on domestic policy.287 While there was evident lack of consensus about whether to 
take the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict to the UN, a state of affairs that lasted until even after the 
Yugoslav delegation left for New York in the second half of November,288 there was equally 
visible general unease with possible over-reliance on the West. Tito argued that ‘we must not 
agree to the Anglo-American offer to take arms from them. We must not allow the 
materialists [Tito obviously meant “imperialists”] to misuse our dispute with the USSR, we 
are going on our own revolutionary line.’289 Outlining defence measures, Tito suggested that 
the Government needed to set up a fund to requisition vital non-military supplies from abroad
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and to withdraw strategic resources from Vojvodina on the border with Hungary.290 That 
suggested he was seriously contemplating the threat of war. Such an eventuality unavoidably 
had an impact on overall economic direction as well:
‘In the mobilisation of the labour force there are various irregularities. If it is 
not possible to solve the issue otherwise, the question needs to be posed of 
extending the Plan in certain branches [of production] by six months to one 
year. That is unavoidable also in view of the pressure (military needs in 
particular) and the economic blockade being enforced by the East. In less 
central projects, labour is to be redirected towards more important projects 
lacking labour power.’291
This decision required a reprioritisation within the reprioritisation of June. Indeed, military 
considerations took precedence as the Economic Council considered the implications of the 
Politburo decision on 8 September:
‘The plan for the transfer of skilled labour to heavy industry is fulfilled 90%, 
but parallel to the plan for the transfer of labour to the JA [Yugoslav Army] 
should also be carried out. It is clear heavy industry will continue being 
developed but military industry is not to be neglected...
In order to solve the problem of labour power for the JA, to whom labour 
power must unconditionally be given, it is necessary to take labour power from 
republican and local enterprises but not in such a way as to completely clear 
out the republics...
By the 15.IX in [Bosnia] and Serbia no new mobilisation of labour power 
should be applied, rather it is necessary to execute the plan for the mobilisation 
of labour power for mining and the JA having in the mind that the current state 
of labour power should be maintained in heavy industry. This decision should 
be kept to and the onslaughts of certain departments should not be given in 
to.’292
Such strong language indicated continuing strains. Actually, the following day, it became 
clear in the discussions of the Economic Council that there was a lack of labour power in the 
mines of Serbia and that this threatened production in several other branches of industry. 
Absenteeism was now running at twenty to twenty-five percent of the labour force and this 
figure included party members. With up to 8,000 permanent new employees needed to carry
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out the plan, immediate withdrawal from the timber industry of Party members and Popular 
Front brigades for redeployment to the mines appeared as the only way to prevent meltdown. 
The minutes noted that daily reports would be sent to Kidrié about progress in regard to the 
affair.293
The crisis over coal would only get worse over the autumn and it presently caused the 
permanent shift on the part of the CPY away from emergency extensive mobilisation on a 
national scale, the final limitations of which were fast becoming clear, towards a return to 
intensifying production. Thus on 3 September, the Minister for Mining complained in the 
union paper: The movement for the higher productivity of labour has so far gripped only the 
big mines, even though all the conditions exist for the movement to develop in all mines.’294 
Elements in the Yugoslav leadership believed higher productivity could be achieved by sheer 
will: the first step entailed spreading shock-work from a small minority to the vast majority 
of workers. The SSJ convened its Presidency for the first week of September to declare the 
offensive:
‘With regard to the huge political and economic importance of the movement 
for higher productivity, and the possibility and necessity of its spreading, the 
Presidency of the Central Council of the SSJ notes that some management 
teams from the trade union organisations have not properly accepted that 
movement and are not fighting with enough ardour against its inadequacies.’295 *
For a month thereafter, almost every front page of Borba carried news of the movement for
greater productivity. Despite this, it appeared that the Economic Council was beginning to
reach different conclusions. Its clear desire to move towards more intensive methods
criticised the Yugoslav Stakhanovs for alienating ordinary workers. Although few indications
293
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of this had appeared in the press, the Soviet experience at least in part appeared to be
repeating itself, so the Economic Council began to signal the push towards intensification:
‘It is necessary to work out the mechanics of the production process in mining.
Our orientation should be towards the current number of workers or its most 
minute increase and only for the new mines, but even here it is necessary to ' 
solve the problem by the transferral of existing labour supply from the old 
mines to the new. An increase in mechanisation will mean nothing if work 
effort is not increased and labour supply decreased. With us, in production, and 
particularly in mining, there is an ossification of a shapeless anti-individualism 
towards the worker tied to bureaucratism and the total individualisation of 
alleged bosses. It is necessary to send Communists into the pits and to arrange 
organisation in the following manner: at the head of brigades, place hard Party- 
men [partijce] who can understand the modem machine and the modem 
organisation of labour and who can take with them the rest of the workers. The 
solution is not to have a few isolated Sirotanovic’s who run far ahead of the 
mass of workers, but we should have Sirotanovic’s, who, at the head of all the 
brigades, will know how to pull the rest of the labourers with them.’296
The demotion of the Yugoslav Stakhanovites was duly symbolised by the decision to create a
new category of udarnik: the collective brigade itself.297 298It was, after all, absurd that 10
percent of workers accounted for 60 percent of work done, declared the trade union
newspaper on its front page, days after the Economic Council meeting had virtually done the
same. Although she apparently situates the drive earlier and exaggerates its universalism,
Susan Woodward all the same depicts its main trends admirably:
‘The centrepiece of this democratizing process was the reorganisation of 
production on the shop floor and in the mines according to the system of 
autonomous production brigades [...] led by a skilled worker but using group 
discipline and group evaluation of work performance...After conferences to 
discuss labor organization collectively, the skilled worker...would assign tasks, 
assist less skilled workers where necessary, and move among brigades to make 
sure that machines were operating at full capacity. Brigades could set up 
assembly lines to speed production so that each brigade pushed the next...The 
brigades would also serve as a system of on-the-job training...’299
Earlier in the year, it had been up to the mass organisations to channel such initiative from
below, as a headline from a union newspaper aptly illustrated: ‘Brigades participate in the
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management of production, but they do not run it’.300 Following the acceleration of 
mobilisation and the democratising realignment of the late spring and early summer, 
emanating from the very apex of the Government, however, the development of the 
‘movement for higher productivity’ had encountered fewer constraints from above. Rather, it 
faced economic difficulties and bureaucratic resistances at lower echelons of the regime. 
Now it had run into its own limitations and the turn to intensification began to be reflected 
unevenly in other forums.
Namely, the Popular Front as the pre-eminent mass organisation began to re-think the nature 
and scope of the brigade system. The Popular Front’s task had been to make sure that the 
socialist transformation of the country integrated work in the urban and the rural contexts. 
Specifically in regard to labour mobilisation, it organised ‘special brigades’, which had two 
main tasks in regard to socialist construction. First, the brigades represented the repeated 
squeeze on the countryside for temporary activation of labour power for the tasks of 
‘primitive socialist accumulation’. Second, reserve labour from the countryside would in the 
process be enrolled for permanent employment in industry, thereby changing the social 
balance of the country in favour of the urban proletariat. In the context of a shift in priorities 
on the labour front, it was logical to reorient the work of the Popular Front. There was some 
disagreement on how to do so. After a sharp debate at the Secretariat of the Executive Board 
of the Popular Front on the 23rd September, where some ministers suggested that labour 
mobilisation be taken on by municipal organs of state power instead of the Front,301 the 
majority passed a compromise resolution that was nevertheless critical of the work of the 
Popular Front on the questions of labour recruitment and labour mobilisation. According to 
the statement, the Front had concentrated too much on mobilising for the sake of completing
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emergency labour quotas and had not developed methods of persuading mobilised peasants to
stay in industry. In addition to that, the Secretariat deemed the work of special brigades to
have been appreciably weakened by the continued disorganisation of the Popular Front on the
local level. It advised certain organisational remedies within the Front but also recommended
full utilisation levers like employment contracts once brigade members were on the shop-
floor. It decided to revive the use of special brigades for local work despite the continued
centrality to the plan of federal priority objectives because the local brigades were of
‘incalculable political interest’.302 The Politburo in fact went further some weeks later:
‘The P[opular] Front in regard to labour power should take recruitment of a 
permanent workforce for industry as [its] primary [task]. Volunteer labour 
brigades should go to local [worksites] or to major projects but only if [work] 
contracts are signed. AFZ [Anti-Fascist Front of Women] brigades to be 
completely abandoned.’303
As the Popular Front, therefore, began to moderate the whirlwind that had taken some 
730,000 peasants through industry in only the first half of the year,304 the Economic Council 
also further evolved its approach to labour: ‘The mines have become transitory corridors 
[prolazni hodnici] and in such conditions it is impossible to speak of a brigade system of 
work, the correct organisation of work, etc.’305 The top economic forum called for 21,000 
new workers if the plan was to be achieved before the end of the year but in the same month 
the Minister of Labour complained to the Economic Council that ‘we have already reached 
the limits of what the supply of unskilled labour power can achieve’.306 In early November, 
too, the Economic Council was again concentrating on productivity increases instead of
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labour recruitment: ‘in the remaining two months we need to overcome difficulties through 
the mobilisation of all internal reserves’.307
Even as the domestic agenda moved back and forth through the autumn, the leadership of the 
KPJ focused on external events which they saw as key to forward movement. Consequent 
upon its overtures to the West, Yugoslavia endured new pressures from the East: the Rajk and
‘J f tO
Kostov trials, troop build-ups and further invective from the Cominform. The Yugoslavs 
took their quarrel with the USSR to the U.N. and decided to put forward their candidacy to 
the U.N. Security Council over the following weeks, though it is still unclear when exactly, in 
order to secure the country against possible Soviet invasion.309 The success of their 
endeavour in late November signalled an opening for a new approach in both foreign and 
domestic policy. Within days of the triumphal return of the Yugoslav delegation from New 
York, the Politburo held a hastily convened set of meetings to sanction the activities and
310choices of the Yugoslav foreign representatives and to endorse the budget for 1950. 
Almost contemporaneously, the Economic Council formally decided to set up workers’ 
councils on an experimental basis in industry at the start of 1950.311 Finally, the year closed 
with extensive deliberation at the Third Plenum of the CC KPJ on 29 and 30 December to 
ratify the ‘strategic retreat’ in industry and the countryside.312
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Part III - Towards the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism ’ -  by umbilical cord with the USA
The Yugoslav Communist leadership welcomed the opportunity to retreat with relief. It had 
had to bend all its mechanisms to achieve maximum mobilisation during 1949 but found it 
had strained them to breaking point. Continuing along the same radical path as hitherto would 
have risked political upheaval. Yet the external threat, less imminent, continued to exist. The 
Yugoslavs found themselves between the Scylla of domestic exhaustion and the Charybdis of 
external threat. Thus their preoccupation remained how to resume forward movement even if 
it was from a weaker position and with slower pace. The answer in the first instance had to be 
the strengthening of their domestic position. The passage from extensive to intensive methods 
of raising productivity in particular represented a wager on sections of the workers who had 
led the shockwork campaigns: the workers’ council appeared to be an attempt to complement 
and supersede some of the functions of both the enterprise management and the union, 
thereby resembling yet another transitional form in the panoply developed by the leadership 
in the search for more effective mechanisms to pursue development.
Nevertheless, while change was the logical step at this juncture, the KPJ turn to the market 
based on workers’ councils was remarkable. The reasoning behind the new system is still 
difficult to discern in its totality and remains much debated. Certainly, the role of workers’ 
councils in winning external allies was a significant consideration. As Kardelj in his speech 
on foreign policy put it at the Third Plenum in December 1949, in the only reference to 
worker management during the entire proceedings, ‘I think that the strengthening of the 
democratic relations in our production -  with the formation of workers’ councils...- is 
exactly that which we shall be able to present to the world as the difference between us
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[Yugoslavia] and them [the East]...’313 Yet the choice of the market had little to do with 
domestic and international legitimation.
Rather more fundamental appeared to be the belief that centralised directive planning no 
longer provided a sustainable foundation for growth amid domestic scarcity and external 
precariousness. Indeed it was not until just after the promulgation of the worker management 
system in mid-1950 that domestic catastrophe in the form of drought forced the need for 
substantial direct aid from the West. Negotiations proved difficult but the perceived threat 
from the USSR in 1951 pushed Tito further than he had hoped to go. Yugoslavia sought 
military aid and secured a longer-term tripartite aid agreement with France, Britain and the 
USA. Cuts to wasteful expenditure, investments in the productive sector and balancing of 
budgets appeared rational following the battering that the apparatus had taken in 1949 but 
they could be presented as all the more necessary in the face of a growing external 
indebtedness. The precipitate pace of change following the summer of 1950, for that matter, 
suggested an element of political calculation on the part of reformers against potential 
conservatives in the apparatus. All the same, the pressures of the world market, if not its full 
operation, did increasingly affect domestic politics and development strategy as a 
consequence. They did so in several contradictory ways. First, market mechanisms 
exacerbated tensions in the federation by intensifying inter-republic struggles over scarce 
resources and forcing the federal government on the offensive. Second, the resulting federal 
policy to harness sub-republican identities in order to pressure the republics from below drew 
workers’ councils directly into the struggle for a new constitutional order. Third, the federal 
leadership deployed the widening trade deficit as a tool to discipline all of society but in 
particular to link increases in wages with increases in labour productivity. Central to the
313 Petranovid, Plenumi, 480
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project was an attempt to create a wage system that would validate entrepreneurial risk and 
increase labour productivity without compromising the goal of harmonious development.
Factories to the Workers!
The turn towards the market was contentious from the start within the KPJ. Many of its 
members had received training in the Marxist orthodoxy that equated the market with 
capitalism. Challenging the premise would unavoidably encounter resistance. That much was 
obvious at the Third Plenum even though the Plenum did not discuss or sanction reform 
measures in the economy. Indeed, it focused on the agricultural front and limited itself to 
halting the collectivisation drive, insisting simultaneously on the internal consolidation of 
existing collectives and cooperatives.314 The leadership had decided on a strategic retreat 
from forming co-operatives in the face of ‘formidable opposition to the collectivization 
campaign from within the party, from the republican authorities and local cadres, and from 
peasants’ in preceding months.315 On the industrial front, the published version of KidriC’s 
speech and the resolution itself aimed to pacify the population and did not warn of excessive 
wage or employment. Instead, they admitted to mistakes in regard to extensive mobilisation 
for two basic reasons. First, the workforce was not rationally distributed, which caused 
problems for industries badly in need of fresh labour. Second, the change in the social 
structure was proving a drain on agricultural resources. The solution, according to the 
leadership, lay in the battle for internal reserves and more rational mobilisation of peasant 
labour. While the subtext was that cuts were imminent, the line for public consumption, and 
indeed the expectation, was that industrialisation would continue to suck in labour and in fact
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soon ease the agricultural overpopulation that still blighted some regions.316 The retreat was 
seen therefore not as a downturn but a slowdown.
The discussions behind the scenes revealed that two contrasting emphases existed about the
way forward. One was gradualist and economistic in the sense of focus on mastering
objective laws. The other was more radical, and emphasised the subjective factor and
campaign methods of transformation in regard to collectivisation and labour. Tito clashed
with KidriS, Tempo, and Veselinov, and Kardelj with Neskovic, for mistakes attributed to the
latter tendency. Often, these illustrated past mistakes but at times they involved overall
direction. Thus Tito admonished Kidric for excessive concentration on industrialisation
without regard for agriculture or defence. This was well illustrated by two exchanges during
KidriC’s speech. In discussing agriculture, KidriC cited positively Tito’s intervention in the
care that the government had shown towards the population:
‘We have, keeping in mind our great need for agricultural products [since the 
war], about which our Party had taken great care at the initiative of comrade Tito, 
decreased greatly the export of agricultural goods. This year we exported just 
under 40 percent of what the old Yugoslavia used to export. (Comrade Tito: “So 
you exported quite a lot! ”) But we hardly made ends meet. (Comrade Tito: “So, 
you did circumvent those measures’’.)’317
Later, KidriS got onto industrial exports, arguing that the republics and local committees 
needed to pay more attention to achieving exports that were crucial for the defence of the 
country. Tito interrupted sarcastically: ‘It should be remembered that Kidrid took into 
account also our defensive capacities.’ KidriS defended himself: ‘I always take into account 
our defensive capacities’, only to get a further sarcastic reproach: ‘It’s just that our exports 
fell short.’318 When Kidri£ finished his presentation, Tito stated explicitly:
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‘I must openly say that I often argue with Kidriö...Comrade Kidriö always accepts 
my criticisms but he has obligations, since our industry seeks this and that and he 
has to give it...but what do we need to take care of? Who is our ally today? Our 
only ally is our own people and if you lose it, then you are left with no one. On 
the one side the Cominform, on the other side -  the capitalists. That is why we 
have to keep our one ally.’319
Tito similarly criticised Tempo for excessive mobilisation and asked why they do not use 
‘contracts and other measures’ in the mines,320 *only to be told that enterprise directors should 
indeed be made more responsible ‘but if left to themselves -  I think that would not be 
good.’ Exchanges with Veselinov, a member of the Serbian leadership from Vojvodina, 
involved both Tito and Kardelj, and were longer and more light-hearted. Veselinov sought 
faster collectivisation in Vojvodina, Slavonija and other grain-growing areas only to be 
accused of ‘voluntary establishment [of collectives] by decree’. His retort was that peasants 
from his locality were favourable and that they were fighting for socialism, which earned 
Tito’s riposte that ‘you are beating them with socialism!’.322
Dissident voices at the Third Plenum made it clear that a section of the leadership feared that 
the emphasis on intensive and economic methods was premature: Djuro Pucar from the 
Bosnian government spoke early in the debate to argue in favour of legalising conscription of 
skilled labour as the best way of overcoming fluctuation.323 No one backed his proposal but 
several speakers expressed their desire to maintain a more gradual transition away from the 
campaign and political methods of the preceding period. Veselinov, probably fearful of 
workers returning to the land, explicated the oppositional line in reference to Pucar: T am not 
speaking here of the suggestion by comrade Pucar that it is necessary to pass a law on forced 
labour mobilisation...[however] I would say that the transition [to the new system] must not
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be sudden but gradual’.324 Perhaps the most direct expression of the unrepentant hard line 
from within the leadership came from Neskovic who later quit the party in 1952 amid 
accusations that he had never reconciled himself to the Cominform split.325 He cited several 
other speakers to suggest that the Communists had ample reason to believe that they could 
rely on the changing attitudes of the peasants to effect collectivisation, and then clashed with 
Kardelj:
‘We cannot view the functioning of these various economic laws so fatalistically: 
the minute we give the peasant enough stimulation, his petty-propertied soul and 
his economic position come into contradiction with us and he is turned down 
work [so that he should cease being a burden on the state budget by being taken 
off guaranteed provisions]. That is a fatalistic worldview. We have to struggle 
against such phenomena by political work, we have to characterise this thing as 
political and to conduct class struggle. But we often fatalistically view certain 
objective economic and social laws within class struggle. (Comrade Kardelj: ‘But 
[to claim] that this does not exist [is wrong], it does exist!’) I think we should not 
relate to them fatalistically.’326
The leadership line associated with Tito and Kardelj prevailed but it was obvious that there 
was much confusion in the leadership. No stable factions existed and frequently speakers 
expressed different attitudes on different questions. Thus Veselinov and Neskovic, who both 
opposed the economistic conciliation of the population, came from different poles on the 
agricultural question with the former favouring collectivisation by force if necessary and the 
latter arguing against collectivisation but in favour of more political methods to win 
peasants.327 The opposition to the leadership line was therefore shallow because it 
represented attitudes rather than a programme and because it was consequently divided. It 
was probably on account of such opposition and not just the need to win the population that 
the leadership was slow at first to introduce reforms but felt safe to accelerate whenever it 
could present unmistakable signs of crisis that sought decisive measures. In fact, the 
leadership’s own stability appeared to owe as much to its position in power and hence its
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ability to initiate policies, its standing from the wartime era and the unity enforced by the 
outside threat, as to the coherence and hegemony of its own ideas within the leading 
echelons. This was illustrated by the contrasting approaches taken in Djilas’s and Kardelj’s 
speeches on the other issues dealt with at the Plenum. The idealistic Djilas was the first to 
raise the term ‘self-management’ albeit in relation to the cultural sphere while Kardelj exuded 
supreme pragmatism in his defence of realpolitik for Yugoslav foreign affairs: ‘we need to 
know how to make the correct tactical...concessions’.328
The seemingly contradictory turn towards ‘objective’ laws partially also expressed a dual 
reality as the leadership saw it. On the one hand, the intensity of the effort to fulfil the Plan in 
adverse conditions during 1949 had impressed most of the leadership sufficiently to suggest 
that socialised forms of production would prove suitable as a strategy of legitimating and 
reinforcing KPJ goals. On the other hand, campaign methods had over time proved 
themselves structurally limited and had begun antagonising the population in a mode that 
boded ill not just for the stability of the regime but for the geo-political position of the 
country. The centrality of workers’ councils to reforms reflected and refracted this 
contradiction in that the reforms represented a fundamental shift in the mechanisms employed 
to fulfil the Plan. The leadership would duly accord workers’ councils pride of place in the 
evolving ideological framework that would define the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’. Yet the 
changes simultaneously represented both a retreat from herculean mobilisations and an 
attempt to harness the popular consent and participation that the leadership had glimpsed in 
the industrial consultations, youth or volunteer brigade efforts, and shock-work. The 
gradualism of effort over the following period therefore expressed the need to win the higher 
echelons of the apparatus as well as the population to the new measures.
328 ibid., 292,474
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Over the following six months, however, conditions changed faster and more profoundly than 
the process of reform itself. Woodward notes that ‘[t]he new system was introduced in a 
campaign of three battles during 1950: the “battle to stabilise the workforce” with 
employment contracts; the “battle to balance goods and monetary funds” through enterprise- 
level balances among wages, labor plans, and guaranteed provisions; and the “battle to 
execute the production plan with reduced quotas of labor.’”329 Kidrid at the Third Plenum 
envisaged the employment of a modest 50,000 fresh workers over the following year.330 With 
production not rising fast enough to cover the wage bill or stabilise the urban-rural divide, 
however, the leadership decided it needed to effect downward revisions in employment by 
late February. The ensuing decision in July to pursue deep cuts in the public sector over the 
autumn appealed to decentralisation as a path of bringing management closer to the 
workplace. This deepened the ideological purview of self-management from the workplace to 
an anti-statist agenda based on decentralisation. Workers’ councils had turned by mid-1950, 
then, into a central ideological plank of a set of what tuend out to be market reforms. Their 
circumstances of operation and their significance changed significantly as a consequence.
The exact role of the councils consequently evolved and the scope of their competencies, 
reflecting the gradualist predispositions of the leadership, remained minimal. Their enactment 
in experimental form in December 1949 had registered concessions to the unions in 
comparison with the draft directive of mid-1949. The meeting at which the Economic 
Council formally decided to introduce the councils had taken place on 8 December and had 
explicated their ideological significance much earlier than Djilas claimed,331 in that their
329 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 151
330 Petranovid, Plenumi, 388
Almost every account of their elevation from experimental status quotes Djilas’s rather facile and misleading 
account in Pise and Fall, 265-269: ‘Once again 1 began working through Das ¡Capital...And so, as I perused in
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‘establishment and participation in the management of the enterprise is founded on the 
Marxist principle that the means of production shall be run by those who labour on them’.332 
The terms of the Directive, released on 23 December, duly contrasted with the terms of the 
earlier draft in several important ways. First, the Directive specified already in Article 2 that 
the competencies of the director ‘do not in any way’ change as a result of the formation of the 
council in a workplace and that the competencies of the union organisation are ‘neither 
changed nor diminished’ as they continued to organise socialist competition and mobilise the 
working class for the purposes of production. Second, the powers conferred upon the council 
as laid out in Articles 3 and 4 were merely consultative in regard to business plans but pro­
active in regard to the organisation of the work-process. Third, in direct opposition to the 
draft, the director was automatically a member of the council under Article 6. Fourth, 
meetings would be held monthly at a minimum rather than quarterly as stipulated by Article 9 
The Directive did contain some concessions to criticisms of the top-down nature of the 
process of decision-making in that in Article 12 it assigned the council the ‘duty to...inform’ 
unspecified higher government bodies of problems should the council be dissatisfied with the 
decisions of the director or the administrative-operational officer. Article 16 also bound the 
council to inform the entire work collective of important decisions via production 
consultations or workplace conferences.333
Developments on the ground moreover gave little indication that the ceremonial inauguration 
of self-management in mid-year owed much to the flourishing of initiative from below. The
Marx those passages dealing with a future “association o f immediate producers”....One day in late spring 
[1950], while we sat in a car, I presented the idea to Kardelj and KidriC. Both thought it was premature...Then 
one day KidriC phoned me... When we presented this in the National Assembly’s Hall o f Ministers, Tito was at 
first opposed....after pacing about for a bit, he exclaimed excitedly, “Bit this is Marxist -  factories to the 
workers!”
332 AJ 40-4, ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije po pitanju formiranja radniCkih saveta, odriane 8.XII.1949 god.’, 
Zapisnik br. 591/111
333
AJ 117-273-509, Uputstvo o obrazovanju i radu radniCkih saveta driavnih privrednih preduzeCa
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initial reports of pre-election conferences and assessments of the elections of the 
experimental councils, produced by the trade union bodies charged with their conduct, 
revealed the frequently paternalistic aspirations of the higher echelons of the party-state, the 
uneven implementation of these aspirations by enterprise-level leaderships and the varied 
responses from workers on the production line. The most striking aspect of the process was 
how the apex judged success: it sought the election of shock-workers, skilled workers, 
innovators and technicians but bemoaned the over-representation of ‘intellectuals’ and the 
under-representation of women;334 * it lamented the frequent lack of participation in 
discussions at the inaugural sessions on the part of workers and mostly blamed poor agitation 
in preparation of the event or the irrelevant speeches by local party officials as the main 
reason; it celebrated worker participation in discussion where it occurred but condemned 
attempts to present alternative lists for election to the workers’ council and described 
undefined criticisms made as ‘an improper, and possibly even enemy viewpoint’;336 it saw the 
organisation of production as the desired topic of discussion and viewed the announcement of 
socialist competition as acceptance of the councils in the best spirit.337 On the basis of 
stenographic records that are apparently now lost, Olivera Milosavljevic records the first 
consultations with directors, union activists, party members and republic ministers, held over 
the conduct of elections: ‘workers’ councils were generally interpreted as being an auxiliary
334 AJ 117-276, ‘Analiza o izvrSenom osnivanju i sprovedenim izborima radniékih saveta driavnih privrednih 
preduzeéa’ in NR Serbia, dated by hand ‘23.11.50’, 2; and also: ‘Analiza odrZanih izbora sa radniékih saveta’ in 
NR Croatia, dated by hand ‘3.III.50’. 1-2; ‘Zakljuéno poroéilo delavskih sovetov v Sloveniji’ in NR Slovenia 
dated ‘22.11.1950’ 2
AJ 117-276, ‘Analiza o izvrSenom osnivanju i sprovedenim izborima radniCkih saveta drZavnih privrednih 
preduzeéa’ in NR Serbia, dated by hand ‘23.11.50’, 4-5; ‘Analiza odr2anih izbora sa radniékih saveta’ in NR 
Croatia, dated by hand ‘3.III.50’. 2
AJ 117-276, ‘Analiza o izvrSenom osnivanju i sprovedenim izborima radniékih saveta drZavnih privrednih 
preduzeéa’ in NR Serbia, dated by hand ‘23.11.50’, 5
AJ 117-276, ‘Analiza o izvrSenom osnivanju i sprovedenim izborima radniékih saveta drZavnih privrednih 
preduzeéa’ in NR Serbia, dated by hand ‘23.11.50’, 5; ‘Zakljuéno poroéilo delavskih sovetov v Sloveniji’ in NR 
Slovenia dated ‘22.11.1950’, 2; ‘Analiza odrianih izbora sa radniékih saveta’ in NR Croatia, dated by hand 
‘3.III.50’. 1
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organ of the management, as well as that their appearance was in direct relation to the current 
foreign affairs position of the country in relation to the East...’.338
Yet even before the leadership was able to mould its experiment in response to the first 
experiences of the workers’ councils, the economic situation changed dramatically for the 
worse. Already in January, all indications were that the five-year plan was running into 
problems. In the Serbian mines, the Economic Council registered that ‘it is a general 
tendency that the directorates of the mines and the party and trade union organisations are 
completely demobilised’ while in Slovenia ‘resistance’ was developing to ‘the introduction of 
brigades’.339 A Politburo meeting in January also discussed serious political problems in 
Slovenia. A member of the Slovene Politburo recounted how the leadership had felt that 
‘things had been slipping from their hands’ the previous November; the economic situation 
had meanwhile got better while reforms ‘which impact on the work of the Party (w.councils, 
démocratisation, etc)...[amounted to] measures that shook the ranks and require intensive 
political work [to mend]’.340 Just the following month, however, plummeting agricultural 
production and the dismemberment of the agricultural co-operatives forced the Communists 
to further make concessions before an emerging hostile reality:341 on account of the growing 
gap between the demands of the urban population and the capacities of rural production, the 
Economic Council decided that ‘a kind of respite’ was necessary with a fall in the number of 
employed.342 The Economic Council hosted representatives of all the republics and re-iterated 
this decision at the start of March calling for unhesitating resolve in cutting labour supply and
338 Milosavljevi6, Driava i samoupravljanje, 105
AJ 40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije po pitanju uglja 18.1.1950 god.’, Zapisnik br. 12/IV, 1
340 AJ 507-III/39, wrongly dated 15. January 1949. The intention had obviously been 1950.13
341 Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, 131-140
AJ 40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa pretstavnicima NR po pitanjima plana gradevinskih radova, plana 
radne snage i plana prometa robe za 1950. god. odriana 27.11.1950’, Zapisnik. br. 42 /III, 3
105
ending fluctuation.343 By the beginning of April, some 70,000 had been removed from 
guaranteed provisions and the Economic Council calculated that the balance between newly 
employed and unemployed would leave some 20,000 workers without work.344
Such measures, however temporary, could not but impact on the functioning of the councils. 
Whereas instances had arisen, in Serbia, of councils seeking to supplant management with 
their resolutions communicated in the language of command in the first month of the 
operation of workers’ councils,345 the overall pattern tended towards decreasing participation 
in the first six months of 1950. Most reports from most republics noted that management, the 
party, the unions and the workers themselves had understood the councils as a mere 
formalisation of the production consultations. Frequently, general consultations ceased 
entirely and elected councils took their place;346 attendance at council meetings which 
comprised an elected minority was poor and dominated by the director and technical staff;347 
an informal new institution emerged in the form of the management board (upravni odbor) 
within the council to deal with everyday tasks;348 higher bodies frequently felt they could 
dominate;349 the quantity and quality of contributions by workers at the council was 
inadequate in that, when a contribution was made, it most often related to the organisation of 
labour in a particular sphere of production within the enterprise and did not venture beyond to 
questions of management or social welfare;350 production issues dominated the agenda;351
343 AJ 40-5-10 ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa pretsavnicima NR odrZane 1. marta 1950 godine’, Zapisnik. br.
42/111, 1
34J AJ 40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa sednice Privrednog saveta, odrZane 7.IV.1950’, Zapisnik br. 59, 1
346 ^  H7-276, ‘IzveStaj o radu radniCkih saveta u periodu februara 1950 godine’, Serbia, 2
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radniCkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeéa’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 1-2
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radniCkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeéa’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 2
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radniCkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeCa’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 12; ‘Analiza dela Delavskih svetov’, Slovenia, 18 April 1950,2
35o *lzve t^aJ 0 radu radniCkih saveta’, Serbia, 16 June 1950,3
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radniCkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeéa’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 2; ‘IzveStaj o radu radniCkih saveta’, Serbia, 16 June 1950,2
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conclusions and resolutions were rarely concrete;351 52 there was little attempt to alert rank-and- 
file workers of the content of meetings and it was only resolutions that the union and party 
cells would popularise;353 a comparatively small number of councils sent in reports about 
their activity at all and meetings were not infrequently scarce;354 and even the trade union 
reports suggested prompting a change of presidents of councils where union officials felt 
work was unsatisfactory.355
Overall, however, the leadership appeared pleased with the councils, since they had proved 
reliable in uncovering hidden reserves and become the central instrument for raising 
productivity.356 Introduction of workers’ councils had also been calculated ‘to secure 
workers’ cooperation -  by being allowed to review management’s decisions -  in the 
upcoming employment revisions that would reduce “surplus labour” and “hoarding” and send 
“one part eventually [back] to the village”.’357 On this count, the results were mixed. At 
times, when councils discussed cutting employment, their conclusions went against the 
desires of the higher echelons of the party-state: one report from Macedonia for April cited 
with disapproval council deliberations in which skilled workers bore the brunt of the
351 AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radnidkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeda’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 2-12. The report lists the agenda for council meetings in seven firms for the period o f  
1950 and 1951. Four had a workers’ council since January 1950, and each held between three and six meetings 
in the first six months o f  1950 discussing a total o f 49 items. Welfare was on the agenda only three times. 
Organisational questions within the council itself came up four times. All the other items on the list pertained to
production methods and targets.
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radnidkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeda’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 13; ‘Analiza dela Delavskih svetov’, Slovenia, 18 April 1950, 2; ‘IzveStaj o radu
radnidkih saveta’, Serbia, 16 June 1950, 2
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radniikih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeda’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 14; ‘IzveStaj o radu radnidkih saveta’, Serbia, 16 June 1950,3 
AJ 117-276, ‘IzveStaj o radu radnidkih saveta u periodu februara 1950 godine’, Serbia, 1 
AJ 117-276, ‘Informacija o radu radnidkih savjeta i upravnih odbora nekih preduzeda’ from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, no date, 15
356 AJ 40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa sednice privrednog saveta 11 aprila 1950’, Zapisnik br. 62/IV, 2; ‘Zapisnik sa 
sednice Privrednog saveta, odriane 29 i 30 aprila 1950 g.’, Zapisnik br.67/XI 6; ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa
pretsednicima privrednih saveta Narodnih republika, odriane 11 i 12 maja 1950 g .’, Zapisnik br.72/XV 18 
Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 156. It is to be taken Woodward is citing CC members from the 
Plenum.
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imperative to reduce excess labour in the enterprise.358 That was not an isolated incident 
according to the Economic Council.359
The exact reasons for the timing behind the decision to inaugurate the workers councils in 
mid-1950 still remain a mystery though. It is noteworthy that the final preparations occurred 
at a time of further slowdown in industrial production,360 the verge of a catastrophic harvest 
following armed peasant uprisings and in the wake of drought,361 and depressed international 
trade following spats with the West in early 195 0.362 The Federal Parliament in June 1950 
enacted ‘The Basic Law on the Management of State Enterprises and Higher Economic 
Cooperatives on the Part of Work Collectives’, instituting councils in industry and mining, 
but the law substantially changed little in comparison with the December directive in terms of 
the mode of functioning of the councils. More extensive and bombastic, with greater powers 
of initiative on the part of the councils and recognition of the informal management board, 
which also acted as the appeal board in dismissal cases, the new law still retained the ultimate 
powers of the director or higher state organs in regard to the business plan, hiring, and veto 
over measures at variance with the law and the plan, under Articles 8 and 37-40.363 Likewise, 
Tito’s speech inaugurating the law had ideological import as it amounted to ‘the first step in 
the formulation of the doctrine of “worker self-management”...which constituted a major 
subtheory of the doctrine of the withering away of the state.’364 Pushed against the wall, the 
Yugoslav Communists had probably decided to make a statement of principle and defiance,
358 AJ 117-276, ‘IzveStaj o radu radniCkih saveta na teritoriji NR Makedonije za mesec aprii 1950 godine’, 3
359 AJ 40-5-10 ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa pretstavnicima narodnih republika po pitanjima op§teg plana 
gradevinarstva, plana gradevinarstva za mesec aprii i plana radne snage, odriane 5 aprila 1950 godine.’, 
Zapisnik br. 60/111, 2
360 The already reduced yearly plan had been fulfilled by 46 percent o f the total in mid-year in value but not by 
the quantity or quality o f goods. AJ 40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa sastanka sa pomoénicima, odrôanog 12.VI.1950 god.’, 
Zapisnik br. 85,1
361 Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, 134-140
2 For figures, see Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 60; for difficult period in Yugoslav-Western relations see 
Bekié, Jugoslavia u Hladnom ratu, Chapters 7 and 8
363 See BoSkovió and DaSié, Socialist Self-Management in Yugoslavia, 1950-1980, Documents, 63-72
Johnson, Transformation o f Communist Ideology, 162
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setting out on their path. Symbolically, the date coincided almost exactly with their expulsion 
from the Cominform.
Market Socialism and the Republic o f Producers
Whatever the exact reasoning for the timetable of reform that followed June 1950, its effects 
were far-reaching. Policy towards the countryside manifested a progressive withdrawal of 
direct state encroachment. The government did away with agricultural machine stations in 
September 1950, abolition of collections followed in two waves in mid-1951 and then mid- 
1952, introduction of higher prices for agricultural goods and a more relaxed taxation regime 
occurred in several intervals over the same period.365 The dismantlement of the collectives 
also progressively took place in 1952.366 On the industrial front, as one prominent account 
has aptly put it, ‘[t]he first eighteen months after June 1950 were marked by a series of 
administrative and legal changes which were individually of minor significance but which 
reflected and also reinforced the new approach...Measures...in 1951 included the elimination 
of the state control commission in February; the suppression of the Federal Planning 
Commission and most remaining federal-republican economic ministries and directorates- 
general in April; no less than three laws...attempting to free price formation in consumer 
goods; and the liberation of the consumer from restrictions of his choice of market and an 
‘administered supply’ of agricultural goods.’367 By mid-1952, direct contracts between 
buying and selling firms replaced the supply allocation plan which was characteristic of 
central planning, leaving enterprises free to operate ‘within existing capacities’.368
365 Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists, 149
366 ibid., 151
367 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 62-63
368 Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, 82
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The ideological import of self-management within this process was central. The dismantling 
of the central apparatus at this stage amounted to a considerable extent to a federal offensive 
against what it perceived the incorrigible and long-time recalcitrance of the republics that had 
been retarding the Five-Year plan. The struggle for control had always involved both the 
weakening of and making concessions to the republics. The former included strong vertical 
hierarchies of initiative and control over the bulk of finance, investment and legislation. The 
most notable instance of the latter included the abolition of various federal ministries, of 
Mining and Electrical Industry in February 1950 and Agriculture, Forestry, Light Industry, 
Construction, Trade and Supply in April 1950, and their transferral to the republics. Each 
concession required a negation, however, and the federal summit proved original in its 
various attempts to undermine the republic leaderships. Various historians have suggested 
that enfranchisement of the enterprise or municipal level had always been intended by the 
federal government to create allegiances at sub-republican level that would pressure the 
federal units from below.369 70 Indeed, KidriC placed the role of the federation and the republics 
in the overall plan for decentralisation in a more ideological exposition in the spring: ‘What 
we are discussing here is that the process of development is such that the apparatus does not 
turn into a bureaucracy but fulfils its tasks, coupling with the ever greater initiative of the 
masses, which replaces the apparatus ever more...This will allow for the apparatus at the 
federal and the republic levels to diminish...’371
Yet within a month, he lambasted the republics because they: ‘understood the reorganisation 
as state-decentralist, and not decentralisation in the sense of bringing the management of 
production closer to the producer. The republics give next to nothing to the municipalities
369 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 57, ff. 74
See Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1984 229
AJ-40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa pretstanvicima NR, odriane 1 marta 1950 godine’, Zapisnik br. 
42/111, 3
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‘17'5and the process of the transferral of local industry is going very slowly’. He went on to 
publicly announce at the inauguration of the ‘Basic Law on the Management of State 
Economic Enterprises by Working Collectives’ in the Federal Assembly in July 1950 that the 
cuts of ‘20-30%’ of the administration ensured: ‘[that] the right of command of the state 
administration over the economy is ever more restricted...the [state] apparatus in our 
economy...increasingly really transforms into the true servants [s/c] of the working 
people’.372 73
The measures taken in the summer did not result in satisfaction for the federal apex, 
moreover, and Minister for Heavy Industry Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo spoke for several 
ministers when he said on 15 December: ‘The economy has, with decentralisation, closed off 
into republican borders.’374 Therefore, Yugoslav hopes that domestic trade which had been 
liberalised in September that year would begin to break down barriers in the rural-urban 
divide or the inter-republican divide had run against structural meltdown in the countryside: 
dinars in circulation had dropped from 45 billion in 1949 to 40.9 billion by the end of 
1950.375 Only an emergency $50 million loan sought after in early October of that year and 
forthcoming from the US in mid-November forestalled ‘the prospect of starvation in some 
areas’.376 Exports had already fallen from $302.2 million in 1948 to $192.3 million in 1949 
but in 1950 they fell further to $158 million. By contrast, imports had fallen more slowly 
from $315.7 million in 1948 through $291.4 million in 1949 to $231.6 million in 1950.377
372 AJ-40-5-10, ‘Zapisnik sa sednice Privrednog saveta, odriane 26.VI.1950 god.’, Zapisnik broj 94, 1
Boris KidriC, ‘O reorganizaciji driavnog upravljanja privredom’, in Socijalizam i Ekonomija, Globus, 
Zagreb, 70
374 ‘Zapisnik sa sednice Privrednog saveta Vlade FNRJ odriane 15. decembra 1950. godine’, zapisnik br. 171
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Moreover, the crisis in Yugoslav agriculture, compounded by drought, forced the Yugoslavs 
to seek aid from the West. Contacts in this direction had already begun in February when 
Kardelj as foreign minister had presented the American ambassador ‘with a persuasive case 
for aid to Yugoslav economy [s/c] trying to trade with the West but without any of the 
promised Western loans’.378 The Yugoslavs sought aid from the International Bank for 
Development and Reconstruction (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but as 
a consequence of the food and export crisis their demands on the former in particular 
rocketed from $200 million to $400 million on conditions far less export oriented than when 
they first approached the institution.379 This ultimately resulted in direct talks between the 
American president of the IBRD and Tito himself in September, 1950. While cordial, they 
failed to break the deadlock and the continued delay meant that the Yugoslav current account 
worsened in 1951. It was only the determination of the U.S. administration to ‘keep Tito 
afloat’ that secured with Britain and France the Tripartite agreement of spring 1951 for $120 
million, to offset the $205 million deficit in the Yugoslav balance of payments. This 
amounted to 94 percent of the country’s current account earnings.380 That opened the way for 
the formalisation of military ties and significant U.S. military aid began to flow from 
November 1951.381 The Yugoslavs continued to resist moves to prioritise agricultural and 
light industry investments, however, claiming that their investment over preceding years 
would be wasted and was in any case necessary for further diversification later down the 
line.382
Following the securing of their international position and the promise of credits that would 
begin to arrive in 1952, the Yugoslavs began to dismantle what was left of the administrative
378 Lampe, Prickett and Adamovid, Yugoslav-American Economic Relations, 31
380 ^amPe’ Pickett and Adamovid, Yugoslav-American Economic Relations, 37
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apparatus. The new federal arrangement again proceeded to draw power upwards towards 
federal institutions or devolve it below the republics. Financial power represented the main 
form of concentration of power upwards while executive functions travelled lower in the 
hierarchy.383 The federal apex attempted to discipline the republics from above by exposing 
them to the world market. The minutes of a meeting held in mid-May expressed alarm that 
the Plan was stalling and suggested: ‘It is necessary to begin with preparations of the 
conditions for the decentralisation of foreign trade, not just in the sense of a decentralisation 
that would signify the free disposal of foreign currency but a decentralisation in the sense of 
the obligations that foreign trade creates for the republics. The import of raw materials will in 
the main be transferred to the republics, on the principle -  import levels will be determined 
by the fulfilment of the plan of exports...The republics have to start taking responsibility for 
the fulfilment of the plan.’384 A month later, the Economic Council had gone on to spell out 
that foreign trade had to capture a share of ‘world profit rates’ and that decentralisation aimed 
to enable ‘our foreign trade...to transform [the economy] from [being] a commodity 
accumulator [an importer]...to [becoming] an accumulator of foreign currency [an 
exporter].’385 *Kidrid himself then went as far as to suggest explicitly in mid-July ‘that at first 
glance this decentralisation of foreign trade looks like pressure on the [Peoples’ Republics]. 
However that is not pressure in a bad way since it is reciprocal...In regard to foreign trade, 
real decentralisation will be only at such a time when we are able to provide decentralisation 
by branches, factories and producers. The producer, not the [People’s Republic] will buy and
10/
sell goods. Then we will reach the mutual association of individual branches.’ The 
government indeed took steps first to extend the decentralisation of foreign trade to
383 Egon Neuberger, ‘Centralization vs. Decentralization: The Case o f Yugoslav Banking’, American Slavic and 
East European Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Oct., 1959), 361-373
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enterprises in May 1951 and only curtailed it partially following the return of economic 
growth in the second half of 1952.387
The market logic did not eliminate but transformed inter-republic tensions however.388 *This 
was for two basic reasons. First, the market logic demanded a wager on the strong. When, in 
spring of 1950, the Economic Council had brought to its attention crisis situations in the 
agricultural areas of Slavonija (Croatia) and Vojvodina (Serbia), it rejected the interpretation 
that the high intensity of collectivisation and disproportionately high rate of agricultural 
collections had led to the breakdown of order in these regions. Rather, after over a week of 
deliberation, the Economic Council concluded that the main problem was the lack of 
investment in Vojvodina and Slavonija which had gone instead to the so-called ‘passive’ or 
historically less developed regions. This was to be corrected in order to strengthen the 
socialised sector and increase agricultural supply for consumers at home and abroad.
Second, the case of Macedonia in November 1952 encapsulated the dependence of 
Yugoslavia on its military capacity for its geopolitical position, which in turn brought it 
crucial foreign aid. Military-related investment, particularly in Bosnia, did much to dampen 
the tendencies to regional autarky with decentralisation and market reform that began to 
emerge in 1950. Nevertheless, it also increased Yugoslav dependence on market-related 
macroeconomic criteria in investment because of the need to pay off loans. Two government- 
level meetings held in May and July of that year, which had given the Macedonians mixed 
signals about investments in their republic, aptly illustrated this new reasoning. Theirs was 
the only republic, they were keen to stress, which was exporting labour power to the rest of
387 Sluzbeni list FNRJ, br 22 od 2. maja 1951. godine, Sluzbeni list FNRJ, br. 35 od 1. jula 1952 godine.
See for similar conclusions, Hamilton, Yugoslavia: Patterns of Economic Activity, Chapter 8
AJ 40, ‘Zapisnik sa sednice Privrednog saveta Vlade FNRJ, odr2ane 29. i 30. aprila 1950. godine’, Zapisnik 
br. 67/XI; ‘Zapisnik sa konferencije sa predsednicima narodnih republika, odriane u Privrednom savetu Vlade 
FNRJ 11. i 12. maja, 1950. godine’, Zapisnik br. 67-XI
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Yugoslavia: a sure sign of its lack of development. The amount they had been led to believe 
they would receive was in fact not forthcoming and they were asking in excess of 6.6 billion 
dinars. It was significant that in doing so they referenced the potential laying to waste of 
existing foreign investments in the republic should their wishes not be granted.390
It was equally significant that despite, or in fact because of, military and economic aid from 
the West, the Politburo felt that it had been correct to have diverted the said resources to the 
upkeep of the army. Tito highlighted the menace as he saw it: ‘We cannot help [Macedonia] 
with foreign currency. The foreign currency for the military has been reduced already and if 
we were to do this [decrease military expenditure further to 1.2 billion dinars] we would have 
to close factories. But without the army we are nothing. We don’t get aid in order to build 
socialism but because the West fears the East. That’s why we have resolved to give 1.5 
billion to the army. We have, therefore, to take care of our external position...We have to 
advance gradually and build what is necessary [domestically]...We have to take great care of 
profitability.’391 Though the two sides reached a compromise in the form of 5.5 billion dinars 
going to Macedonia,392 this episode demonstrated the extent to which the Yugoslavs found 
themselves in a new situation: relying on their geopolitical position to draw investment funds 
but reinforcing domestic inequalities as a consequence. The purported redistributive character 
of investment in the initial five-year plan began to appear very distant.
Nevertheless, since federal power largely depended on its monopoly on dealings with 
international creditors as well as its ability to control fiscal and monetary policy, the apex 
depended on the strengthening of the legal apparatus. More than that, in order to avoid 
accusations that it was beholden to financial interests and not to the working people, it aimed
AJ 507, III-59, 3, 5
391 AJ 507, III-59, 3, 5
392 AJ 507, III-59, 5
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to reconstruct new forms of popular control over state executive functions based in the last 
instance on the workers’ councils. This to some extent occurred with the re-assertion of 
socialist legality at the Fourth Plenum in mid-1951, which had clear undertones of a 
minimalist socialist state akin to the Rechtsstaat of the Continental European legal 
tradition.393 Since , the creation of local initiative on the level of the firm would help create a 
constituency for the regime based on class, what was being crafted, as Connor has suggested, 
was ‘a dialectic scheme in that a transnational identity was to be promoted by stimulating a 
subnational, functional identity.’394
Indeed, the claim that the state was undergoing a metamorphosis to become the ‘commune 
state’ of which Lenin had written about in the State and Revolution, rested on the 
constitutional reforms that the old Communist Mosa Pijade was drawing up under the 
direction of Kardelj from December 1951. Pijade introduced the document on the re­
organisation of popular power to the Fifth Plenum in May 1952 to a barrage of criticisms. 
The main idea behind the complex set of amendments to the 1948 constitution was to 
strengthen representative over the administrative organs of power, and abolish the Chamber 
of Nationalities as a second chamber in the federal parliament and replace it with a Chamber 
of Producers. Delegates were to be elected from workers’ councils and other mass 
organisations. Pijade envisaged that the body would dominate the financial centres that had 
been amalgamated and placed at its disposal: the self-organised working class would be 
setting the pace of investment centrally while execution of policy would be decentralised and 
organised bottom-up.395 The law itself would only be passed in January 1953. Nonetheless, 
the intention to counter the centrifugal pulls on the federation by appending new mechanisms
393 For the early Soviet rendition, see Evgeni! Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, London: Ink 
Links, 1978
394
Connor: The National Question, 229.
395 Petranovié, Plenumi, 650-652
116
to a new top body in the Federative Republic that had some popular standing was clear 
enough. It was a significant step towards widening what had until then been known as 
‘worker management’ to ‘social self-management’.396
In the same period, there was an attempt to tie wage increases to increases in labour 
productivity. KidriC argued in a series of articles starting in November 1950 going through 
his most adventurous in July-September in 1951 and ending in January-March 1952 in favour 
of the harnessing of the law of value to the benefit of the economy. He did warn however
397against the principle of the establishment of an average rate of profit in the economy. 
Woodward has aptly argued that this followed the socialist preoccupation with the need for 
wages to be determined by the results of work in the transitional period: ‘Although 
productivity was defined in its Marxist sense of declining socially necessary labour time, and 
although social control over investment was intended to expand capacity and productivity, 
the system of industrial relations assumed that the primary source of growth was rising labour 
productivity in existing firms, supplemented by local initiative...Labor’s price...in the public 
sector should, it was believed, be a direct measure of its contribution to productivity...not a 
measure of its scarcity and bargaining power on an external market.’398 The consequence was 
a new wage system passed in December 1951 and operational from April 1952 according to 
which formal central determination of wage norms and employment quotas was abolished, 
and wages divided between a guaranteed social minimum and a variable proportion decided 
by the workers’ council.399 The variable element was, however, severely curtailed by the 
complex ‘rate of accumulation and funds’ system which basically taxed away at a progressive 
rate income above that necessary for running production at minimum capacity. More than
396 See for useful explanation o f constitutional principles: Ivo Lapenna, ‘Main Features o f  the Yugoslav 
Constitution 1946-1971’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1972), 21, 209-229
397 Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, Chapter 4 
”5 Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 174-5 
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that, prices continued to rise amid abandonment of price controls in agriculture and scarcities 
in industrial consumer goods, and outstripped the minimum portion of the wage, dictating 
rises in the variable portion, which in turn fuelled inflation.400 Some early indication of its 
inadequacy came when variable rates between skills categories of workers were made to 
reward attainment of formal qualifications, to take effect from 1953.401 Nevertheless, the 
changes in the system as a whole transformed the party-state’s approach to labour.
Industrial Relations under ‘Socialist ’ Unemployment
Developments on the shop-floor reproduced in intensified form the transitional character of
the period. The effects of the economic crisis, the sheer unevenness of occurrences in view of
constant institutional changes and the chaos among lower echelons of the unions in particular
on account of demoralisation characterised the first phase of the process of change.
Popularisation of the new wage system followed in 1951, only to produce further
disorientation upon its introduction in 1952. Several statistics illustrate the depth of the
contrast between the years 1946-1949 and 1950-1952. Surveying employment rates alone,
with 461,000 workers employed in industry in 1945, rising to 1,990,000 in 1949, and then
falling to 1,734,000 by 1952, indicates that it would not be a confident working class pressing
its demands in the councils in contrast with the preceding trend.402 The leaderships of the
various institutions of the party-state continued to exhibit differing attitudes to change, with
the KPJ lower echelons being slowest to shed the dirigisme inherited from the USSR, the
union leadership beginning a period of soul searching with an increasingly critical stance
towards the reforms, and the Popular Front slowly losing its preeminent role in mobilisation
and becoming more political-educational in character. The depth of change in social
400 Bidanid, Economic Policy, 103-105
Biland2id, Historija Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 185
Bilandiid, Historija Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 162-163
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conditions necessarily provoked a genuine ideological crisis that shook the party-state with 
the KPJ itself deciding to publicly ditch its leading role as the zenith of the reform process 
and rename itself the League of Communists (SKJ) to symbolise its new educational role.
With the SSJ charged since December 1949 with implementing worker management in its 
experimental phases, its role remained central following the passing of the Basic Law. 
Organisational changes followed fast and the SSJ held two plenums in July and September 
1950: the Twelfth and Thirteenth. At the Twelfth Plenum, the trade unions took the decision, 
first, to follow the trend of the federal state and cut administrative bureaucracy as well as 
reactivate voluntary participation. Thus the overall number of full time employees, which had 
risen to 2,271 in 1948 to 3,009 in 1949, now began to fall dramatically, to 1,140 in 1950,499 
in 1951, 433 in 1952, and 411 in 1953.403 Second, measures against bureaucratic methods 
envisaged a more active approach to leadership at lower levels of the hierarchy. This implied 
among other measures leaving 60-70 percent of dues to the local organisations, while the 
figure had been 30 percent.404 Third, in direct response to the implementation of the Basic 
Law, the fundamental role of the SSJ became educational and cultural in nature. For fear that 
the complexities of the transition could strengthen bureaucratic resistance to the line in the 
lower echelons of the party-state, factory cells had to educate workers to help them assert 
themselves in the councils. That task included attention to working and living conditions 
among workers even though that task would begin to wither away.405 Fourth, the Plenum 
abolished the division in competencies between the territorial and industrial unions at local 
level because the frictions and lack of co-ordination had been detrimental to work.406
403 Milosavljevid, Driava i samoupravljanje, 320, ff. 112
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Local leaderships and the rank-and-file interpreted the results of the Basic Law and the 
Twelfth Plenum as the cessation of the need for a union. Membership began to fall and mass 
apathy set in. Some union leaders continued in the ‘old way’ but the key-note speaker 
exhibited greater fear of ‘parliamentarianism’ than ‘bureaucratism’ in the ranks: discussion 
without mobilisation would be detrimental to the economy.407 The new task would be to 
advise councils and management boards on economic affairs because of the experience of the 
union but also to continue mobilising the workforce to attain the goals of the plan. Part of the 
problem was however that more general cultural and educational work had since the Sixth 
Congress fallen to single individuals to conduct and had thus disappeared for all practical 
purposes in the productivity drive. Now, the focus would be for committees as a whole to 
conduct educational and cultural work, with more courses and schools for union activists.408 
This followed a similar move by the KPJ: both were an obvious response to the need to 
switch to an intensive mode of work which involved greater technical and cultural levels 
among workers.409 The Thirteenth Plenum attempted to redress problems by circulating 
clearer and more detailed guidelines for activists, which were later cited by local union 
branch reports as having had a beneficial impact.410
The unions thereafter spent most of 1951 preparing the ground for the new wage system, 
holding a consultation, plenum and congress. Their new identity was more akin to the 
sympathetic teacher than charismatic organiser. Leaders appeared to become ever more 
openly concerned about living standards. Their refrain became that they were aware that 
times were tough but they pointed out that external difficulties were the cause. They 
explained that welfare projects continued to be pursued nonetheless and that changes to the
407 AJ 117-15-32, ‘MiSo Paviéevié: Uloga sindikata u osposobljavanju trudbenika za upravljanje privredom’, 9
408 Ibid.,37-39
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economic system would bring improvements if workers understood the correct balance 
between raising their own wages and reinvesting. Accounts of the new wage system and the 
market became frequent. Thus, the appeal was to patience rather than superhuman efforts.411 
The contrast between the citations from the Marxist classics in 1950 and 1952 mirrored this 
state of affairs. At the close of the Thirteenth Plenum, the battle cry was that ‘in the 
realisation of the most responsible task which historical development has foisted on mankind 
-  the erection of the free association of direct producers -  our unions will, under the 
leadership of the Communist Party, make their contribution and justify their name -  the 
schools of the socialist education and cultural elevation of the working class.’412 By contrast, 
the leadership address to the Second Congress in November 1951 was far less bombastic. It 
cited Marx from the Civil War in France:
‘The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no 
ready-made utopias to introduce par décret du peuple. They know that in order to 
work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which 
present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will 
have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, 
transforming circumstances and men.’413
By spring, however, it had become clear that despite the importance accorded to the issue of 
the new wage system at the Second Congress, unions had not prepared the ground 
adequately. The consultation held in March with the leaders of the industrial unions made it 
clear that all other work was to be delayed such that conferences about the new wage system 
could be held, the requisite information gathered and the correct line communicated to 
members.414 The responsible union officer explained that: ‘the basic question to which we 
should pay special attention is the correct distribution of the wage fund within the enterprise,
411 AJ 117-15-33,’XIV plenum, 18-19 juna 1951 g u Beogradu’, ‘Zadaci sindikatau reSavanju neposrednih 
ekonomskih i socijalnih pitanja radnika i sluZbenika’, 1-15
412 ‘MiSo Pavidevid: Uloga sindikata u osposobljavanju trudbenika za upravljanje privredom’, 39
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414 AJ 117-21-56, ‘Zapisnik sa sastanka odrianog sa pretsednicima Centralnih odbora sindikata na dan 7 marta 
1952 godine’ 1
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the determination of the tariff rates for each workplace, the liquidation of wage levelling and 
due reward for work performed.’415 Since special care was to be taken to ascertain average 
wages in enterprises within an industry and across republics, the inescapable conclusion was 
that the centre was serious about trying to create an even playing field for every worker such 
that individual pay would reflect individual work regardless of the circumstances of the firm 
or region the worker was employed in.416
The design of the wage system made this very difficult in conditions of underdevelopment 
and unevenness. The second elections to the new workers’ councils took place in the spring 
of 1952 and boded ill for the introduction of the wage system: turnout was low as ‘peasants 
industrial workers’417 did not attend and masses of workers in any case appeared to 
boycott.418 The councils’ work was poor: councils ‘separated themselves from the collective’, 
workers did not know ‘who the president of the workers’ council was’ and continued to 
believe in the omnipotence of the director, and the party analyses themselves sought 
explanations in the subjective weaknesses of the various political and social actors rather than 
trying to find reasons in material conditions.419 Regional economic disparities began to blight 
both the content and quality of reports: in industrialising Bosnia, the work of the councils was 
worrying as up to a third of councillors did not take part in proceedings and ‘enemy elements’ 
were vocal.420 The former tendency probably reflected the high incidence of ‘peasants 
workers’ while the latter explanation sounded like the highly moralistic partisan approach of 
the immediate post-war period, suggesting that those writing reports continued to be the same 
people or people trained in the same spirit who saw the world in martial terms. Meanwhile, in
415 ibid.
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the more developed Slovenia, reports praised the new system for successes in rationalising 
production. The mistakes they cited were also more nuanced and technocratic: experts hid 
behind concepts like profitability to hoodwink workers but workers without the capacity to 
challenge experts developed an opportunist or sectarian line towards experts.421
The actual effects of the wage system developed along similar lines. Unemployment 
increased as skilled workers who dominated the management boards with ultimate 
jurisdiction over dismissal saw the potential for higher earnings with fewer workers in the 
enterprise.422 Meanwhile, the uncontrollable environment caused almost immediate and 
irrational fluctuation of prices but usually an upward trend which drove wages up and 
inflation up as well: indeed some 43 percent of firms were unable even to pay the minimum 
social wage and needed to be subsidised by the bank.423 Generally, only Slovenian reports 
suggested that the system had caused an increase in productivity. Elsewhere, demobilisation 
and apathy reigned and, with union indifference, it appeared that neither market nor 
mobilisation were effective.424 Tendencies towards remedy began to appear for the year 1953. 
Changes to the wage system tried to blunt the drive towards unemployment by bringing in 
differentiation of workers according to skill to thereby decrease incentive to lay off less 
skilled workers. Giving more power of taxation to local government, the federal apex hoped 
to attain a more rational rate of accumulation and funds that would lessen enterprise 
dependence on central subsidies.425
Neither the KPJ nor the Popular Front managed to turn this situation around. Communists 
played a significant role in the work of the councils, comprising just under a third of
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members of workers’ councils and just over a third of members of management boards.426 
Nevertheless, party cells tended to veer between the ‘old methods’ of simply asserting the 
line to the unions and councils, and the new apathy whereby their leadership appeared to be 
unnecessary in the new era of socialist democracy.427 The Popular Front by contrast had little 
direct involvement in production given that its role outside the major public projects was not 
in industry. Still, the Popular Front continued to wrestle the SSJ over voluntary brigades for 
local works, with union branches attempting to justify their resistance by reference to 
voluntary work within factory compounds or in factory-related work.428 The Popular Front 
exhibited extreme demobilisation and an inability to return to political work following its role 
in 1949: in many bigger cities like Skopje in Macedonia it managed to neither popularise the 
Basic Law nor produce a single slogan for the first set of elections for workers’ councils.429
It was in these circumstances, by the second half of 1952, that Yugoslavia officially 
completed, or rather abandoned, its ill-fated first five-year plan that it had started in 1947. 
This signified the end of an era and certainly represented a logical point for the KPJ to hold 
the Sixth Congress. Tito had explained at the Fifth Plenum earlier in 1952 that the Politburo 
had kept postponing preparations because of the reform process or what he described as ‘the 
wholesale labour and development of our country’.430 The KPJ finally held its historic Sixth 
Congress in November 1952 on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Tito condemned 
Soviet ‘state capitalism’ while the young but mortally ill KidriC delivered his last public 
speech to re-affirm his legacy as the market planner and doyen of the ‘Yugoslav Road to 
Socialism’. The Congress passed several resolutions of significant symbolic value. The 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia became the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to
426 Milosavljevié, Drzava i samoupravljanje, 311
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symbolise a return to Marx. The League was separated from the State; it had a ‘conscious’ 
rather than a ‘leading’ role; its basic or local organisation meetings opened to the public; 
higher bodies could no longer dispense operational assignments to lower bodies; basic or 
local organisations would recruit and expel their own members with no reference to the 
Central Committee; there would be a free struggle of opinions in the organisation instead of 
the stale obedience of the leaders;431 ‘socialism was built not by the party but by the class...’ 
with the role of the party ‘to educate the class for its [historic] role.’432 Such rhetoric and such 
moves showed the boldness of an organisation that had decided to leap into the unknown. 
Where the move had come from is unclear from the available evidence. What is certainly 
obvious is that the move at the Congress did not logically reflect either the experience of the 
re-orientation or the deliberations of the mass of the Party. Even more than the Directive 
establishing the first experimental worker councils, which had been an ideological response 
to a nevertheless existent force from below in 1949, the 1952 departure from a strict 
interpretation of democratic centralism showed that the ideological aspect of the Yugoslav 
transformation, even if it had arisen from material circumstances, had taken on a logic of its 
own.
Conclusion
This first chapter of the thesis has argued that Yugoslavia struck out on its own path only 
after 1948. Before the split with Stalin, the KPJ proved to be a highly creative but loyal ally 
of Moscow. Its domestic politics followed previous Soviet schemes albeit with adaptations to 
Yugoslav conditions. Indeed, the country’s chosen radical development path depended on the 
Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Close relations existed and no evidence of the desire to
431 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 16-11
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break came to the fore. Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs were an independent ally of the USSR 
and pursued their line according to their own elaboration of it. When the split came, it took 
the leadership by surprise. Yet the leadership remained reluctant to retreat from its radicalism 
and the split temporarily strengthened radicalism because classical methods of labour 
mobilisation from the 1930s Soviet Union remained the only remaining resource for 
Belgrade. When that strategy began to reach its structural limits, the Yugoslav Communists 
tilted West in the Cold War in order to procure security and aid. At that point, the KPJ began 
to contemplate the dismantlement of its centralised apparatus, decentralisation, financial 
controls and balancing of budgets, and limited market methods to make the most of its scarce 
resources to maintain the essentials of its development plan. The worsening of its internal 
situation given its lack of reserves and the drought that hit the country in the summer of 1950 
pushed the Yugoslav leadership towards a progressively increasing reliance on the U.S. for 
aid. This changed its retreat into a full-blown new strategy that rested on two mutually 
dependent and yet contradictory tendencies. One was to establish criteria for profitable 
macroeconomic investments that could keep dependence on the West to the minimum and to 
repay loans. The other was to use U.S. aid to maintain central control and continue building a 
military-related heavy industry. This transformed relations domestically, forcing the 
abandonment of agriculture to the private sector, reinforcing regional imbalances, and 
weakening labour on the shop-floor.
Workers’ management emerged as an idea in 1949 during the height of the major labour 
mobilisations to complete the plan. As such, it contained the dual imprint of its times. On the 
one hand, it sought to capture the enthusiasm of the campaign methods gripping industry and 
the public projects. On the other hand, it envisaged the need to reverse these campaign 
methods because of their failure to provide a basis for intensive rather than extensive growth.
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Institutionally, the first draft in fact made this intention clear because it left the council as an 
empty shell in the hands of enterprise management and demoted the unions as the chief 
agents of mobilisation in industry. Union opposition to this draft from a temporary position of 
strength suggested that the union leadership wanted to maintain a close link with the class it 
was institutionally wedded to. This dual tendency was built into the first directive since union 
complaints gained incorporation into the experimental phase of the implementation of the 
council system. By mid-1950, the basis of the compromise remained but a nuanced 
oscillation back in the direction of management occurred. It was in fact invisible at the time 
but became more visible. The rise of the management board and its empowerment as the 
ultimate tribunal for dismissal expressed well the party leadership’s wager on social mobility 
for the more skilled or qualified against the less skilled at a time when numbers in 
employment had to be reduced.
The tendency of the director and managing board to block against the workers’ council and 
the wider work collective further evolved in the period after the inauguration of the new wage 
scheme. Alongside imperfection in the new economic system and wider conditions, this 
tendency frustrated the party leadership’s desire to implement the principle of ‘to each 
according to their work’. Yet precisely because the new system emerged in recession and 
increasing regional inequalities, the further unintended consequence of the process was the 
reinforcement of the role the union as an all-Yugoslav organisation in implementing policy 
and mobilising workers. In conditions of unevenness when neither the market nor 
mobilisation appeared yet capable of moving society forward, such distinctions were of less 
import. Struggles over the wage system would soon encapsulate the struggle for the heart of 
the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’. The issue would dominate the mid-1950s. For the time 
being, though, the ideological moment was supreme as reflected by the temporary triumph of
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propaganda over agitation as the preferred method of both the KPJ and the mass 
organisations. With U.S. funds just keeping the KPJ afloat, the decision of the Sixth Congress 
to bring the party closer to the population appeared logical. The crisis of 1948-1952 had 
changed all the familiar coordinates that the KPJ was used to, and it was therefore bound to 
create a crisis in the party if it refused to adapt. At the Sixth Congress, the leadership decided 
to force the moment. It was a risky move that soon demanded its own recalibration. That
recalibration lasted until 1958.
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Chapter 2 -  Between State and Market: Workers’ Councils 1953-1958
The mid-1950s were a ‘testing ground for the market in Yugoslavia’.1 More than that, 
though, the period following the Sixth Party Congress in late 1952 and ending with the first 
strike of the self-management era in the mine of Trbovlje in Slovenia in January 1958 
involved a struggle to rebuild the institutions of the party-state on a new basis. Commentators 
have frequently depicted the resulting tension within Communist policy as one of piece-meal 
economic liberalisation and soft political conservatism.2 The former process crucially 
included the search for a more gradual and balanced investment policy, correcting the 
imbalance between heavy industry on the one hand, and light industry and agriculture on the 
other. The process of political stagnation, by contrast, followed the decision of the Second 
Plenum of the CC SKJ in June 1953 to take measures to forestall the demoralisation in the 
rank-and-file membership following the call for the Party to ‘wither away’. Djilas’s 
subsequent failure to come back into line, resulting in his expulsion from the leadership and 
prompt departure from the SKJ, certainly sent a signal about boundaries to reform. 
Nevertheless, while useful, this broad portrayal of the dual nature of the period obscures as 
much as it illuminates.
For the Yugoslav Communists faced several synchronized dilemmas. Perhaps the least 
obvious but in the long term the most serious issue appeared to be the Yugoslav position in 
world affairs. The KPJ leadership certainly had great reason for satisfaction with the 
evolution of Yugoslavia’s geopolitical status during this period. The death of Stalin in spring 
1953 re-ordered international relations from the Yugoslav standpoint. Reconciliation with the
1 Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, 120
2 Petranovid, Istorija Jugoslavije, 340; Dj. Tripkovid, ‘Spoljni faktori i politidka kretanja u Jugoslaviji 1945- 
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Soviet Union followed and, even though the two countries experienced a second 
confrontation towards the end of the 1950s, over the Yugoslav refusal to return to the bloc, 
the threat of war seemed to have subsided.3 This process allowed Tito to settle border issues 
with Italy but also to pursue relationships outside Europe with less fear of antagonising his 
main creditor in the form of the United States. Close relations with the non-aligned countries 
in the Cold War, principally India and Egypt, promised both political weight and economic 
benefit.4 The carrot of new and less competitive foreign markets in the East and in the Third 
World, though, combined with the stick of U.S. aid moving from grant to loan basis.5 Thus, 
as the war economy began to recede, so an export-orientation began to be a pressing concern 
for the country’s leadership.
That could not pass without domestic reverberations. Throughout the period the KPJ worried 
that its political, social and economic development lagged behind the country’s international 
engagements. The effects of international pressures were not direct, though, and to an extent 
international factors granted the country domestic latitude for policy experimentation. Over a 
series of questions, therefore, the immediate problems posed for the leadership had only faint 
echoes of the external arena. Nevertheless, these became more pressing with time. This 
chapter traces the developments of the period 1953-1958 in three sequences. The first focuses 
on the attempt to stabilise the system after the period 1950-1952 and argues that the new 
decentralised, gradualist and technocratic path, as viewed in particular through the Second 
and Third CC SKJ Plenums in mid-1953 and early 1954, encountered problems that 
necessitated a degree of recalibration to achieve national cohesion. The second sequence
3 See Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. See also: D. Bogetid, Jugoslavia i Zapad, 1952-1955, Javno
preduzede ‘Sluibeni list SRJ’, Beograd, 2000
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follows the process of partial re-centralisation that lasted until the Hungarian Revolution. 
This interlude, another tactical rather than strategic retreat, ended amid real pressures from 
below arising from the continued inability of the system to establish a closer link between 
production and consumption. Nevertheless, debates pertaining to the wage system showed an 
increasing leadership frustration with the lack of productivity gains not merely in absolute but 
in relative terms: by comparison of producers domestically and in relation to the world 
economy. The third sequence centres on the major restructuring to the system on a more 
competitive and decentralised basis, which intensified social and regional strains. The open 
struggles that erupted on the shop-floor as a consequence shook the myth of the harmonious 
industrial relations allegedly reigning under self-management.
Part I -  ‘The dinar has indeed started running all relations among people ’:6 Politics, self­
management and the market
Politics dominated the domestic scene in 1953 probably more than any other year for the rest 
of the decade. It was the year in which the new Constitutional Law came into force and the 
year in which elections for the new Federal Assembly, with its new Council of Producers, 
were held. It was also the year in which the SKJ leadership made its first assessment of its 
new direction after the Sixth Congress, as well as the Fourth Congress of the Popular Front at 
which the Front assumed many of the everyday functions of the Party and changed its name 
to the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ). Finally, it was the year 
in which Djilas came into collision with the leadership resulting in his ouster in early 1954. 
Across the spectrum, the SKJ found its mechanisms, methods and cohesiveness deficient.
6 The phrase is Djilas’s at the Second Plenum: AJ 507-11/10, ‘II Plenum CK SKJ, 16-VI-1953’, 74
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The Second Plenum took place in mid-year in response to rank-and-file demobilisation but 
also the new difficulties thrown up by the market that appeared to be testing both the 
technical and political capabilities of local leaderships. It re-affirmed gradualism, technocracy 
and an elitist conception of politics as the legacy of the Congress. That Djilas himself seemed 
not to notice the mood and to insist on populism, and then even to challenge the acceptable 
cannon of the Communist regime, suggested that his case represented a departure from the 
new line and a symptom of disorientation, rather than a cause of political gradualism. 
Similarly, the electoral campaign in the latter part of the year did not meet with popular 
enthusiasm until the border dispute with Italy enflamed nationalist sentiments, which 
suggested that socialist democracy as preached by the leadership did not excite on the shop- 
floor. The most probable reason for continued public apathy and leadership dissatisfaction 
with the system was the overall malfunction of AF (accumulation and funds) system, which 
made economic decision-making more difficult at both the macro- and micro-levels. This 
would lead to its replacement in the following year by a more government-controlled system 
of profit-sharing. Workers’ self-management in 1953, therefore, continued to be more an 
object than subject of policy, and its direct remit decreased in the workplace even as its 
formal political role increased. This presented an embarrassing dilemma for the SKJ.
Between the Congress and the Plenum: The Threat o f Populism
The front page of Borba on 6 January captured this dilemma well. It reported, as the top two 
news of the day, on the one hand that the Legislative Committee of the lower house of the 
outgoing Assembly had completed its reading of the draft Constitutional Law and on the 
other hand that the republic Congress of the union confederation in Macedonia had discussed
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the work of workers’ councils and incidents of ‘bureaucratism’ in enterprises.7 The former 
had cleared the way for the draft to go to its first reading in the legislature while the latter 
admitted that even the bodies of self-management could exhibit the vice which they had, 
according to the new orthodoxy, arisen to combat: bureaucracy. The concrete examples, aside 
from the standard citations of the director making moves independently of the workers’ 
council, concentrated on those councils and union branches that kept silent when their 
enterprise profited from a monopoly position on the market and when wages therefore rose 
not on account of increases in labour productivity but at the expense of society.8 The parallel 
tendencies to seek solutions in the wider constitutional-political plane outside the workplace, 
and to concentrate on the workplace itself, dominated much of the debate through 1953.
The former tendency crystallised largely over spring with the decision at government-level to 
depart from the AF system. The newspaper report carrying the news explained that the 
system had ‘begun to retard the development of circulation’.9 This was a reference to the 
situation in which the AF system ‘concentrated the whole income distribution of the 
enterprises into one single policy instrument, and if this was wrongly fixed there was no way 
to compensate for the error by other instruments...The difference between branches was too 
big, and the whole system had no ceiling, thus leading to inflation.’.10 Policy makers tended 
to blame wage rises in particular for turbulence in the market. In the words of KidriC’s 
successor as chief economic policy-maker, former minister of heavy industry and mining 
Tempo, ‘there is a tendency for the rise in purchase funds without a commensurate increase 
in the commodity funds, i.e. there is not the commensurate rise in the production of industrial
7 ‘Ustavna reforma: Zakonodavni odbor Veda naroda zavrSio pretres predloga Ustavnog zakona’ and ‘Tredi 
kongres sindikata Makedonije: Diskusija o radu radnidkih saveta i birokratskim pojavama u preduzedima’ in 
Borba, 6 January 1953, 1
8 ibid., 2
‘Dvodnevna diskusija u Saveznom izvrSnom vedu: Potrebno je razraditi poloiaj komune i samouprave u 
privredi’, in Borba, 25 April 1953, 1
10 Bidanid Economic Policy, 104-105
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and consumer goods. Evidently, work collectives have not understood that the [living] 
standard cannot be improved by increasing wages if the commensurate cover does not exist in 
commodity funds.’11 One subsequent study used data from National Bank of Yugoslavia to 
suggest that the deficit on the total wage bill was ‘small’ at 6.5 percent overall,12 with large 
variations across branches, usually not explicable by reference solely to decisions of workers’ 
councils to raise wages but rather the wider irrationalities in the economy,13 which another 
account put down to poor planning from the centre: the system took no account ‘of the capital 
cooperating with labour in different enterprises; on the contrary, often very capital intensive 
branches were charged lower rates of accumulation because much of the new investment 
yielded very low returns on capital or even losses.’14
The government response duly concentrated on increasing the number of policy instruments 
such that macroeconomic balances could be restored without the often incoherent ‘micro- 
economic pretensions of KidriC’s fiscal system’15 Instead of fixing individual rates for each 
enterprise, then, the new system called the ‘distribution of total receipts’ or the ‘profit-sharing 
system’ imposed an obligation on the enterprise to pay fixed rates of interest on capital and a 
land tax, an interest on working capital, plus a turnover tax. Next, there would be a wage fund 
with contributions for vocational training, various business associations, housing and social 
security. After costs, depreciation, wages and income tax, the residual would be called 
‘profit’ (dobit), which would be at the disposal of the enterprise and taxed according to 
purpose: ‘added salaries, investment, reserve funds, etc’.16 *Enterprises would provide some
¡2 ‘Konferencija za Stampu druga Svetozara Vukmanovida Tempa’, in Borba, 18 February 1953, 1
Bozo Marendic, ‘The Distribution o f Income Generated in Manufacture in Yugoslavia under Workers’ Self- 
Management since 1952’, MPhil Thesis, University o f London, 1966, 34
13 ibid., 35-36
1 Sire, The Yugoslav Economy, 18
Dyker, Socialism, Development and Debt, 31
Dvodnevna diskusija u Saveznom izvrSnom vedu: Potrebno je razraditi poloiaj komune i samouprave u
privredi’, op.cit., 1-2
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investment from internal funds but the bulk of investment would come from the state on the 
basis of ‘investment auctions’ to enterprises offering the highest rate of return.17 
Recentralisation of banking and some fiscal autonomy on the part of local government bodies 
sought to give various levels of the party-state, albeit pointedly not the republics, greater 
power to regulate if not to direct economic life.18 Djilas appeared to speak for several 
members of government cited in the article by explaining: ‘in regard to the development of 
the new economic system, the focus should be placed on the giving of ever greater freedom 
to the economy and taking the viewpoint towards the system of the commune [local 
government].’19 *
That claim, though, was at least superficially contradictory: regulation was growing stronger 
but so was the market. The reform package contained much that suggested that the centre was 
indeed reassuming previously devolved powers including greater capacity to intervene in the 
overall enterprise determination of wages. Nevertheless, the basis on which it was attempting 
to do so, ‘as in most market economies, was fiscal policy...by the end of 1953 Yugoslav
•  i n
enterprises were facing a fairly familiar fiscal regime [from the market standpoint]’. The 
Yugoslav Communists had thereby clearly departed from their effort to elaborate every 
systemic reform from the standpoint of a pre-established periodisation inherited from the 
USSR. Indeed, while KidriC had argued that ‘socialist commodity production’ was a 
temporary aid to the central planner and would eventually wither away, alongside scarcity 
and the state, the resort to what contemporary leftists would have recognised as conventional 
bourgeois mechanisms of market regulation had now become an open-ended perspective.21
is ^ orvat’ ^he Yugoslav Economic System, 220-221
Dvodnevna diskusija u Saveznom izvrSnom vedu: Potrebno je razraditi polo2aj komune i samouprave u 
privredi’, ibid, 2 
9 ibid.
Dyker, Socialism, Development and Debt, 30
21 See also ibid., 28-29
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While apparently in contradiction with greater freedom for productive units in the system to 
market goods and services, the upward pull on policy clearly also aimed to facilitate a more 
predictable and level playing field than the AF system had created. As indicated by the title 
of the Borba article, 22 elaboration of the exact place of workers’ self-management and the 
commune in the economy remained and open question. This suggested that the scope of 
positive and negative freedom for the enterprise would become wider, necessitating a more 
sophisticated approach on the part of subjective factors in the lower echelons of the system.
Yet the state of affairs at lower levels was neither promising nor did the apex approach the 
tasks with a lucid and integrated strategy. The Second Plenum took place in order to correct 
those tendencies but they had emerged in public earlier. The dominant view in the leadership 
framed the debate from official rostrums as the role that local government should play in 
balancing between the rights and obligations of individual enterprises in relation to society. 
Kardelj laid this out most clearly in his address to the Fourth Congress of the Popular Front 
when he explained the tasks of the future organisation in relation to the struggle for the higher 
consciousness in gradualist, pragmatic and elitist terms worth quoting at length:
‘For workers in workers’ councils, peasants in agricultural cooperatives, citizens 
in their self-managed establishments, in the people’s committees, in the residential 
assemblies, educational institutions, the bureaus for social security, etc, etc, to be 
truly able to contribute as much to society as possible, and in the process to 
themselves as well, and to be able to as successfully as possible put to use the 
material and moral means at their disposal -  for that it is necessary for them to 
feel themselves not only free, independent in their initiative, but also responsible 
towards other working people, responsible to the community (drustvenoj 
zajednici)....The method of work should tend towards the infusion in our social 
reality of moral norms and customs which would become the most powerful 
guidepost for the work of the individual and for the mutual relations between 
citizens and social organisations. At the same time, the Socialist Alliance should 
make it possible for working people to always, step by step, gain ever more
22 ‘Two-day discussion in the Federal Economic Council: It is necessary to work out the position o f  the 
commune and self-management in the economy’
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material knowledge which is necessary for individuals to properly answer current 
issues which life itself throws up.’23
A similar leadership response arose to debate at the Fourth Congress of the Front in Slovenia. 
The Committee for Questions of Social Management of the Economy witnessed many 
delegates recount organisational-technical issues from their own workplace. Borba 
acknowledged only a few contributions from delegates, presumably only those of which it 
largely approved or which drew official clarification. Thus one delegate criticised use of 
monopoly positions to make super profits but also argued that local councils of producers did 
not execute proper control of workplaces. An official responded that the Socialist Alliance 
viewed control and not intervention in enterprise affairs as the proper remit of local 
government. He pointedly added that the local councils had to take special care to balance 
budgets. Another delegate criticised local bureaucracy, which often attacked higher bodies 
for bureaucratic behaviour but in fact behaved bureaucratically towards enterprises, taking 
over local projects which enterprises themselves were now meant to fund, plan and execute. 
This comment appeared tame since it prescribed proper roles without challenging hierarchies 
or the remit of accepted boundaries. The Prime Minister of Slovenia intervened at this point, 
though, to argue that ‘it is spoken too frequently about the rights of individuals, enterprises 
and organs of the local community, and too little about their social responsibilities’ and the 
Deputy Prime Minister echoed him immediately afterwards. The latter was the only one who 
mentioned workers’ self-management, though, explaining thinly that an overly technical 
approach to workplace problems was symptomatic of the belief that economic growth would 
by itself create socialist relations in the workplace, which he counter-posed to the apparent
23 ‘The Role and Tasks o f the Socialist Alliance o f  Working People o f  Yugoslavia in the Struggle for Socialism: 
Address to the IV Congress o f  the NFJ’, reprinted in Edvard Kardelj, Problemi nase socijalisticke izgradnje, 
vol. 2, 348-349
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other prominent belief that concentration on socialist relations at the expense of their relation 
to growth was the proper way forward.24
The latter was clearly a mischaracterisation of more populist views which did indeed exist in 
reality, even though they were not directly reported in the Borba article. These emanated 
from trade union circles and the more radical intellectual layers of the middle and higher 
echelons of the Party but also the work collectives themselves. Their first clear emanation 
surfaced in January 1953 when the SSJ decided to conduct mass consultations on changes to 
the Law on Workers’ Management in the Economy then being discussed. On 21 January, 
Borba carried selected reactions from the unions after consultations in some 2,000 
enterprises.25 The majority appeared to suggest significant changes to the way self­
management functioned although there was little coherence to the different suggestions, 
except that they all in some way sought to rebalance the power relations in the workplace 
against management. Thus, the statement from the utilities workers recommended the 
abolition of the management board and the sovereignty of the work collective as a whole, 
although it appeared to confuse the work collective and the workers’ council. The textile 
workers were less ambivalent and sought the creation of an assembly of the work collective 
as the highest body in the workplace, the abolition of the management board in favour of a 
secretariat within the workers’ council, and a control committee. The Montenegrin report 
suggested that several views existed but most wanted either full sovereignty for the work 
collective or the expansion of numbers in the workers’ councils. Mutually similar statements 
from the transport workers, the unions in Bosnia and the metal workers’ union recommended 
that the workers’ council be renamed the workers’ chamber, and that it or the collective elect
24 ‘Kritika negativnih pojava u nekim preduzedima i organima vlasti: Rad komisija Cetvrtog kongresa 
Socijalistidkog saveza radnog narode Slovenije’ in Borba, 27 April 1953, 2 
‘Iz prakse radniikih saveta: §ta misle radnici i sindikalne organizacije o izmenama zakona o
samoupravijanju’, in Borba, 21 January 1953, 2, 4
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the director. The leather processing workers stood out by defending the management board 
but duly wanted it to take over hiring and firing from the director.26
Predictably, these tendencies worried the central leadership but it struggled to impose 
discipline. Norbert Veber argued the position of the Central Council of the SSJ in response to 
these views in the same issue of the paper that too many complaints centred on organisational 
problems.27 He went on to say that the director should not be an elective position and that 
calls for an assembly of the workforce were impractical; referenda on important issues 
including the rule book, the annual plan and the wage tariff, and occasional meetings to 
challenge an unpopular decision of the workers’ council could do just as well.28 *Nevertheless, 
he announced a meeting of the highest body of the SSJ would take place shortly to bring
70more agreement to the union movement, and this meeting indeed convened on 7 February. 
The result could not have been satisfactory from the standpoint of the central leaders as many 
of the representatives of the industrial unions refused to budge from the views expressed 
earlier. Thus, the resolution of the meeting read that: ‘it is necessary to ensure wider rights for 
the work collectives, i.e. that work collectives should directly, and not through their 
representative organs, decide on the most important issues in the enterprise.’30 These included 
the annual production plan, the final accounts, the statute and rulebook, wage tariffs, the 
residual fund, on its own investments, and the ability of work collectives to negate any 
decision of its representative organs should the majority not approve of them.31 Most 
damagingly, the resolution continued: ‘This is the preliminary stance of the Presidency, since 
it did not discuss the details of the mode by which the collective would exercise its rights
26 ibid A
27 ibid, 2
2* ibid., 2, 4
AJ 117-27-2-94, ‘Zapisnik br. 2 sa sednice PretsedniStva Centralnog ve<5a Saveza sindikata Jugoslavije 
odriane 7 februara 1953 godine.’
30 ibid., 1
31 ibid, 1-2
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(worker assemblies, referendum, etc) but rather believes that collectives themselves should 
regulate these questions, that they should themselves choose the means which best suit the 
character and conditions of each enterprise.’32
Yet the resolution continued in a mode almost calculated to claw back at least in part what it 
had conceded. By elaborating its remaining and apparently incidental or transitory 
conclusions in reference to existing institutions, it implied that no change in that regard was 
in fact envisaged. It stated that the principles which it had expounded on earlier should serve 
as the basis for the functioning of actually existing self-management. It accepted the 
argument that collectives with fewer than 100 workers should make the entire work collective 
the workers’ council. It also accepted that only the minimum number of councillors should be 
stipulated for the organs of self-management (20 for the council and 7 for the managing 
board). The principle that the law should only lay down competencies that higher bodies 
could not pass downwards prevailed. Outside intervention in the firm too, according to the 
Presidency, would need to be curtailed by law. The workers’ council would choose the 
director who would no longer sit on the management board. Finally, the resolution resolved 
to support the call for the managing board to include only members of the collective, which 
was a veiled statement that the director and other non-workers should not be eligible for 
election.33
Behind the seeming failure to do more than restrain the apparent democratising momentum of 
the consultations in the text of the resolution, though, lay an insurgent and confident layer of 
union leaders. The discussion leading up to the resolution indicated that this cohort took 
seriously their new role in self-management, perhaps to compensate for the relegation in
32 ibid, 2
33
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these years of their previous main task in the form of labour mobilisation. Yet this was not 
necessarily the role assigned to them as mere educators but a still undefined role that they 
were actively carving out in response to the new conditions and, for some, probably with 
reference to their experience in the pre-war period as revolutionary unionists.34 Thus, in 
pursuit of their ideas, already detailed in the Borba article and for the most part repeated 
without significant elaboration, the most interesting aspect was the part of the discussion 
relating to hiring and firing. Borko Temelkovski, the representative from the Macedonian 
unions and a pre-war unionist, in particular made the clearest distinction between a ‘member’ 
and a ‘worker’ in the collective. He explained that workers were afraid of speaking up 
because their livelihood depended on someone with the power to hire and fire. While 
seasonal workers cared less for the future of the enterprise, permanent workers who had a 
stake should remain members of the collective even if their work contract was terminated, 
according to Temelkovski. This would ensure a more assertive and involved working class.35 
Several speakers agreed that control over employment would need to be taken away from the 
director. The complication arose because directors were exposed to a press offensive and 
‘demoralised’, so it was necessary to highlight that their proper responsibility, restricted to 
day-to-day business decisions, was too impractical for collectives to become engaged with 
and was therefore worthy of respect.36 Pointedly, the central leaders steered clear of this 
aspect of the discussion and the resolution did not mention it. The central leaders’ tone, too, 
was more conciliatory on the day than Veber’s in the Borba article. BoziCevic, the general 
secretary, appeared more populist than Veber and accepted that the workers’ council should
34 The exact proportion o f union leaders drawn from the pre-revolutionary period is unknown amid the dearth o f  
work on the unions. Nevertheless, Sharon Zukin suggested that in the immediate post-war period, the number 
accounted for as many as half in the central leadership: ‘The Representation o f Working-Class Interests in 
Socialist Society: Yugoslav Labor Unions’ in Politics & Society, June 1981, voi.. 10, no. 3, 292
35 AJ 117-27-2-94, ‘Zapisnik sa sednice PretsedniStva CV SSJ, odrZane 7 februara. PoCetak u 9.30’, 2
36 ibid, 6
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choose the director and that political methods from below should be used to keep the director 
in check rather than formal intervention from the local government.37
The discussion unsurprisingly evaporated slowly from public view after this point. The 
resolution of the Presidency appeared in the union paper Rad without commentary days 
later.38 Letters and recommendations from various councils and union branches reflecting the 
now standard variation of stances on familiar issues continued to pour in to the union paper 
through February and March but disappeared after that. The campaign to change the law 
largely withered away after its less dangerous proposals were adopted.39 Borba explained that 
the union was embroiled in discussions over the way forward with two dominant views 
prevailing: that the role of the unions was clear and that the role of the unions was only just 
evolving with the new economic system. Subtly on the side of the latter, Borba cited the 
views of ordinary workers who did not understand the new role of the unions and often 
regarded them as ‘semi-state’ unions, amid lock-ins to facilitate a branch meeting after work, 
to suggest that the union needed to find new political methods to interest workers in the 
problems of self-management.40 With the unions turning inward, Borba appeared to take 
upon itself the task of enlightening work collectives about their proper role. Now the paper of 
the Socialist Alliance, following the Fourth Congress of the Popular Front, Borba was part of 
the agitprop complex presided over by Djilas. His close friend, the prominent intellectual 
Vladimir Dedijer, edited Borba and the paper remained unquestionably ‘at his unfettered 
disposal’.41 Its stance towards the organs of self-management remained populist despite the 
clear signal sent to the unions that their focus on workplace relations had been out of step.
37 ibid., 6-7
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The paper continued to bring news of expanding self-management freedoms,42 report on 
bureaucratic usurpation of the rights of work collectives or successful cases of the 
collectives’ resistance to white collar or bureaucratic subterfuge,43 and question why areas in 
which workers’ councils had not yet been introduced still existed.44
The effects of this on the shop floor were unclear. Economic data certainly suggested that the 
AF system had induced at least partial rationalisation of the workplace in that employment in 
manufacture and mining had risen by 5 percent while labour productivity had risen in step 
with wages by 6.2 percent.45 More than that, skilled workers or Temelkovski’s collective 
‘members’ appeared to have gained in confidence in 1952 and 1953. There was evidence that 
wage rises tended to favour them rather than non-skilled or seasonal workers in 1952,46 while 
their power to check directors also increased as witnessed by their apparent ability to ouster 
directors or decrease their salary.47 That did not stop directors dominating most processes in 
the firm on the basis of having exclusive power over immediate financial transactions like 
signing checks or using technical expertise and alliances with management staff to ram 
through unpopular measures on the basis of their supposed necessity.48 Nevertheless, the 
position of skilled workers continued to improve through 1953 as the introduction of the 
variable minimum wage set by qualification favoured workplaces with more skilled 
workers.49 Some enterprises without skilled labour responded with attempts to artificially
42 ‘Novi oblik samoupravlianja u velikim preduzeéima’, 23 April 1953, 4 iost v
43 ‘Posle dogadaja u „Zitoprometu“ -  Ne: ko je  kriv -  Nego: gde su uzroa birokratizma? , «February 953 ,3 ,
‘Narodni odbor nareduje radniôkom savetu: Buma zasedanja kolektiva cig ane u avons o rfva
February 1953, 5; ‘lnteresi pojedinaca nadvladali interese kolektiva: Kakoje tekla diskusij P J J 
preduzeéa’, 18 April 1953, 3
44 ‘ZaSto komunalna preduzeéa nemaju radniCke savete?’, 21 May 1953, 4
45 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 180
46 Ward, From Marx to Barone, 169
47 ibid., 156-158
48 ibid., 154
49 ibid., 174
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raise skills levels,50 while others went into receivership,51 and others still attempted to raise 
cash by employing workers Actively by engaging so-called ‘dead brigades’.52 Since the 
abandonment of the AF system had been announced but was not to take place until the end of 
the year, these malpractices were certain to continue for some time and the effects of the 
future system remained a mystery. For the time being, the dominant wing in the leadership 
appealed to patience, announcing that the programme of investment in heavy industry was 
nearing completion, which would begin to release funds for living standards.53 The press also 
reported throughout spring on a series of referenda in larger work collectives on annual plans 
which set aside more money for social projects, an obvious attempt to obviate calls for more 
direct forms of democracy.54 While able to contain and channel popular enthusiasm, then, the 
dominant wing of the leadership could see that the populist elements in the party-state had an 
audience among the advanced sections of the working class. That remained a threat to the 
future as they saw it.
Perhaps just as worrying for the leadership, however, was the threat that populism did not 
come simply from tendencies within the party-state apparatus but from enterprise directors 
with multiplying links with the private sector. This became obvious as incidents of economic 
crime registered an increase in 1953, and went beyond the pilfering of enterprise property or 
the misuse of internal funds earmarked for internal use in order to gain advantage on the 
market. Instead, networks of black market trade with the private sector, false accounting to 
gain bank credits, and use of official positions for unofficial business mushroomed without
50 Horvat, The Yugoslav Economic System, 181
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serious opposition in, and sometimes tacit agreement from, the work collectives.55 The 
suggestion that divisions within the workforce could be temporarily overcome by populist 
directors ready to deal with the enemies of the SKJ to procure goods boded ill for the 
Communists at a time when increasing wages encountered a still restricted consumer market. 
The effect was worse still as a consequence of the divisions in the ruling bureaucracy. The 
dominant faction in the leadership probably feared that hostile elements would use self­
management as a cover for the return to private property and therefore took exception to 
unionist or idealistic journalist excesses.
The Elitist Response from the Plenum to the Djilas Affair
It was against this background that the Second Plenum took place in early summer. Since its 
contents did not reach the public, except through the resolution and the letter to the 
membership, historians tended to read its significance in relation to the more dramatic Third 
Plenum.56 Djilas’s later account of the choice of venue and his description of the event 
certainly served his own purpose of retrospective alienation from the dominant and 
domineering attitudes of those in power but certainly portrayed something of the prevailing 
atmosphere at the Plenum. This Plenum was the first to take place at Tito’s residence on the 
Adriatic island of Brioni. As a gesture, this was an affront to the collective nature of the 
leadership but Djilas asserts that he alone complained about it.57 Djilas, moreover, had two 
contrasting recollections of the setting. One emphasised the jarring impression that a 
gathering of ex-partisans in luxurious circumstances produced,58 while the other likened the
Milosavljevié, Driava i samoupravljanje, 244
56 See Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 80-87; Clissold, Djilas, 229-230, as well as Chapter 27. Similarly, 
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meeting more to a ‘secret conclave in a conspirator’s stronghold’.59 Both were symbolic of 
the shift that Djilas later perceived: the increasing estrangement and conservatism of the 
leadership from what he saw as the popular and populist decisions of the Sixth Congress. 
Tito’s instruction to him to speak at the Plenum so that no one would suspect divisions in the 
leadership staggered Djilas, especially the ‘oblique insistence that we must be in 
agreement’.60 His only comment on the actual proceedings was to rue his own intervention, 
which he described as ‘the muddled, contradictory speech of a man doing his best to please 
someone else without being false to himself.61 True as this was, it was also somewhat one­
sided. For the Plenum was more than a simple retrenchment. It involved subtle debates and 
sophisticated reformulations of the line within boundaries that Djilas was evidently beginning 
to question. Whether this was because of his belief that potential rapprochement with the 
USSR was on the cards given Stalin’s death in March, and that this would halt the Yugoslav 
experiment,62 or whether he was enamoured of Western social-democracy as Tito later 
accused him,63 Djilas certainly took his opposition ever more into the open after the Plenum. 
Yet precisely because he represented the exception, an examination of the debates within the 
rest of the leadership, hitherto uncommented on, deserve elaboration.
The Plenum in fact showed keen if not sympathetic sensitivity to forces from below, 
acknowledged and aired divisions within the leadership, and sought to grapple with the 
novelties of the situation with a sharp understanding of the international situation. Tito’s 
opening speech exhibited conservative attitudes in regard to social trends that sounded 
positively harmful to SKJ rule, like the use o f ‘Mr’, ‘Miss’ or ‘Mrs’ in public speech.64 It also
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went on to call for a purge of the Party to restore discipline.65 Still, for Tito, the thrust was not
the failure of Communists to take on the bourgeois enemy, who entered the new reality from
the past through the cracks in the current system, but rather their failure to develop and
improve the new decentralised system so that the enemy would not find a new audience:
‘Comrades, the question of democracy is not simply a question of whether people 
say this or that, whether those old elements are regrouping (and there is an 
element of that), but in that we carry that democracy, which in fact has its greatest 
basis in our economic decentralisation, correctly from the SKJ into the masses, 
into the ranks of the producers, the ranks of the collectives, etc. Otherwise, we 
will every day have increasing incidences of demonstrations breaking out in the 
enterprises because the surplus wage fund is taxed away, and why, because people 
do not understand that the factories have been given to them to be run by them, 
and that they will not, after thirty years, like in Roman law, become their owners.
Our people still do not know, many of them at least, what the community is. There 
are those who understand but there are also those who do not.’66
It was significant that Tito no longer spoke about bureaucracy but concentrated on the lack of 
balance between individual and general interests. Djilas was certainly correct to notice this 
trend and point out its inconsistency with the perspective of the withering away of the Party. 
Nevertheless, he appeared to misunderstand that the immediate perspective of the Congress 
had been the decentralisation of power and the movement from direct to indirect forms of 
Party control of the decentralising state. Sure enough, Tito did not assert that nothing had 
changed and that top-down command had to return. Rather, his argument was that the Party 
needed to change to facilitate reform. It needed to respond to decentralisation and 
démocratisation but without giving up its ambition to intervene to get the results it wanted. 
Kardelj and Tempo, respectively delivering the political and economic report at the Plenum, 
elaborated on Tito’s short introduction and did not depart from it significantly.
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Both Kardelj and Tempo concentrated on the theme of finding equilibrium between the 
individual and the general but both started from reformist and market principles. Seeing as 
the former was the main ideologue of the system and increasingly in the public eye, close 
treatment of his contribution would best reveal the strategic views of the inner circle around 
Tito. Pointedly, Kardelj argued with some reason that many of the problems facing the SKJ 
had roots before the Sixth Congress. This related to both conflicts and demobilisation as a 
consequence of a lack of clarity about how to relate the Party and the SSRNJ but also and 
mainly a failed response to the new economic and administrative system. The Sixth Congress 
had, according to Kardelj, amounted to the first concerted attempt to deal with the new 
situation.67 Naturally, he admitted, it was difficult to pass from a phase of coercion to one of 
persuasion.68 Yet the major problem for Kardelj was that Communists lagged behind the 
changes to the system: they became apolitical economic experts responding only to the 
interests of their enterprise, locality or indeed republic.69 Frequently, the explanation 
continued, this meant that they took on a capitalist understanding of such concepts as profits 
without seeking to understand whether these new tendencies were being subordinated to 
socialist relations.70 This explanation suggested that Kardelj was implying a new 
understanding of politics that placed understanding and handling of the whole economic and 
administrative system over simple persuasion of the masses about class struggle. He intended 
the problems he described to be understood as symptoms of a deeper problem, which he 
would reveal later but these problems were nevertheless real and needed analysis: they 
invited enemy activity and demobilised good Communists, leaving the mass organisations 
starved of political leadership.71 They also reinforced territorial-functional cocoons, which 
Kardelj described as that ‘particularism’ of which ‘the republic was the beginning and end’
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and satirised as ‘socialism in one district’,72 an obvious reference to the theory of ‘socialism 
in one country’ in the 1920s USSR.
These all represented emanations of crisis. The cause, rather, was the incompleteness of the 
system, and resort to administrative measures would amount to failure, a statement Tito 
agreed with;73 nevertheless the incompleteness of the system opened the door for opportunist 
elements to use populist means to reinforce their own position: ‘Let’s say we take the issue of 
surplus wages. We have the phenomenon, in Split, that the future director undermines the old 
director [and] says this to the workers: what investments, what construction, it’s wages we 
should give to...and that’s a Communist in question...yet no one calls that Communist to 
account...’74 Yet the leadership could not criticise people for protesting when its own 
mouthpieces exhibited a tendency to petty criticism (kritizerstvo).75 The press, which too 
often encouraged protest, prevented the worker from fighting against a wage rise because it 
failed to offer the general perspective on the Yugoslav economy.76 This was as much the 
result of lack of politics in the centre which failed to explain its measures as the fault of the 
local press allowing itself to be led by circumstance and a simplistic understanding of 
socialism, whereby wage rises were only to be expected.77 Perhaps most ominously in a 
multinational federation, similar struggles for particular resources were developing between 
the republics, Kardelj warned. His words are worthy of reproduction because they also 
introduce remarkable obiter dicta in relation to the national question and the market in 
general:
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‘With us, two tendencies have begun to clearly crystallise about our direction.
One tendency has arisen in the more developed parts of Yugoslavia, and 
according to that view everything that is produced in industry is, more or less, the 
[ownership by] right of those who produce it, the [ownership by] right of the work 
collectives, to give or not to give, and that which they give is just some sort of aid 
to the rest of Yugoslavia. More than that, this question of aid is exaggerated, 
without an understanding that not only republican economies, but also the 
Yugoslav, and in fact the world economy, grinds things together so much that the 
whole world has become interdependent and that the accumulation of this or that 
industry is the result of a combination of factors, not just of that work 
collective...On the other hand, there is the other tendency that is developing in the 
less developed regions, and which can be reduced to the claim that the developed 
regions should stop and wait until the less developed catch up...which is economic 
nonsense, since any progress is equally Yugoslav...’78
Kardelj’s idiosyncratic depiction of the interpenetration of various productive units in the
world economy and its use to appeal against particular interests, be they those of a work
collective or a region, ran into its own contradiction when applied to unevenness within the
Yugoslav economy. Why the supposed economic interconnectedness of the totality should in
the one case dictate in favour of redistribution from the well-off but not in the other was not
coherently explained. In so far as logic could be inferred, it appeared to suggest that political
reasoning from the viewpoint of the Yugoslav federal apex determined what would be
domestically useful from the Yugoslav standpoint in relation to the world economy. While
neither intended nor conscious, such reasoning certainly appeared to dominate Yugoslav
policy in the following decade.
Kardelj’s conclusions presented another but more conscious and explicit constant for much of 
the rest of the period. It was perhaps here that he answered the implicit conundrums of where 
decentralisation would lead and how the SKJ should respond over the longer-term rather than 
in answer to immediate problems. Here he most clearly presented an elitist, technocratic and 
gradualist view of politics. His first point was that political struggle needed to develop, 
particularly in the republics, to effect change to allow a free economy:
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‘As soon as we decentralised the economy, placed it on a democratic footing, 
producers would [sic] begin to connect with each other from below, then they will 
merge with each other on the basis of interest, on the Yugoslav, middle and lower 
scales, but the League of Communists should be a factor which will below and 
above, and very much above in those institutions and organisations, fight for a 
real socialist line, struggle to secure a consistent socialist direction of 
development’.79
He went on to argue, secondly, that Communists needed to be in the mass organisations and, 
thirdly,80 that they needed to leave their offices and work more in the field, particularly in the 
aftermath of the election for the new Federal Assembly.81 This implied that decentralisation 
would require leading Communists to rotate between centre and lower echelons, though this 
was not explicitly stated. Fourth, Kardelj attacked the populist press and reiterated the need to 
‘chase out the theory of the freedom of the press’82 Fifth, he reiterated again the need for 
republic parties to take more care about political issues.83
The discussion following Kardelj’s exhaustive and meandering but unprepared speech did not 
add substantial novelty. Hasan Brkic, a leading member from Bosnia, probably added most 
colourful detail from a standpoint similar to Kardelj’s, the most notable being the mode in 
which electoral campaigns were exerting pressure on the system in the form of unnecessary 
expenditure because of populist promises by local politicians.84 Significantly, he backed 
‘administrative’ measures for criminal irregularities but also complained about workers’ 
councils because ‘we have some which have nothing to do with workers’ self-management’: 
he backed measures from above and from below.85 Yet it was the contributions of a leading 
Serb politician Petar Stambolic and Djilas himself that offered contrasting reasoning for
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similar conclusions between conservative politicians and populists, which accounted in part 
for the fear of forces from below in the majority. Stambolic delivered a short and descriptive 
speech. He decried the state of affairs where ‘two morals’ had appeared: ‘one the communist 
moral, the other the moral of the president or director of a trading company, who fights for 
income’, and concluded that the previous system had engaged Communists more.86 By 
contrast, Djilas appeared to think aloud and wander, adding little to what Kardelj had said. He 
began by saying he would raise issues Kardelj had raised with him personally but had not 
mentioned at the Plenum. So he bemoaned the fact that no one had discussed the effect of 
socialist commodity production, which made it difficult for the Party to react: ‘The dinar has 
indeed started running all relations among people’:87 After much repetition of the need to take 
the general viewpoint in response to different problems, Djilas uttered an aside that probably 
indicated just how optimistic he was regarding the efficacy that political changes coming 
with the new Constitutional Law would have in changing Yugoslavia: ‘I have been a bit to 
the West [he had just returned from Paris], I had gone there before too, I observed the 
Western world, they have some forms [of democracy] that are higher than ours, if you take 
the substance of democracy, they are above us, but if we Communists fought actively and 
politically, we shall overcome them in formal terms in two to three years.’88 Unlike Kardelj 
or Stambolic, then, Djilas saw formal démocratisation in the political sphere as the cure for 
the ills associated with the market and spoke in abstract terms: T will dwell on the question 
of republican localism...All these things are the results of some objective and economic 
processes...our socialist consciousness has submitted to economic socialist anarchy...We 
speak much about the commune but not of Yugoslavia as a commune...comrades should fight 
against republicanism and for internationalism.’89
86 ibid., 52
87 ibid.,14
88 ib id ,80
89 ibid, 82
152
In the economic discussion, however, several speakers appeared rather more open to what the 
market could offer and how to master it than they were about its undermining effects. Tempo 
at one point explicitly referred to the formulations of Stambolic and Djilas in relation to 
competition between Yugoslav exporters. Berating ‘bureaucratic’ understandings of trade, 
Tempo asserted: ‘They don’t see one thing, that the system as a whole has brought about the 
fact that the enterprises are indeed dead serious [krvno zainteresovana] about exporting and 
getting something out of it, and are preparing themselves well, and for me, what Stambolic 
and Djilas said about the phenomenon of the business morality, that’s the negative side, we 
should be hard [treba tuci] in that regard, but there is something positive there too, or I’ve 
become economically oriented.’90 Similar statements would be heard and would cause irate 
outbursts in the discussion after Tempo finished his address, showing that the market turn 
still caused substantial anxiety. Tempo himself, though, exhibited deeper commitment to 
market mechanisms than was obvious simply from his defence of export-oriented companies.
This was apparent less at the level of substantive points raised than the benchmarks used for 
success. Indeed, Tempo gave an accounting for the preceding period of economic 
development which brought to light little except that, on unreleased figures, the first half of 
1953 had finally brought industrial growth for the first year since 1949.91 He defended the 
overrepresentation of Slovenia and Bosnia in distribution of investment by reference to 
geopolitical pressures from the East, and explained the overrepresentation of heavy industry 
in investment for the same reason. Nevertheless, his attempt to explain that growth was 
actually greater than on first appearances rested on comparisons of world prices for domestic 
products, specifically the claim that Yugoslav agricultural prices were artificially low but
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would massively raise Yugoslav GDP if calculated on world prices. Tempo used this to 
suggest that domestic unevenness was complicated by political factors and needed to be 
viewed from the Yugoslav ambition to develop fast in relation to the world economy.92 
Tempo expounded on a growth path that still remained wedded to import substitution. He 
admitted that the centralised fund had not worked and argued that bank credits on a 
commercial basis would bring about a sounder basis for growth. Cuts to administrative costs 
would result, which would enable the state to fund agriculture as a mode of lessening 
dependence on Western credits.93 All the same, growth depended not just on quantity of 
investment but its structure. Here, the Yugoslavs were beginning to have new problems as 
parasitism on the part of lower units in the system was developing at the expense of the 
centre, whereby investment intended for a priority projects would be deviated for expansion 
of local plant. The locality calculated that the Federation would still find resources to 
complete its priority later while the locality could in the meanwhile raise its own capacities as 
it saw fit. This led to an unfavourable investment structure in comparison with Western 
countries, since the Yugoslavs duplicated capacities instead of finishing key investment 
projects. That in turn, Tempo intimated, would necessitate temporary administrative methods 
in order to ensure a more balanced basis for growth as investment projects needed to be 
finished in that year.94
His proposals for the future were for the most part hardly new: decreases and rationalisation 
of the public expenditure,95 abandonment of certain social welfare provisions to the locality 
and the enterprise itself in order to force their own internal rationalisation,96 initiation of joint
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social projects between enterprises and local authorities to soak up unemployment,97 
tightening credits since more and more investment would come ‘from below’,98 and the 
creation of reserves and a politics of prices against agriculture to retain the state’s primacy 
over the private sector.99 The outstanding question was the balance of payments deficit. 
While Tempo admitted that the deficit could only be expected to widen in the short-term, in 
view of unfavourable changes to Yugoslav imports and exports,100 the key to the future was a 
departure from the inherited pre-war ‘understanding that Yugoslavia is a backward country, 
semi-colonial’ but that ‘we are coming out of colonial backwardness’.101 Instead of importing 
raw materials in addition to capital goods from the West, the solution to the problem would 
be a long-term orientation towards import of raw materials from Asia and Latin America and 
export of industrial goods in return.102 An orientation towards an export industry in the 
undefined future therefore created a deep duality in Yugoslav political economy in following 
years, between the continued ambition to reduce imports from the West and increase exports 
to the nascent Third World. The former process induced protectionist measures and irrational 
prices of domestic inputs from the standpoint of the world economy, while it also effectively 
transferred value out of the country since export companies benefited from state subventions. 
On the other hand, the cost of imports of raw materials in fact adjusted to domestic monopoly 
prices, fuelling instead of easing inflation.103
The debates following Tempo’s speech, however, rarely touched on the balance of payments, 
suggesting that immediate problems and the nature of the transition domestically troubled 
some leaders more than issues whose full implications would only be known later. An
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implicit exchange from predictable quarters did suggest that the issue was live but not in the 
open. Thus, the first speaker after Tempo, Ivan Ma£ek from developed Slovenia, questioned 
criteria by which projects became key from the federal perspective and complained about the 
complex system of foreign trade coefficients, which acted as ‘an undeveloped system of 
customs duties’,104 arguing that coefficients were being set too low, giving exporters little 
incentive to rationalise production but also having unintended consequences on the home 
market. He gave the example of trade coefficients for cherries which fetched peasants a better 
deal than they did either the state, which in effect subsidised the sale, or the economy which 
subsequently suffered from inflation.105 By contrast, the Bosnian government official Osman 
Karabegovic, whose less developed republic benefited most from arms spending, responded 
indirectly: ‘We have discussed the question of exports. There are always discussions among 
us whether we should let foreign currency freely on our market, whether we should abolish 
the tax etc. But, in regard to all that we should be careful to extract for the army, to secure our 
community with everything that it needs, etc...there are those who say we should abolish the 
tax because it is an administrative lever. But if we did that we would bring into question that 
which benefits Yugoslavia, that for which it [the federal centre] is responsible: the Army, 
nutrition for the country, debts, etc.’106 While MaCek was clearly not arguing for either 
position, the difference in emphasis in their presentations of the problem could hardly have 
suggested anything but a debate on how export-oriented Yugoslavia should become in the 
near future. That the more representative of the most developed republic was arguing in 
favour of greater stimulation of exports, while the representative of a developing republic 
dependent on federal redistribution for defence represented the case against liberalisation of 
foreign trade was suggestive of future alignments.
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Yet it was no more than suggestive because in both speeches, these questions had been side 
issues. They received no comment except that Tempo later argued in his summing up against 
Karabegovic asserting that taxes were indeed ‘administrative’ and arose because of 
conditions of scarcity, so the political decision needed to be taken in the Central Committee 
whether Yugoslavia would import for heavy industry, the army or nutrition.107 By contrast, 
Tempo agreed with Macek but appealed for realism: ‘Last year, there were loud complaints 
from comrade Ma£ek that coefficients were too low. We have done everything to raise 
coefficients, to fulfil [the plan for] exports. Is that not true? I agree now too, we pursued the 
policy that, even if there was disorder on the domestic market because of high coefficients, 
because of high stimulus of exports, we maintain this line precisely because we want to force 
industrial exports. I have quoted statistics and shown...how much [agriculture] has lost for us 
in the last four months. We are talking of 104 million dollars. But had we not forced it, we 
would have paid even more.’108 Thus, the reformist policy-makers were certainly looking for 
recalibration but felt that it had to be slow in response to circumstances. Visibly, there was 
need also to conciliate different interests that were often both mutually reliant and in tension. 
It was illustrative and ironic that another Slovene delegate argued in favour of a federal 
politics of redistribution towards poorer areas on the border, in this case with Austria, lest 
their poverty weaken Yugoslavia’s geopolitical position.109
Exchanges on domestic affairs in fact provoked greater passions and demanded more 
coherent exposition. Two sets of debate best showed that the reformist wing of the leadership 
was careful to distinguish between two levels of market leanings: when they occurred at the 
top, on the level of policy, it tolerated them against partisans of apparatus politics and 
populism; when they occurred among the lower echelons as an emanation of populism using
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the market, it felt the need to draw clear boundaries. Thus, no one took on the more reformist 
and technocratic federal minister Jakov Blazevic when he used pro-market metaphors in 
debate with the more conservative Karabegovic. This was because Karabegovic reminded all 
those present that there were divisions among economic policy-makers and was vociferous 
about technocrats who tricked Party cadres to allow the squeeze on the living standard to 
continue: ‘We cannot any longer argue what we used to argue, that there had been a war, that 
the country had been devastated etc. The masses feel immediately when the prices of food or 
a consumer product change...That is why I believe we need to be much more careful, that we 
shall succeed only when we actually adopt a single line on issues, and in that regard conduct 
a united campaign.’110 He continued that frequently resources went missing not because of 
resistance from below but because of lack of effective measures from the centre: ‘I think the 
situation is not just that taxes were not collected. Here too there were different opinions. We 
put this one hundred times at meetings. Once again, the question is about Yugoslavia, a single 
Yugoslav market, about getting goods from the peasant, but it is a fact that we did not act in 
unison and that there was no common viewpoint.’111 While not straightforwardly populist, 
Karabegovic’s line emphasised centralism over decentralisation, political unity over 
development of the market system.
Blazevic intervened immediately after Karabegovic, and raised the issue of the 
‘vulgarisation’ of the question of funds for wages that led to the ‘anarchy [stihija] whipped 
up around the question of living standards’ on the part of individuals and ‘whole work 
collectives’.112 Like Tempo, BlaZevic identified this elemental spontaneity [stihija] as 
simultaneously both potentially dangerous and potentially useful, and he talked of using it as
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a ‘dynamo’ |pogonska snaga] for things ‘we want to achieve’.113 He then went on to argue 
that the SKJ had gone ‘too far in its understanding of decentralisation and self-management 
in the sense that there is no need for some state organ...to show what is fictive and what is 
not.’114 In this context, he chose to speak in technical terms in contrast with what he 
somewhat patronisingly represented as Karabegovic’s emotive rhetoric, reproaching him for 
his very ‘comfortable’ understanding of the situation, even though he said he knew 
Karabegovic’s ‘heart ached as do all our [hearts]’ over the evasion of tax.115 Furthermore, 
while he spoke of the need for a strict new tax control body and for renewed agricultural 
collections at fixed prices, he ridiculed the practice of promulgating laws needing further 
regulations which remained ‘in the drawer’, a classic metaphor for bureaucracy, instead of 
setting the system such that the state sector would use economic methods to stimulate and 
outcompete the private sector.116 Signalling that this was only a portion of what he had to say, 
he suggested he would pursue matters with Tempo in other forums.
The next exchange developed over setting boundaries for lower echelons in the system. It 
involved several more participants and arose when Kardelj intervened a second time to 
underline that politics was not primary in the old sense but that the focus now was on 
developing the new system, since practicism would lead to the return of the politics of the 
administrative era.117 18To dramatic effect, Kardelj then brought up cases of factories leasing 
land, equipment and seeds to peasants to create reserve inputs for their production plans. 
Tito was horrified and made the representatives of the republics in question justify such
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activity on their territory.119 Yet the episode did not end there. Indeed, when Josip Cazi, one 
of the leading members of the SSJ, took the floor at the Second Plenum, he joked: ‘I would 
like to discuss those bits of the speeches by Kardelj and Tempo which, actually, did not even 
mention the trade unions. From this, it can be concluded that communists working in the 
trade unions are doing well. (Laughter).’120 12Cazi managed to turn the humorous interlude into 
another altercation that drew Tito’s wrath. The thrust of his report was that there was not 
enough communication between government and the unions, as when Karabegovic had 
denied planning tax rises but days later presided over a tax rise on enterpriseswithout 
admitting that its purpose was to tax surplus wages. That left the union with the task of 
explaining the situation to angry workers. Overall, though, Cazi argued that the situation from 
below had improved and he ended by noting that those episodes of factories employing 
capital and labour in the countryside reflected the positive side of the business moral that 
came with the new economic system: collectives were interested in the success of their 
enterprise.
The response was swift. The next speaker, an economic policy-maker from Vojvodina, Jovan 
Veselinov, began with an irate response to Cazi. He used the case to underline the need for 
politics to keep all the negative side-effects of the market under control, pointing out that he 
was not disagreeing with Kardelj about the need to understand that the development of the 
system was the perspective. He could not conclude without returning to Cazi’s softness on 
‘wage slavery’.122 Tito then waded in to ask Cazi how he could defend the indefensible: the 
return of wage labour. Cazi said he had been misunderstood but Veselinov retorted that 
‘comrade Cazi does not know what is going on here, only comrades working in the economy
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do’. After a brief detour into whether the new system was the new basis for nationalism or 
whether old elements used it to strike back against their loss of privileges, respectively the 
views of Djilas and Tito,123 24 Tito once more took the floor to rebuke Cazi and argue that role 
of the trade unions was to defend the system that had abolished wage labour not defend such 
practices which had ‘revolted not just me but the others sitting here’.125 Tito added that the 
whole point of the new wage system was to abolish such a non sequitur as the surplus wage 
fund by introducing the concept of enterprise profit that could be taxed away.126 The 
distinction was important since it touched the heart of the matter: the fruits of labour under 
socialism went to those who toiled. The leadership appeared very much moved to make this 
clear and that can only be understood as a result of the entire preceding period. It was on this 
note of warning that the Plenum ended.
The SKJ leadership went on to the offensive within the Party after the Plenum. The letter sent 
to all Party organisations attacked two extreme mistakes: ‘first...that the role of Communists 
is now reduced to holding lectures...second...that nothing has changed in the method and way 
of work after the Sixth Congress.’127 The emphasis, however, was clearly on the appearance 
of widespread ‘petty-bourgeois-anarchist ideas of freedom and democracy’ while ‘the 
struggle for ideological and political unity is weak’.128 To reinforce the point, the leadership 
embarked on a six-month purge, with the number of expelled members for the year totalling 
72,067, which left the membership at 730,011 at the end of the year from an original 779,382 
at the time of the Plenum.129 This process did not gain much public attention, though, as
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foreign policy issues surrounding the Trieste crisis and .the elections in November took 
priority.
The subsequent six-month period eclipsed the Plenum but not the alignments that had 
crystallised around it. These in fact substantially shaped the events that followed, then and at 
least until 1958. The elitist, technocratic, decentralising and gradualist market reform 
coalition henceforth moved with considerable care to recalibrate the system and regain 
control of events but also to ensure that the leadership remained united. It avoided frontal 
showdowns and acted decisively only when opposition came into the open. This was in fact 
what occurred with Djilas. He accelerated his radicalism precisely when it had been made 
clear that boundaries to reform had to exist given the fragile state of the economy and the 
implications for SKJ rule. The availability of archival evidence relating to party-state forums 
has not changed fundamentally the story of Djilas’s downfall. His own account suggested that 
immediately after the Plenum he had decided to go against the line and that he had told 
Kardelj so while on a fishing trip.130 Whatever his own motivations for this decision, and it 
was evident he was often himself confused about where he wanted to take his individual 
rebellion, the responses of his comrades warrant more attention than they have received in the 
historiography, for they were not merely ‘that hard core of Party functionaries and militants 
who in no case wanted to give up their power.’131
The most striking aspect of the clash developing between Djilas and the leadership was in 
fact its tolerance of his ever more evident opposition. He had already raised some of his ideas 
at the Plenum but he took them further in a series of article in Borba in the autumn. Djilas 
‘seemed to be thinking aloud -  thinking thoughts that were generally stimulating, often
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1 ^obscure, and sometimes, to Orthodox Marxists, smacking dangerously of heresy’. 
Nevertheless, his articles until December had not contained anything that was not formally 
the Party line or that he had not already said at the Plenum. Yet it was his emphasis that 
showed an intensifying radicalism: he asserted in substance that the bourgeoisie was a weaker 
enemy to socialist democracy than bureaucracy.* 133 After having consulted Tito and received 
minor criticism, Djilas decided to sharpen the criticism, according to his own account in early 
December.134 On the 20th December, Djilas went so far as to attack the monopoly of the Party 
itself: ‘No one Party, not even a single class, can be the exclusive expression of the objective 
imperatives of contemporary society.’135 Realising that he was now past the point of no 
return, Djilas recounts that he sounded out Tito’s other close collaborators, who together with 
Djilas and Tito had represented the inner leadership: Kardelj and Rankovic. Both made it 
clear that they did not agree with him.136 Yet the Third Plenum did not come until several 
weeks later in mid-January.137
Djilas’s own account of this period, taken up by most historians as a basis for their accounts, 
focused largely on leading personalities but did not discuss wider forces. Indeed, this had 
marked a qualitative transformation whereby Djilas had started viewing individuals and not 
classes as the motivating subject of history. More than that, though, Djilas presented himself 
as an individual rebel in his memoirs. This was undoubtedly true but his activities suggested 
tension between sincere desire to push for freedom of discussion in the leadership and 
premeditated attempts to organise a faction. Namely, days after writing his open attack on the 
role of the Party, Djilas attended a closed meeting of the SSRNJ Presidency to assess the
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impact of the elections. He did not take part in the discussion until Kardelj’s summing up. 
Thereto, the Presidency had discussed with some satisfaction the conduct and results of the 
elections, despite minor problems and the undervaluation of the election for the Council of 
Producers, concluding that they had enhanced popular participation in government and raised 
self-confidence against bureaucratised local leaderships.138 Most speakers had also noted that 
the October crisis around Trieste had energised until then dull campaigns, suggesting that 
patriotism had silenced enemies.139 Kardelj in his conclusions tried to downplay the Trieste 
issue somewhat but ran into Djilas’s asides:
T think it is true what comrade Brkic said, that people voted for socialist 
democracy, that they voted for economic freedom, for the freedom of economic 
action, and they voted, clearly, for our foreign policy. But these first two moments 
were, in my opinion, the most important. /Milovan Djilas: The foreign [policy] is 
undeniable./ That is the patriotism that means a lot for the peasant without regard 
for his attitude to the Government, the character of the regime, whether he likes it 
or not. /Djilas: Even the bourgeoisie is partially for our foreign policy./ That is 
clearly what our citizen has voted for in these elections and both consciously and 
actively. That was obvious from the voters’ conferences where people spoke and 
took sides, where old political categories had disappeared, I don’t know, 
Communists, socialists, former democrats and radicals, where people already 
started thinking and deciding in new categories...our successes are not that which 
we have achieved...but what the masses expect us to achieve.’140
The exchange was exceptionally subtle. Djilas appeared to be suggesting, as in his Plenum 
intervention and articles, that the old order had been defeated and that cross-class or post­
class alliances could form around progressive policies. Kardelj by contrast purposefully 
distinguished between different classes but also distinguished politics from class. His fixation 
on the system was unquestionably reformist and perhaps exaggeratedly so given that the 
pragmatism of the government’s populist use of the Trieste issue for electoral purposes. It 
was plausible that Djilas might not have picked up on the subtleties of Kardelj’s negative
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responses or that Kardelj did not take seriously the possibility that Djilas intended his 
subtleties. Both were unlikely, though.
By all accounts, at a closed meeting of the Executive Committee, undated but evidently held 
days before the Third Plenum which ejected Djilas from the leadership in mid-January 1954, 
Djilas had consciously acted to build a faction in the Party. There was no clear agreement 
when he had started but leaders among themselves alleged a matter of months at least. Tito 
basically argued that ‘around him [Djilas] have gathered petty bourgeois intellectuals, 
students, for he has...passed on to a position against the working class, into petty-bourgeois 
anarchism, he does not even mention the working class.’141 Kardelj recounted the various 
episodes in which leading Communists, both inside the Executive Committee and in Agitprop 
work, had warned over preceding months Djilas that he was ignoring the working class and 
the conscious work of subjective forces like the SKJ.142 Several speakers accused Djilas of 
openly trying to build a following through the journals and newspapers he controlled or in 
personal chats behind people’s backs. His close friend Tempo said Djilas had openly solicited 
him in recent times,143 Kolisevski thought Djilas had formed supporters in Macedonia and 
had misused his high office to publish articles and gauge a reaction in the Party,144 and 
Rankovic agreed, explaining that Djilas had not taken an administrative role following the 
Sixth Congress but ‘[h]e sat at home. I cannot prise myself away from the impression that he 
was systematically working to win people to his ideas, he used the incredible busyness of 
people around the elections, the economic system and threw those things in the public 
domain. He was pushing three articles a week and had four in N[ova] Misao...From CG 
[Montenegro] district and city committees inform us that they received a letter from Djido
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142 ibid, 1-2
1 «  -j
165
[Djilas’s nickname] telling them to subscribe to NM [Nova Misao].’145 It was in Nova Misao 
that Djilas had published his well-known ‘Anatomy of a Moral’ which attacked the life-style 
of the Communist elite in shades foreshadowing his later classic The New Class and which 
drew invective from the Third Plenum.146 Djilas had apparently refused advice given him by 
Kardelj and Rankovic about his articles and got his colleagues to solicit articles from 
prominent Communists with open factional intent.147 The general conclusion appeared to be 
that, while remote since the Congress, he had become ever more conscious and active in the 
second half of 1953. More than that, the class basis of his position was certainly not among 
old Communists or workers.148
Days later, Djilas met his end at the top, accused of revisionism at the Third Plenum. Since 
the materials of proceedings were immediately published, historians have frequently centred 
on the proceedings at the Plenum as much as on Djilas’s memoirs and published materials to 
explain the preceding set of events and the alleged subsequent cooling of political reform 
inside the SKJ. The Plenum lasted two days. On the first day, Kardelj accused Djilas of a 
‘melange of Bemsteinism, mysticism, existentialism, liberalism and bourgeois anarchy.’149 
Djilas put up a spirited defence asserting that he thought the Party ‘was the main obstacle in 
the way of democratic and socialist development’.150 Only his ex-wife Mitra Mitrovic and his 
friend Dedijer defended Djilas but neither on grounds of defending his views.151 The rest of 
the leadership washed their hands of him if they had had connections beforehand. Kardelj in 
private offered him clemency on the second day, explaining that Tito considered the matter
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closed but that his case would be viewed with more leniency in six months’ time, and Djilas 
caved in, accepting that his views had been in contradiction with those of the Party and 
wrong. Djilas was duly expelled from the Central Committee and given a ‘final warning’ by 
the Party. Tito explained that Yugoslavia would continue to pursue its own variant of 
socialist democracy, bowing to neither East nor West, and as if to symbolise it, Djilas was 
spared Eastern bloc treatment but also denied political prominence.152 A purge of ‘Djilasites’ 
followed the Plenum, while more than 32,000 members left the Party of their own accord.153
The impact of events in 1953 on the ensuing development of the self-management system 
was central. Most of the changes had in large part already been announced before the Second 
and long before the Third Plenum. They had arisen to real problems in the system and the 
perceived dangers of populism on the shop-floor in relation to the stability of the SKJ. This 
became clear at the Second Plenum. The Djilas case that arose in the aftermath of this turn of 
events arose out of Djilas’s departure from the cannon but did not signify the result of a 
significant or principle departure from the reform path taken before the Sixth Congress. The 
Djilas case certainly contributed to the strengthening of political conservatism in the SKJ 
after January 1954. The Party had problems recruiting intellectuals and youth for more than 
two years after the affair.154 Famously, a future Praxis philosopher recounts that, as a student, 
he chose to express opposition by gathering a group and cheering Djilas after the Plenum.155 
All the same, the demobilisation of the Party had started before the Djilas affair and 
continued, such that in spring of 1956, the Party again discussed similar problems to those at 
the Second Plenum.156 Indeed, the Party continued to view populism as its main enemy 
throughout 1954-1956. With Djilas having chosen to capitulate on the potential role of leader
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of such a movement in favour of a more radical democratic and liberal direction, the market 
reformers turned their attention to the trade unions. The first Politburo meeting after the Third 
Plenum argued that the next Plenum should deal with a further reorganisation of the SKJ but 
that the one after should deal with the role of the SSJ. It was thus that a tug of war started 
over influence on the shop-floor between the higher echelons of the party-state, the lower 
echelons and the workers themselves.
Part II -  Self-Management, Wages and the Hungarian Scenario: 1954-1956
As chief representative of the reform wing of the leadership, Kardelj identified precisely the 
wage system as the main cause for the stagnation of self-management and the arena of 
struggle for higher productivity of labour in the Federal Assembly in late 1956.157 While it 
would take a further year after Kardelj’s speech for the profit-sharing system to be dropped in 
favour of income sharing, which would force workers to set wage rates in anticipation of 
enterprise income rather than after the annual accounts had been settled and taxes 
deducted,158 it was significant that the blame in the malfunction of the system had radically 
shifted again from the ‘particularism’ of which ‘the republic was the beginning and end’, in 
1953,159 to the ‘bureaucratic-administrative method of running the economy’ from the centre, 
by 1956.160 The transformation was not due simply to inter-elite swings between different 
policy choices, more market or more regulation, but amounted in part to very real pressures 
from below that forced changes in the thinking of leading Communists. The Hungarian 
Revolution in particular shocked the Yugoslav leaders. Falling living standards in the mid-
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1950s reinforced anew levelling tendencies among workers, both skilled and unskilled, and 
once again threatened open revolt on the shop-floor when the regime tried to up the pace 
without commensurate reward. This pulled the lower echelons of the party-state and meant 
that no solution that did not make major concessions to popular opinion would suffice. 
Meanwhile, the leadership saw levelling as a major brake on increasing productivity of labour 
which it ever more explicitly tied to the country’s position in the world economy. The end of 
U.S. aid in grants and its continuation on the basis of loans also acted as a spur towards 
market solutions. Popular approval of non-alignment rather than closer relations with the 
USSR probably reinforced the turn as well.
An influential economist of the times explained that in the mid-1950s, the preoccupation over 
wage policy ‘was to stimulate the productivity of labour and to prevent further increases in 
employment, which were encouraged by the way the profit-sharing system operated in 
practice. The profit-sharing system was altered to a greater or lesser extent every year in a 
game of hide-and-seek between the Federal Government, the local authorities, the workers’ 
councils and the workers themselves, all competing for better gains from the profit-sharing 
legislation’.161 Namely, workers’ wages continued to be divided in two: a fixed and variable 
rate. The latter derived from the profits of the enterprise, after tax. At first, the share would be 
decide by the district social plan but the federal government soon fixed maximum and 
minimum rates as percentages of the basic wage-fund. The basic approach of the Federal 
Government was to take the bulk of profits and to then ‘play the arbiter for the rest between 
the competitors, protecting the workers’ share from the district authority, and strengthening 
the funds of the enterprise against the claims of the workers for bigger shares’.162
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The various schemes all contained significant flaws which frustrated all the actors. In 1954, 
government still fixed wages centrally according to classification by skill and an aggregate 
wage fund. This meant that wage rises for any category of worker would have to apply to all 
other categories of workers. Since skilled labour was short, the system in practice forced 
enterprises to raise their wages, which it did by employing unnecessarily more unskilled 
workers.163 The system therefore changed in 1955 in an attempt to strengthen the position of 
the more skilled categories. Wages would now be determined by a wage tariff decided on by 
the enterprises themselves, after an internal procedure of consultations, and obligatory 
verification on the part of the local trade union and local government authority.164 The 
workers’ share gradually rose from 4.8 percent of net profits in 1954 to 9.2 percent in 1957, 
usually amounting to ‘the thirteenth pay cheque’.165 The government meanwhile retained 50 
percent of net revenue, after deduction of tax.166 It expected the unions to transmit production 
plans and fight for the general interest against particularism, to advise workers’ councils and 
keep wages down.167
The development of the wage system, however, only partially encouraged the practices that 
the government hoped to foster. Its successes registered important economic and political 
gains for the SKJ. The allocation of profits in 1954-1956 on the basis o f ‘the results of a trade 
union survey of 101 enterprises from various economic sectors suggests that despite the low 
standard of living, enterprises nonetheless chose to spend a good portion of these funds on 
investment in fixed and working capital rather than distributing them back as wages’.168 
Moreover, content analyses of workers’ councils minutes in seven industrial firms in the
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period 1950-1960 revealed that ‘the issues workers’ councils devoted the most time to were 
by and large those connected with “rationalising production”: determining product mixes, 
setting plan targets, modernizing both the technology and the organisation of work, and so 
on.’169 It also appeared that the concept of the ‘collective’ was gaining despite the higher 
incidence of ‘peasants workers’, according to a researcher who, ‘in a cross-republic study of 
over 5,000 workers, found that workers of all skill levels were far more willing to “struggle 
against inadequacies and negative phenomena” in their enterprises than in local 
government.’170
These moves in the direction of the guided independence that the market reform coalition had 
embarked on in 1952-1953 encountered massive obstacles. The first was that the imbalance 
between town and country exhibited in the earlier period 1948-1953 returned with economic 
growth. Just in 1954, industrial employment increased by 13 percent.171 Through the 1950s, 
employment in industry doubled.172 Meanwhile, agricultural production did not reach pre-war 
levels until 1957.173 Thus it was most likely that personal consumption did not outstrip that of 
interwar Yugoslavia until I960.174 This meant that changes to wage structure did little to 
entice productivity increases, which remained moderately below world levels despite the 
country reaching one of the highest growth rates in the world at the time, even according to 
reworked statistics in a study critical of official growth claims.175
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The social situation became critical in the mid-1950s, though, as shown by internal evidence 
drawn up for the Organisational-Political Secretariat of the Central Committee of the SKJ in 
the aftermath of the Hungarian events in 1956. The reports and discussion around it painted a 
bleak picture of the situation on the shop-floor that had little resemblance to the proclaimed 
goals of the successive wage systems. The conclusions were indeed dramatic:
‘The material basis for the increase in personal consumption has been in recent 
years structurally unfavourable and one-sided, since it depended almost 
exclusively on increased funds of industrial commodities. In these relations, 
demand on the market has not formed, rather the opposite: the demand for food is 
greater but weaker for industrial goods. Therefore, with the overall rise in prices, 
the rise in the price of food has been three times greater than the price of industrial 
goods...In the course of 1953 and 1954, the standard in certain categories rose 
pretty evenly, in fact the rise in the standards of workers and employees in the city 
has been faster than that of rural households. However in 1955 there is a major 
change in these relations...the standard in the city has fallen by about 6-7 percent, 
while in the village it has grown around 10 percent. In 1956 [despite a rise in 
wages]...it is...visible that living standards in the bigger cities and industrial 
centres have deteriorated in respect to...l955.’176
This led to open popular dissatisfaction, which in turn had a demobilising effect on the lower
echelons of the party-state, once again posing the question of power in the minds of leading
Communists. All the republics registered various social and political problems: each
experienced a fall in consumption, underpayment appeared in Serbia and Macedonia,
Macedonia and Montenegro saw unemployment rise substantially such that unemployment
welfare could not be paid out in certain localities, and housing became critical.177 The wage
system came under criticism for not being stimulating enough for skilled and highly skilled
workers leading to the setting of low norms and widespread economic crime.178 The same
report went on to say that all the republics described a state in which activists avoided
discussing living standards in public forums, ‘especially in the unions, at voters’ assemblies,
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meetings of the League of Communists etc.’179 Intensification of conflict between local 
government committees and voters, and between management and the collective, made living 
standards the main talking point in daily private conversation between people and opened the 
door to enemy activity.180 18The report stated unequivocally: ‘It is a general belief that our 
achievements in foreign policy are massive, while on the economic front they are 
negative.’ Open chauvinism was on the rise in Slovenia and Serbia, as was illegal 
emigration from Slovenia and Croatia.182
The themes emerging in the discussion represented both continuity and departure from the 
line in 1953. The alignments were still the same but the interpretation of the problems had 
begun to change with significant implications for who was deemed dangerous and why. First, 
the crisis on the shop-floor did not appear to be giving rise to the populist enterprise director. 
While the bourgeois enemy was still referred to, the direct ire of the masses was the foremost 
concern. The threat of go-slows in order to gain on overtime183, wage equalisation, now 
popular among both skilled and unskilled workers,184 and economic crime pointed to the 
potential temptation for conservative forces of a return to administrative methods as the 
leadership’s main worry. This explained Kardelj’s turn in the Federal Assembly at the close 
of 1956 from fearing particularism to fearing a potential central defender of the national 
interest. It was noteworthy that Rankovic, later Kardelj’s rival, at this juncture insisted on 
Kardelj’s speech being taken as the basis of agitation and propaganda in the period to
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follow.185 Later allegations of their conflict being in the open at this point, with Rankovic 
representative of a frustrated pro-Soviet wing in the leadership, appear groundless in this 
period.186 Second, unlike over the Trieste crisis, popular opinion had not turned against the 
West but against the USSR in view of the Hungarian invasion, which was why foreign policy 
could be more popular than domestic policy. In Serbia, in fact, rapprochement with Moscow 
somewhat unexpectedly drew comments that interpreted it as the cause of the fall in living 
standards, amid loss of U.S. aid.187 That was additionally a useful counterbalance to the 
potential threat of revanchist centralism. Third, the threat from the potential pro-Western 
intellectual circles did not any longer appear to seriously worry the leadership, making 
continued reliance on the West more palatable. Only the journalists appeared problematic, 
seeing as some wrote about the Petofi Circle in Hungary as a progressive movement. 
Rankovic responded that among journalists there were still ‘remainders of djilasovstina’ but 
these could be dealt with by clarification of ideas.188 Fourth, the continued focus on self­
management relations rather than ‘these sensitive questions of living standards’ suggested 
that not only the demoralisation or discontent of the party-state rank-and-file was a problem 
but the dysfunction of entire transmission belts for policy.189 The SSJ was the obvious target 
of that accusation at a time of threat.
The unions had indeed continued on a trajectory that had continued to upset and threaten the 
leadership since 1953. Thwarted in bringing major democratic changes to work relations in 
1953, the unions maintained a public discussion around some of the issues in their newspaper
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Rad until the union Congress in 1955, agitating for the return of productivity consultations 
involving the whole work collective and organised by the enterprise union.190 The intended 
Party Plenum to deal with the unions never took place but Cazi had an opportunity to 
continue his clash with the leadership when the SSRNJ held a plenum in order to deal with 
the intransigence of the much of the SSJ apparatus in 1954. As the opening statement191 by 
SSJ head and member of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the SKJ, 
Djuro Salaj, put it, ‘the functioning of the trade unions...is not and cannot be only a matter for 
them’.192 In a critical account of the relationship between the SSRNJ and the SSJ, the speaker 
argued that the SSRNJ was failing to reach workers who stayed ‘cocooned’ in their 
enterprises where the SSJ held sway.193 Yet the bodies of the SSJ also failed to initiate co­
operation with the SSRNJ as the overarching, umbrella of the mass organisations. Thus, the 
former remained only in the factory while the latter remained in the neighbourhoods without 
interaction.194 When it came to relations between the SKJ and the SSJ, there were further 
problems in that leading Communists failed to take trade union work seriously or, apparently 
less frequently, simply continued to issue commands.195
Salaj devoted the rest of his speech to the role and tasks of the union itself, which he defined 
as the defence and furthering of the interests of the working class within socialism. Harping 
on the refrain of balancing the general interest with that of the particular, Salaj continued: 
‘...the union movement...should be the representative of the class as a whole in relation to 
parts of the working class, in relation to individual enterprises.’196 This often meant arguing
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for delayed gratification of wants, which warranted political methods to win workers to new 
moral standards. Nevertheless, it frequently also led to conflict with backward layers and 
local union leaderships were not doing enough to resist accommodation.197 At a deeper level, 
the unions exhibited unevenness in their work, not simply territorially and according to the 
size of their workplace, but in terms of concentrating on some tasks, while totally neglecting 
others. Salaj gave instances of worker protection and cultural-educational work lagging.198 
The final section of the speech pertained to the work of the unions in self-management: the 
unions ran elections, helped maintain democratic relations and helped in the execution of 
council decisions.199 Yet the concentration on these tasks alone had caused problems in other 
areas of union work, as noted, but it also caused duplication of tasks, suggesting that unions 
tried to impinge on the work of the councils.200 Apparently more significant was the opposite 
tendency, to mirror and enforce whatever measures the councils promulgated, whether or not 
they were legal or in the general interest. That was why it was important to separate 
personnel.201 Finally, worker activity outside their enterprise in the organs of social self­
management was not satisfactory and needed change.202 The rest of Salaj’s speech merely 
went into greater detail on the issues he had raised. He discussed educational work and 
defensive tasks of the unions, arguing that these had been inadequate in that the former was 
too inward looking and the latter too often remote from worker interests.203 In relating to the 
style of work, Salaj appeared to yet again argue that the union was too cut off and did not do 
enough to engage the masses or to collaborate with other forces and institutions.204
197
198
199
200 
201 
202
203
204
ibid., 10
ibid., 11
ibid, 12
ibid., 13-14
ibid, 14-16
ibid, 16-16a
ibid., 17-24,24-30
ibid, 30-36
176
Concluding, Salaj spoke of the lack of accountability towards higher organs by lower organs, 
and hoped that the engagement of other forces would help the SSJ fulfil its important tasks.
The discussion showed some disquiet among several trade union leaders. Again, Cazi, amid 
protests that he had spoken too long, rattled off the standard history and role of the unions 
from the Communist assumption of power to the Plenum, before raising his own reasons for 
disquiet.205 His complaints were devastatingly simple. If trade unions were protective 
organisations of the working class, amid a mushrooming set of institutions of working class 
power, then it was surprising that they were getting an increasing workload in terms of 
representing workers in disputes with management and more surprising still that it was 
expected of them to perform the other significant tasks like economic, political and cultural 
education. Cazi demanded to know, more than being told that the protective role of the trade 
union was withering away, what concretely was to be done. His own understanding was that 
the task had to be shared between the SSJ and the other institutions of self-management, lest 
the SSJ ended up being solely a protective body instead of performing all its tasks.206 Kardelj 
responded with the mantra that the working class was the class in power. Neither a 
transmission belt for a leading organisation nor a defensive organisation of the worker against 
an employer, trade unions had to attain a better functioning of the system. That meant 
representing the position of the whole against particular interests, with the decision of what 
represented the general interest being taken elsewhere. ‘Old’ and ‘oppositional’ methods 
needed to give way to ‘new’ and ‘co-operative’ ones.207 Tempo added his voice to the belief 
that the system was primary over the subjective forces: ‘we should organise the economic
205
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system in such a way that consciousness comes as a supplement.’208 He nevertheless argued 
that the unions in a situation of flux had the obligation, given they decided on wages, to act 
with extreme discipline as an ‘iron’ organisation.209
Another quarrel betrayed a similar disagreement. One of the union leaders BoziCevic clashed 
with Kardelj, who had argued that the unions were still over-centralised and needed to 
develop more initiative from below.210 Bozicevic insisted that the union had been 
decentralising since 1952, sending some of its strongest cadres from the leadership to the 
industrial cities, where the situation was good, but that the lack of trained activists meant that 
smaller places lagged behind. The vertical forms of the industrial unions admittedly 
remained, BoziCevic continued, but they did not represent the substance of work. In so far as 
centralism remained, it was necessary for different branches of industry to co-ordinate work. 
Still, the full-time apparatus that had characterised the union had been given up in 1950. 
While it was possible that this also had to change, BoziSevic added with a hint of irony, it 
was best to settle on the role of the unions in the system before changing its structures any 
further. The unions had had to postpone their discussions of their role and structure anyhow 
given the frequent changes to the wage system and the obligations arising therewith.211
These discussions echoed Cazi’s swipe at Karabegovic at the Second Party Plenum. Union 
leaders felt resentment that they had to answer for the inadequacies of the economic system 
and the continued institutional chaos in the country. They nevertheless appeared to agree with 
the general trajectory and the need to bring their house in order. The resulting set of decisions
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very much reflected Salaj’s and Kardelj’s views.212 For all the difficulties of a changing 
economic structure, constantly fluctuating workforce, periodic alterations in the wage system 
and interminable institutional changes, the statement of the SSRNJ Plenum became the 
authoritative statement on the role of trade unions for decades.213 A plenum of the SSJ 
convened fifteen days after that of the SSRNJ and adopted the recommendations of the 
SSRNJ without undue fuss,214 and the Congress of 1955 officially endorsed them.215 With the 
crisis of social standards of 1955 and 1956, however, it appeared that the situation only 
deteriorated. It was not the Organisational-Political Secretariat alone that had detected the 
disarray in the lower echelons of the unions. The Party leadership began to blame the unions 
not just for equalisation tendencies but presumably for higher expectations raised by their call 
for more consumer goods at the Congress in 1955.216 That was clear from the trajectory of 
debates around the wage system and the internal structure of self-management bodies both at 
the 1955 Congress and in policy forum discussions in 1956.
Indeed, the SSJ Congress appeared to have been a turning point in that it appeared to have 
given self-confidence to a frustrated rank-and-file despite official resolutions backing the 
Party line. The cursory notes in the Executive Committee in September 1955217 recorded 
Dobrivoje Radosavljevic from the Serbian leadership as having argued: ‘The situation will be 
difficult next year too. The basis of all stories and panics: unsettled relations. It all started 
with the Congress of the Unions. Each meeting of the Committee for the economy is known 
of outside. Demobilisation of our cadre.’218 With the tone of debate suggestive of serious 
concerns, and Tito calling for an urgent rise in living standards, leading Communists moved
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more clearly towards a more export-oriented, market model. Tito himself did criticise 
decentralisation but he also called for more investment in light manufacturing and 
agriculture. He criticised recent economic plans and in particular ranted against calls for less 
funds for the military.219 Tempo started with his previous thesis of parasitism at the expense 
of heavy industry, suggested that military and industrial expenditure remained at a high of 48 
percent, which would prevent any immediate amelioration of living standards, but then went 
further:
‘It had been necessary to go for low wages for workers. Every year some 300,000 
moved to industry, and we work with manual labour -  expensive. Thinks it is in 
that direction -  the mechanisation of production that reductions ought to be sought 
not with the army...Need to find a solution in a change of the system. Points out 
that the conclusions reached at comrade Tito’s have not been implemented among 
the republics. Need to change the credit system in agriculture. Criticises theories 
that prices are the only condition and stimulant to raise agricultural production.
The tax system needed change also. The small peasant enjoys all the benefits -  as 
a peasant he is not taxed -  he is lightly taxed, while as a worker he has all the 
benefits of employment in industry. The rise in production in agriculture should 
not be accompanied by a rise in the purchasing power of the village...The question 
of wages: production is rising faster than the number of employed. Necessary to 
develop interest in the productivity of labour to the full.’220
That set of reasoning amounted to the first implicit acknowledgement that worker
management had been straitjacketed by a system of low wages, rather than that the wage
system was inadequate because of continued ability by the enterprises to rise above planned
rates. Additionally, Tempo had admitted to the persistence of the worker-peasant layer,
which, he argued, needed to be decided in favour of the city, if worker management were to
be meaningful. The phrase towards the end of the extract about labour productivity signalled
the beginning of the end of profit-sharing in enterprises. Income-sharing, a mode of a priori
wage-planning, would be the result of the reforms of the period following the Hungarian
Revolution. Nevertheless, the decisive forum had pronounced on the principle even though
implementation would occur only later.
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It was Kardelj who, continuing from Tempo’s analysis, stated all this more clearly in his own 
criticism of economic planners: ‘Can we as a socialist country continue to exert pressure on 
the ordinary man?...It is necessary to change the structure of investment and not be afraid if 
the whole sum rises. It is necessary to take a clear stand on [living] standards.’221 2He then 
went on to propose a seven-point programme: lowering investment; slowing down the flow 
of labour to industry; strong measures for local investment; a reform of the wage system; 
reform of the economic system; increase of exports; and bringing work relations under 
control. Speakers from the less developed republics all spoke in favour of a rebalancing in 
their favour, confirming the line of the Third Plenum but suggesting its conclusions had not 
been implemented.223 Several of them also suggested a desire to have a public discussion 
since experts had too much say in the economy and Aleksandar Rankovic suggested that the 
issue be brought out in the open at the proximate plenum of the SSRNJ when ‘more 
information would be available’ 224 That was carried in an obvious push by the leadership to 
push a public debate and set of conclusions on its unruly lower echelons.
Indeed, less than two months later, the famous Fourth Plenum of the SSRNJ brought an even 
more coherent and unequivocal statement of purpose on the part of the Yugoslav leadership 
about its intentions on the eve of the fateful year of 1956. Tito gave the authoritative 
statement which for the first time suggested a rounded and coherent direction ever since the 
new course of mid-195 3.225 Sharp in his admission that only administrative levers appeared to 
be functioning, Tito went on to explain the overriding necessity in the preceding period of 
building heavy industry even, as it had been, at the cost of widespread imbalances. Now, he
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argued, there needed to be a more integrated way forward that sought balances across regions 
and sectors, including military production. Production for domestic consumption, particularly 
of machines, had to occur and to lessen reliance on foreign capital. He reasoned also that the 
government needed to smooth out inter-republic relations, which had understandably suffered 
from the imbalances of the preceding period and which were beginning to fester.226 When he 
reached the question of exports, Tito finally provided a strategic viewpoint:
‘When we speak of future investment policy, we have to take care that investment 
takes place primarily on the basis of domestic development, and’ then also for 
foreign markets. Were we to concentrate on industrial production on the basis of 
raw material imports, for the purpose of exports, then we shall, at the present stage 
of development when we are still weak, go very slowly with raising the living 
standards of our citizens, because our products would with difficulty withstand 
competition on foreign markets, on account of high production costs, and 
regression on account of exports is costly for our citizens...I am in favour of 
building and upgrading, in the first instance, that industry which uses resources 
from domestic sources, because it is more profitable to export finished goods than 
raw materials...We must in the future focus on finding new export opportunities 
from the agricultural sector.’227
This amounted very much to the confirmation and deepening of the line provided in 1953. A 
clearer relationship between investment for domestic and foreign purposes emerged from 
Tito’s speech. Production for domestic consumption gained primacy over heavy industry, at 
least temporarily, while production for export also received a strategic footing beyond 
covering for a temporary disproportion in the balance of trade. More than that, a stagist view 
of the country’s export potentiality clearly suggested movement in the direction of accepting 
roles in the international division of labour with no capitulation over the ambition to 
industrialise the country. Tito moved next to labour productivity: extensive growth had to end 
and with growth in industrial production set to slow down, Tito was amazed that planners had 
foreseen a further rise in the number of industrial workers. Internal rationalisation of 
production had become central in the struggle to raise living standards, particularly as any
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continued attempt at keeping living standards down would have been potentially explosive. 
Further market reform of the wage system therefore envisaged the possibility of higher wages 
and lower prices.228 For Tito, then, labour productivity remained an accounting problem of 
the imbalances within domestic production. Despite his claim that living standards and the 
imbalance in trade amounted to the two most important questions for further development, 
their interrelation at best occurred on the level of the reformulation of the macroeconomic 
balance between different sectors of the economy and, seemingly, not directly.
Further discussion did make that connection, however. Miha Marinko, from Slovenia, made 
an explicit link between labour productivity and exports during the discussion, in a speech 
worth quoting from extensively:
‘We have already had, here and there, complaints from various negative elements, 
with an anarchist attitude to rising living standards, when we spoke about the 
impossibility of raising living standards without raising labour productivity. 
Already, we have started getting comparisons with Germany. When I went to 
Litostroj, various demagogic opinions could be heard on the living standard, so 
they said we should compare ourselves with Germany. They said that when we 
have those standards, we can seek such labour productivity. It is clear that the 
thing has been turned on its head. For, there is no possibility of raising standards 
without raising productivity of labour...No one here thinks or talks about...what 
the production costs of our export articles amount to....We have to pose the 
question of value, the question of production costs as one of the elements we 
ought to tie to the question of wages, with the question of the struggle for a higher 
productivity of labour, which here has to play a role in our standing on the 
international market.’229 230
Other speakers, more importantly, showed that the issue of a comparative assessment of 
labour productivity was present among planners more widely, if evidently not systematically. 
Sefket Maglajic, a representative from Bosnia, spoke of how the government in that republic 
assessed the performance of the metallurgical coke factory in Lukava by comparing its 
productivity per worker with that of other plants ‘of the same type in Europe’.
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Quite clearly, therefore, a competitive logic had both indirectly and directly begun imposing
itself on Yugoslav economic development. Leading figures, including Tempo and Tito,
moreover, argued for re-interpreting the previous approach to wages best encapsulated as ‘to
each according to their work’, towards a system that rewarded individuals on the basis of the
performance of their collectives as a whole. In Tempo’s (and Tito’s) words:
‘I cannot understand how the income of workers in the shipbuilding works in 
Rijeka, or their tariffs are identical to those of the shipbuilding works in Split, 
even though the productivity of labour is greater. It is true some enterprises have 
no incentive for a greater income, in other words for decreasing their costs, neither 
in terms of reducing their labour force nor their material costs...I think that the 
wage system is still on weak legs...My main complaint is that we need a good 
look at what is not working here.../Tito: I completely agree...The wage system 
must go in parallel with all these changes.../’231
The preferences of the leadership were ever more clearly moving in the direction of more
profound market reform at the level of providing incentives for greater enterprise autonomy
and the creation of a labour market. This combined with the Yugoslavs’ belief that more
money in circulation would provide enhanced opportunities for development rather than
malpractices, a further decisive step away from command-and-control. Historians registered
developments in this direction, albeit on a different plane of analysis: ‘[ijmport restrictions on
consumer goods were eased, starting in 1955, in the hope of encouraging higher labor
productivity and at the same time forcing a decline in the costs of domestic production in
order to improve the competitive position of Yugoslav products abroad.’232
Implementation of the measures called for by the Fourth Plenum was nonetheless slow. 
Yugoslav leaders became,engrossed with discussions over future relations with the Soviet 
Union. It was only with the twin crises over Suez and Hungary in autumn 1956 that finally
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accelerated the pace of the declared reforms. The Executive Committee of the CC SKJ met in 
early November 1956 to discuss the economic situation. Only the conclusions of the meeting 
have survived but they re-affirmed the Executive Committee and SSRNJ Plenum conclusions 
from late 1955. Understandably under the circumstances, the brief notes placed living 
standards and a change in the wage system as a first priority and discussed military spending 
as a second priority. Foreign trade came third but only in the sense that what credit could be 
attained would go towards production rather than payment of debt and that public spending 
would have to fall towards a more realistic level. The formulation, therefore, was more 
defensive than that during late 1955. Industrial investment would also fall, while the budgets 
of local governments would be based on local taxation and strictly circumscribed. Social 
control of spending needed to be strengthened, the document further posited, while a politics 
of redistribution in favour of less developed regions also needed to take place. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, the Executive Committee decided that one-year plans had not 
shown themselves an apt instrument of policy and announced the need to work out a second 
five-year plan.233 This, more than its other conclusions, which accentuate some of the tactical 
priorities of the moment, amounted to a significant leap in policy and a new departure. The 
end of aid and the projected reliance on credits set the stage for the next phase of Yugoslav 
integration in the world market.
Part III — Income Sharing, the Market and the Trbovlje Strike 1956-1958
The previous section demonstrated the ascendancy of the market wing of the party-state 
leadership as it implemented its technocratic and market-oriented vision of development amid
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trade union resistance. Still hamstrung by the multiplicity of views in the ruling SKJ, the 
reform coalition had to propose each leap in the direction of change by injecting it with 
elements acceptable to its opponents. Nevertheless, it had used the Hungarian events to make 
the decisive push for radical reform by linking the classical socialist tenet of ‘from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his work’ to work collectives rather than 
individual workers. This decisive shift occurred within the context of what could be seen as a 
comfort for more conservative elements in the leadership: a revival of long-term planning in 
the form of a new five-year plan to embrace the half decade from 1957 to 1961. More than 
that, clothed in the language of self-management, this turn towards the market emphasised, 
albeit for tactical reasons, the primacy of the domestic against the external market. 
Production had to be geared to correct the earlier imbalance in favour of producer against 
consumer goods. Cuts to the public sector and investment in agriculture, furthermore, acted 
as a means to reduce reliance of foreign credits as the balance of trade deficit continued to 
worry the Yugoslav Communists and cause them embarrassment as they proceeded with 
rapprochement in the East. Although the plan projected an increase in exports, it was the fall 
in imports that represented the major preoccupation.
All these measures reflected, at least temporarily, an autarky acceptable to both weary 
conservatives, fearful of the corrosive influences of the world market, and pragmatic 
reformers, cognisant of the low quality of Yugoslav manufactures. Neither side wanted to 
abandon the ideal of rapid state-led catch-up and appeared content with rising economic 
output. Both sides understood the need to maintain unity in an unpredictable geopolitical 
setting and understood the need for a quick alleviation of living standards. The strains of 
industrialisation in East Germany, Poland and Hungary had raised a spectre of uprising from 
below that the Yugoslav leadership wished to banish from the corridors of power. By the start
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of 1958, however, the reform wing of the leadership suffered a significant reversal despite 
over a year of steady and significant advances at various platforms and Congresses, in the 
legislative process, and over foreign policy following the autumn of 1956. The turning point 
occurred in January 1958 as a strike in the Slovenian mine of Trbovlje inaugurated what 
turned into a shallow but significant strike wave over several years. While unrest never 
reached threatening proportions from the standpoint of the party-state, it nevertheless riled 
the leadership and forced a novel reassessment of the line.
Behind the Congress o f Workers ’ Councils: November 1956-June 1957
Following the decisive shift towards further market reform at the meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Central Committee of the SKJ after the Hungarian events, the SKJ 
leadership became engrossed in foreign affairs. It fell to the Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
to develop the legislative shift from profit sharing to income sharing in the enterprises. The 
papers of the relevant committee of the SIV are not available at the time of writing but the 
process of reasoning can be reconstructed on the basis of trade union archives. Namely, the 
SSJ leadership remained in constant discussion with SIV over wage policy. At the close of 
1956 and opening of 1957, the SSJ went to great lengths to distance itself from accusations 
thrown at it by government and Party leaders pertaining to demands for wage levelling in the 
period from 1953 to 1956. Nevertheless, trade union preoccupations proved different to that 
of the governmental bodies and the relationship between the two institutions continued to 
experience frictions. They foreshadowed conflicts that would arise after the strike wave 
began in early 1958. In the meanwhile, such was the dominance of the reform project that 
policy divergences remained beneath the surface and subject to comradely discussion. Up 
until the Congress of Workers’ Councils in the summer of 1957, called at the apparent
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initiative of the SSJ, the trajectory of the socialist system appeared to be ineluctably moving 
in the direction set by the SKJ apex in the autumn of 1956.
The programme of reform crucially depended on the ability of the apex to re-connect with a 
popular base. This involved a delicate and contested series of differentiations of the echelons 
below the federal and republic leaderships by policy makers. Most obviously, tying advances 
in living standards to productivity gains on the part of increasingly autonomous enterprises 
challenged middle-level apparatuses that had sprung up in the preceding period.234 This shift 
necessitated a return to more populist methods of mobilisation that represented a stark 
contrast to the dominant political themes of the years 1953-1956. A significant surface 
expression of this shift was the prospective five-year plan entered the public sphere for 
discussion as part of the strategy of mobilisation.235 Precisely because market reform 
necessitated some concessions from levels of the state bureaucracy but also implied a time 
lag between a change in direction and tangible material reward for successful work 
collectives, the dominant faction in the party-state decided to establish a more durable 
relationship with a relatively stable constituency within the enterprises. It settled on the 
skilled and highly skilled workers who dominated the institutions of worker self­
management. Later commentators acutely identified this move because of the official 
preoccupation with the need to widen the pay gap within firms that dominated public 
discourse until and at the Congress of Workers’ Councils.236 The question of living standards 
also began to dominate policy forums as against simply wage systems. This became evident 
at the first plenum of the Central Council (CV) of the SSJ to be held after the Hungarian
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events in December 1956 at which living standards constituted the main discussion point on 
the order paper.237
Already in November, the CV SSJ presidency had met to suggest an emergency wage rise of 
5 percent for non-skilled and semi-skilled workers and 10 percent for skilled and highly 
skilled workers to take effect in January 1957. It had also worked out a plan of activity for the 
SSJ as a whole for 1957 that included special attention to the question of wage rates and work 
relations.238 Just over a month later, the Third Plenum met to concretise the modes in which 
the trade unions could put in motion their massive apparatus to implement the changes 
necessary to stave off urban revolt and maintain a high level of economic growth. The trade 
union press indicated that a revolution in policy had finally been settled upon at the Plenum: 
it rested on the principle that living standards ought to be raised primarily by raising wages 
rather than cutting costs.239 Veber prepared a set of theses on the living standard of workers 
and administrative officers. The document was based on research carried out in the summer 
of 1956, spread over eighteen pages and had been sent to participants in anticipation of the 
meeting. The theses provided an indication of the range and complexity of the issues that the 
trade union leadership undertook to tackle in anticipation of the prospective five-year plan: 
trends in real wages; productivity of labour, the stimulation of producers and tariff politics; 
agricultural production; the market, prices and supply; housing; social protection; the 
structure of spending; and the politics of the commune or district government. Over forty 
participants took to the podium in a lively and heated discussion over two days.240
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It emerged that there was serious concern in the trade unions about the new direction. Most 
agreed that a new wage system was necessary.241 Moreover, in terms of the subjective 
weaknesses speakers pointed to, the emphasis was on what technocracy could bring. This 
included professional organisation of the labour process with the belief predominating that 
engagement of part of the technical staff to work on this problem substantially improved 
productivity.242 Industrial chambers and associations had also not taken a leading role in 
terms of modernising work methods or other useful tasks like collecting information that 
could be used by enterprises and planners.243 Furthermore, lack of cooperation among 
enterprises duplicated tasks and retarded specialisation.244
Nonetheless, several speakers pointed out that there was disagreement about what constituted 
higher living standards. Nikola Segota from Croatia therefore proposed a joint committee of 
government and trade union representatives to study living standards in greater detail and 
agree a single line on the issue.245 While he disagreed with the theory of ‘poverty’ wages,246 
Segota ended up effectively calling for continued central allocation of wages to prevent social 
strains blowing up. The promised wage rises of 5 and 10 percent were in his opinion 
symbolic and would not lead to rises in productivity but rather: ‘bring into the enterprises a 
string of arguments and discussions about how the comrades up there have already granted to 
those with high wages even higher wages, that they care only about them, etc’.247 Since there 
was great variation between industries and regions, giving preference to skilled and highly 
skilled workers posed challenges for Yugoslav unity as the impact of wage increases would
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be uneven.248 § ego ta preferred a lump sum given out to enterprises to distribute internally by 
the workers’ councils, which the government feared would mean wage levelling. Moreover, 
he argued for greater predictability in the system, a new stimulating norm rate to only be 
taken up the following year on the basis of thorough research, and greater control and 
inspection from above.249
The response given by the representative of the government, the federal vice-premier Tempo, 
amounted to a frank admission of divisions in the federal government but also a bold pitch for 
radical reform. His opening arguments placed the growing current account deficit at the 
centre of the debate. This followed a dramatic set of internal reports, presented two months 
after the SSJ plenum at a meeting of the Executive Committee, stating that Yugoslavia, even 
after drastic changes to the economic system, might not be able to recover its balance to 
equilibrium until 1961 or even 1965.250 The government had relied on American aid to 
finance deficits running into tens of billions of dinars every year since 1950 but in 1957 this 
was about to change: ‘we are no longer receiving aid but taking out loans’.251 The five-year 
plan had to subordinate its priorities to overcoming a massive annual deficit of 120 million 
dollars.252 This would be achieved by effecting deep cuts in public expenditure,253 reduction 
in social welfare which was apparently the highest in Europe at 10 percent,254 employing the
A C C
mass organisations in a struggle against duplication among firms and republics, targeted 
investment in agriculture and local transport,256 and increases in exports.257
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Logically, the wage system had to be at the centre of such a push. Tempo devoted roughly the 
last quarter of his speech to the issue of labour productivity.258 He stated openly that he had 
made his opposition to the profit-sharing system public as early as 1954 on account of the 
fact that it did not offer adequate incentives for raising labour productivity.259 In direct 
response to Segota’s proposal that wage rises should be decided by the workers’ councils 
after a lump sum had been handed out across industry, Tempo expressed a level of 
exasperation. While the government had initially intended to raise only the wages of the more 
skilled layers of the workforce, it had given in to union pressure for the 5 and 10 percent deal 
for the less and more skilled workers respectively. Now there was further confusion with yet 
another, different proposal coming from the unions, so Tempo asked the union to decide 
before the next sitting of the government what its position really was.260
His own views, which he said were not shared by all in his ‘surroundings’, by which he 
meant government,261 were still open to alteration but he himself believed that the new wage 
system would have to be a compromise between the need to overcome the unevenness 
produced by the administrative period and the profit-sharing period on the one hand, and the 
need to provide an effective stimulus for raising productivity on the other. Nevertheless, he 
hoped that that compromise would not concede much to centralism and would favour 
enterprise, autonomy and workplace rationalisation.262 Moreover, it was important to go 
against levelling and reward skill for two major reasons: to provide incentives for training 
and to strengthen the city against the countryside.263 With the threat of ballooning debt
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hanging over the economy, the former was vital because even when Yugoslav firms 
employed the latest technology, their enterprises took on more workers and had a lower 
labour productivity than comparable plants in Europe. The latter reason rested on the 
assumption that low-skilled peasant-workers would spend their money in the countryside 
where the private sector still predominated, while skilled workers would remain in the city 
and purchase goods produced in the socialist sector, thereby giving domestic production a 
crucial boost.264 As Tempo concluded, he received enthusiastic applause.265
A significant shift had occurred in the terms of the debate between the government and the 
unions. Both professed the deepening of the autonomy of the institutions of worker self­
management. The government interpreted this to mean that the centre would empower the 
more skilled elements in the workplace to fight for more share of the market within broad 
limits by encouraging wage differentials within firms and thereby enhancing the incentive 
scheme to raise productivity. The unions, by contrast, insisted that the centre should empower 
workplaces by allowing them to decide on the wage scale autonomously while acting 
administratively to keep wages in tune with prices. The two approaches did not deny the need 
for government intervention or popular mobilisation but expressed a difference in kind and 
location at which these should be employed. The government saw productivity rising with 
technical competence moving to the enterprise but within strict political and legal limits. The 
unions by contrast saw technical competence remaining with the centre while mass political 
mobilisation would raise technical knowledge and productivity within the workplace. Put 
more vividly, the former sought to bring technology to the masses while the latter wanted to 
pull the masses towards technology.
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This became immediately clear as the first issue of the union paper to come out after the issue 
with the reports from the plenum carried an article that moderated but retained the union’s 
position from the plenum on the question of wage rises. Entitled ‘Against a linear 
increase’,266 the article in fact argued that the trade union view now was that the 5 and 10 
percent wage rises ought to be implemented but not mechanically. Rather, workers’ councils 
would approximate wage rates to these two figures but mould them to fit the concrete 
circumstances of each individual workplace. This evidently amounted to a concession to the 
government as the stronger party in the partnership but it still sought room for manoeuvre: 
the principle that political actors within the workplace could tailor the demands of the centre 
to their own situation even if they had to remain within stricter boundaries than they would 
have preferred. The unions, therefore, while professing adherence to strict democratic 
centralism, or the need for maximum debate before government made a decision and 
maximum unity in executing the decision, still appeared bent on blunting the edge of the 
policy to be executed even as they conceded its overall direction.
The same issue of Rad contained another two announcements on issues that would come to 
dominate the following year. The first was that the government was drawing up new laws 
pertaining to work relations and the second centred on the convocation of the first Congress 
of Workers’ Councils for June of 1957.267 While news of changes to the wage system did not 
come as a surprise, the sudden convocation of the Congress was a relative novelty. It had in 
fact first been suggested by the Federal Assembly in 1955 and had been newly mooted to the 
a trade unions who set up a Committee for the Convocation of the Congress of Workers’ 
Councils at the close of 1956,268 only to be criticised at a closed meeting of the EC CC SKJ in
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early 1957.269 The exact origin of the renewed interest in holding a Congress is unclear. 
Nevertheless, Kardelj brought it up at the EC in January, in order to obtain close political 
supervision of the event. He suggested that the initiative be broadened out as ‘the impression 
is being formed that this is an action of the trade unions alone’.270 The EC decided that the 
presidency of the SSRNJ as the umbrella alliance of all the mass organisations that included 
the trade unions should formally sanction the move and participate in the organisation of the 
Congress even if the Congress was to stay a trade union initiative.271
Such concern notwithstanding, the political apex had clearly attached great importance to the 
organisation of the Congress: they had decided on serious mobilisation around it, a 
broadening of the composition of the committee for its convocation and extensive coverage 
in the press.272 Most later commentators consequently saw the Congress as a major landmark 
that recorded the intentions of the reform alliance and created ‘a climate of public 
expectation’ around what ‘seems to have been the first mention in an official document of the 
possibility that investment (‘expanded reproduction’) might also be transferred, at least in 
part, from the State to the self-management sector.’273 Yet the Congress amounted to more 
than that. It delayed, shaped and intensified the rift that had begun to open up over worker 
management at the Third Plenum of the SSJ. That would only become clear months after the 
Congress had taken place. Indeed, its impact was only indirect. The titanic struggle was in 
fact over the wage system and the fault lines that dominated Yugoslav economic policy­
making until at least 1961 and arguably as late as 1965 crystallised around issues pertaining 
to the wage debate. Moreover, it was the strikes of 1958 that provided a more obvious and
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dramatic opportunity for major institutional and policy battles that foreshadowed the market 
reforms of 1961.
The full significance of the Congress of Workers’ Councils to that process has never been 
appreciated. Yet it contributed to the process in two major ways. First, the trade union leaders 
appeared to have realised that the Congress had been foisted upon them and that further 
departures from their own vision of running the system were imminent in the form of a wage 
system they disagreed with. So, they in large part gave way to the market reformers at the 
Congress and decided to make their stand afterwards. Second, their success in organising the 
Congress had given the SSJ an impetus and standing that other institutions and mass 
organisations had begun to lose, amid a myriad of problems both at the levels of policy and 
execution of policy. This meant that the fixation their leadership developed with matters of 
state raised rank-and-file belligerence but left the trade unions exposed when they proved 
unable either to deliver their programme or contain the resulting frustration of their members. 
Thus, while the SSJ gained a pyrrhic victory in the short term by strengthening interventionist 
elements in the party-state, it also suffered a shake-up that installed a major market reformer 
at the helm. The significance of the Congress of Workers’ Councils could only be grasped, 
therefore, in the totality of relations that developed after the autumn of 1956 and that reached 
a peak at the start of 1958.
Lost in Transmission: Defects in Mobilisation ahead o f the Congress and the Strikes
Reflecting on the first labour strikes of post-war Yugoslavia, Tempo admitted about the SKJ 
leadership in his memoirs that: ‘the results in the development of production and standards
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during 1957 had pretty much lulled us to sleep’.274 Only Tito appeared concerned, warning 
high-ranking government officials in late 1957 that continued popular dissatisfaction with the 
economy ought to be understood as ‘underground thunder’.275 Nevertheless, a sense of 
relative confidence dominated at the apex for much of 1957. This did not extend to policy 
direction so much as policy execution but it pervaded a sense that their power was secure. 
Whatever happened, the Yugoslav leaders appeared to believe, they would be on top of 
things. They debated many important issues in the open. Indeed, the antecedents of the 
contest around wages began to reach the public via the trade union press already in the 
spring, even if the debate occurred in earnest after the Congress.
That very much contrasted with the relative paucity of discussion of the Congress even 
behind closed doors. It was as if most of the actors appeared to believe that the Congress 
involved a one-off mobilisation like any other that was conducted around an election or the 
Congress of any of one of the mass organisations. Indeed, following a brief treatment in 
January, the EC met several times in the first half of the year but did not discuss the Congress 
of Workers’ Councils. Instead, it concentrated on the worsening relationship with the 
countries of the Eastern Bloc following the Hungarian Revolution, the economic situation 
following the resulting suspension of Russian credits for a major aluminium plant in 
Montenegro, and personnel changes in the Federal Assembly and the leadership of the trade 
unions following respectively the death of the renowned EC member Mo§a Pijade and the 
illness of another senior EC member Djuro Salaj.276 *6
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While that in itself might have been indicative of a relative relegation of the Congress to the
status of just another assembly, the decision to facilitate a change of leadership in the trade
unions and then a failure to do so until the beginning of the following year, after the strikes,
suggested weariness of the SSJ. The archival papers of the Party certainly do not reveal why
Salaj stayed on for a full year after the decision was made but further research into the
Secretariat of the SSJ may yield important clues. The episode may be of interest because
Tempo, who was ultimately to succeed Salaj, instead of Ivan Bozicevic, the high-ranking
trade union functionary in fact chosen at the March 1957 meeting of the EC to be Salaj’s
successor, signalled disagreements over the attitude to be taken towards the trade unions at
the top of the SKJ. The details are murky and Tempo’s memoirs tend at times,
euphemistically put, to be a better indication of overall trends than exact events. On this
matter, his claim that the EC decided on him in early 1958 on the back of the Trbovlje strikes
and that he refused, only to change his mind some time later,277 appears to be borne out in
part by the evidence: the EC did meet to decide on personnel changes in anticipation of the
Seventh Congress of the SKJ and announced changes to the SSJ leadership on 7 February
1958 but named Tempo as president only at a later sitting on 20 March 195 8.278 The reasons
for the delay are not so clear from the evidence. Tempo intimated that the month of
prevarication became the subject of factional intrigue by forces hostile to economic reform
and largely based in Serbia, around the chief of secret police and one of inner leadership
within the EC, Aleksandar Rankovic. None of the names Tempo mentioned as his possible
rivals came up in that capacity either in early 1957 or early 1958 in the archival papers. Still,
his account may be indicative of the reason why Salaj stayed on through 1957: to prevent the
struggles that jockeying for position would have necessarily provoked at a time when a line
had not been agreed on major issues where the unions had a stake and a public debate
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beckoned. That in turn may be indicative of the strains the SKJ leadership believed that the 
debates would provoke.
Such caution might have been realistic given the process of erosion that the SKJ apparatus 
itself appeared to have undergone during 1957. Uncertainty about the date of the Seventh 
Congress of the SKJ in part played a role in this. Having already postponed the Congress by a 
year during the turbulent events of 1956, the leadership felt twice more forced under pressure 
of external events to reschedule, from the initial date set for late autumn of 1957, to the 
early winter of 195 7,279 80 and then to the spring of 1958.281 The overbearing pressure of the 
Eastern Bloc accounted for the deferral as it practically forced the SKJ to accept an invitation 
to Moscow on the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution as a way of avoiding 
renewed confrontation on the scale of 1948.282 Indeed, foreign relations provoked a high 
number of EC meetings for the entire year and dominated proceedings in five of the seven 
meetings, indirectly affecting two, which dealt with the balance of trade mechanism or other 
external shocks like the suspension of Soviet credits for a major aluminium plant in 
Montenegro.283 The only CC plenum held that year also concentrated on the postponement of 
the Seventh Congress and on relations with Romania.284 With the gaze of the federal 
leadership fixed firmly on events beyond Yugoslav borders, therefore, other bodies had to 
deal with domestic issues with little political guidance from the leaders.
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Yet notes on the meetings of republic-level parties over the summer of 1957, prepared by the 
Organisational-Political Secretariat of the federal CC as part of the preparation for the 
Seventh Congress, revealed that the republic Party leaderships convened in large part in order 
to discuss post factum federal Party meetings or to react to pressing local political issues. So, 
the Slovene leadership dealt with the medical profession and elections of professors at the 
University of Ljubljana, the Serbian communists appeared most concerned with minor 
organisational details and agriculture, the Croatian leadership concentrated on the twentieth 
anniversary of the foundation of the Croatian Party and cadres in Zagreb, the Montenegrin 
Party bosses raised substantive issues like agriculture and the reorganisation of the state 
administration, the Bosnian Party effected personnel changes and discussed local elections, 
and the Macedonian reports contained only the number of meetings but not their topics. 
This suggested that there was a significant lack of initiative on the part of the Party as a 
whole in affecting the major trends of policy set by government.
While the work of the lower echelons did seem to be more proactive, some major warning 
signs that the system of transmission was not in the best order even at that level were 
reaching the Organisational-Political Secretariat. At a meeting on 31 January 1957, chaired 
by Rankovic, the Organisational-Political Secretariat discussed cadre policy. Two 
worrying developments came to the attention of Party leaders. First, the slow pace of 
rejuvenation of Party committees at the district and municipal levels, was threatening to 
alienate the SKJ from the working class as older members, frequently partisans, appeared 
unsuited for the new tasks at hand. The eagerness of young workers to pursue technical 2856
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training meant that the shortage of skilled cadres was increasing rather than decreasing in 
leadership positions. Potentially, that would leave the SKJ unable to impact on policy-making 
in the organs of worker and social self-management. Various ways therefore had to be 
devised to overcome this problem, from additional training for older cadres, through an 
increase in the size of committees to get a better mix, to more political work with younger 
workers to get them more involved.287 28Second, speakers complained of the monopolisation of 
functions, with Party members taking on more responsibilities than they could possibly carry 
out as individuals, in one case a city committee member in Montenegro taking on 22
• ^oo
functions, as an increasing danger to Party authority.
As the year progressed, other issues came to the fore too but they were subsumed by 
relatively positive assessments about the development of Party work or organisational details 
pertaining to the Seventh Congress. Party membership grew substantially in the first half of 
the year, from 648,000 to 728,000.289 This allowed EC heavyweights to argue the need to 
strengthen the commune, favour workers over peasants, and use the elections to the Congress 
as a more direct form of mobilisation closer to the workplaces.290 The situation appeared in 
good order for the first time in years but molecular changes in the rank-and-file caused some 
worry. In September, the Organisational-Political Secretariat explicitly discussed problems 
albeit within the context of overall policies that it considered successful. Namely, it went 
behind the statistics that registered the rise in Party membership to question whether all was 
indeed well. A high turnover rate, as well as spikes in recruitment that reflected a mechanical
287 ibid,2 -3 2
288 ibid., 3 2 -3 6
AJ 5 0 7 -V /X , ‘S ten o g ra fsk e  beleSke sa proSirenog sastanka O rg a n iza c io n o g  sekretarijata C K  S a v eza
kom unista  J u g o s la v ie , o d r ia n o g  2 6 .IX , 1957 . g o d in e ’, sp ec ia l m aterial p roduced  for R ankovió , sum m ary, 2  
AJ 5 0 7 -V /X , ‘S ten ografsk e  b eleSke sa  sastanka O rg a n iza cio n o g  sekretarijata C K  S a v eza  kom unista  
J u g o s la v ie , proSirenog sa  republiCkim  org. sekretarim a 6  m arta 195 7  g o d .’; 290 ‘S ten ografsk e beleSke sa  
proSirenog sastanka O rg a n iza c io n o g  sekretarijata C K  S a v eza  k om u n ista  J u g o s la v ie , o d r ia n o g  2 6 .IX , 1957 . 
g o d in e ’
201
adoption of the line from the centre, meant that new members did not necessarily become 
integrated in the work of the SKJ and that success was more formal than real. Moreover, 
there was significant regional unevenness, with the more developed republics exhibiting more 
obvious problems. The SK of Slovenia did not recruit enough workers while the SK of 
Vojvodina recruited mechanically en masse.291 *
There was, nonetheless, agreement that the methods that the Ideological Committee had tried 
out over preceding years to raise the political level of members had begun bearing fruit, so it 
was not so much an issue of finding new methods as generalising existing ones. The 
leadership judged the Party magazine Komunist to have been an overall success but felt that it 
needed to interpret international events more sharply than the daily press and to bring more 
concrete examples of SKJ work in organs of self-management. This implied that the actual 
experience of SKJ branches was still rather uneven in the two spheres the Party deemed key 
following the Hungarian events of the preceding year.293 Indeed, the reason for complacence 
in this regard had to do with the detection of a much more immediate and worrying trend for 
the leadership: the waste of social funds. The Organisational-Political Secretariat did not to 
discuss the exact proportions of what it termed a notable political embarrassment but 
pinpointed all too frequent festivities, spendthrift ceremonial events, networking between 
enterprise managers or with foreign delegations that justified extravagant meals or social 
occasions, and inappropriate use of company assets like cars on the part of responsible 
officials as a visible concern for rank-and-file workers.294
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With the SKJ recovering from the malaise of the mid-1950s only slowly and unevenly, it 
could not be expected that the mass organisations, which acted as the transmission belt for 
Party policy, could perform that task. Strains indeed became visible early on as the umbrella 
for the mass organisations, the SSRNJ, continued to undergo serious malfunction. It had been 
to the SSRNJ that the EC of the CC SKJ had delegated the duty of overseeing the work of the 
trade union-led Committee for the Convocation of the Congress of Workers’ Councils. Yet 
the SSRNJ leadership executed its duties in regard to the Congress with no apparent 
enthusiasm. A single meeting of the SSRNJ presidency considered the Congress in the run up 
to June and that occurred early on, in late January. The Congress was the second issue of the 
day on the order paper, while the press took precedence.295 This was despite Kardelj’s 
assertion at the meeting that there were ‘practically two months’ left to organise the Congress 
(there were in fact technically over four months left). Some of those present responded that it 
would be better to postpone the Congress.296 On the occasion, the SSRNJ leadership left it to 
the Committee for the Convocation of the Congress to work out the details of the Congress 
but on the basis of a very detailed report read out to them by Djuro Salaj on behalf of the 
Committee.297 The SSRNJ presidency was content with oversight.
As it turned out, few organisational details brought up at that meeting changed over the 
following months. Furthermore, the attitude taken by those present appeared to view the 
Congress as a side issue. Salaj admitted he had not contacted speakers for several of the 
commissions that the Committee for the Convocation of the Congress had envisaged, 
primarily for the economic session. Kardelj berated him and asserted that it was the quality of 
the speakers that would make or break the Congress. Such a cavalier attitude towards
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practical organisation, let alone the perspectives and concrete activities to follow up the 
Congress, which were not raised by anyone except Salaj in the briefest of sketches, was in 
fact suggestive not of strains but of a lack of fear that the Congress would play either a 
central or a destabilising role on events. The presidency simply asked to be updated in written 
form at a later stage about various details and in fact never went back to the issue before the 
Congress took place.298
The Congress only came to be discussed at the Committee for Social Self-Management of the 
SSRNJ in late February.299 In the name of the Committee for the Convocation of the 
Congress, the president-elect of the trade unions Bozicevic told the SSRNJ committee that it 
was unclear how it could help or participate in the bodies organising the Congress since it 
was too late and the latter had started their work. He argued instead that the best aid that the 
SSRNJ could give was to use its agitprop role in the forthcoming elections to the workers’ 
councils in the spring to publicise the Congress and to help the bodies of worker management 
to prepare an extensive self-analysis and documentation of their work for use by higher 
bodies.300 The committee was largely in agreement with him and added little beyond practical 
suggestions like concrete use of the press to greater effect.301
Revealingly, when it came to a discussion of the work of the SSRNJ committee itself over the 
preceding year, and its perspectives, out of the five sub-committees formed, one admitted to 
not even having organised a single meeting.302 The situation was more dynamic but quite
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uneven at the republic level.303 The chief of the lawyers’ association, Leon Gerskovic, went 
so far as to suggest that the committee should concentrate on the Congress and collecting 
information on organs of self-management in order to work out how the wider system outside 
the worker management system was functioning and ought to function.304 Some discussion 
followed, with Bo2i£evic suggesting that the committee subdivide and that those in charge of 
worker management concentrate on elections pertaining to the workers’ councils and that 
those overlooking self management concentrate on a questionnaire and the working out of 
theses on the issue.305 While the result of the discussion was not explicitly stated, that 
appeared very much to have been the line followed: some discussion of how to use the 
information that had been gathered before the Congress finally took place at a meeting in 
November later that year.306 The Congress itself appeared to have been a secondary issue to 
the SSRNJ, whose structures very much seemed to be overstretched and not directly 
interested in the workplaces. This was an attitude that its February plenum had implicitly 
criticised in its resolution even as it praised the work of the trade unions since their own 
Congress.307 The preparatory materials to the plenum had in fact openly commented and 
criticised the apparent lack of roots in workplaces as few workers made it up the SSRNJ 
chain of command.308
By contrast, the trade union apparatus took the Congress seriously but also became very 
critical of its preparations. In taking on the Committee for the Convocation of the Congress, 
the SSJ accepted to execute such an extensive yet self-limiting mobilisation in the first
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months of the year. In any event, its presidency in early June drew conclusions inimical to the 
course that had been set by the SKJ leadership several months previously. Indeed, the SSJ felt 
that it was vital to openly criticise the nature of the Congress in its press shortly before it took 
place. Rad ran with a front page at the beginning of June with the headline ‘One-sided’. The 
article praised the fact that the Congress was taking place but noted its disappointment with 
the emphasis on the economic aspects of worker self-management at the expense of a more 
holistic understanding of the concept which would include the social and human aspects.309
This stance reflected the reasoning of the discussion at the Presidency meeting.310 While the 
Congress was only the third item on the order paper and discussion around it very brief, the 
analysis was pregnant with deep criticisms of the worker management system. Djoka 
Pavlovic read the main report which noted that the preparatory district assemblies in early 
May ‘had exhibited serious deficiencies in the reports and discussions’.311 After an 
intervention, on the part of the organisers, the discussions tended to improve but the reports, 
or opening speeches, did not. Pavlovic explained that most work collectives put this down to 
the fact that ‘experts, who were removed from the collectives and workers’ councils’312 had 
prepared the speeches on the basis of ‘materials which they had at their disposal in the 
management of the enterprises’.313 Consequently, the assemblies took on the character of 
‘economic assemblies’.314 The intervention of political elements, ‘political workers, trade 
union activists, Party functionaries and other higher-ranking economic officials’,315 shed 
more light on the functioning of the councils themselves but did not elucidate the ‘socio­
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political role of the organs of management’.316 All too frequently, the entire preparation of the 
district conferences and assemblies was totally divorced from the workers’ councils and work 
collectives. Discussion inside work places, according to lower bodies of the trade unions, 
would only occur after the district conferences and assemblies, in the coming period of 
June.317
This defect allegedly occurred because preparation took place without enough central control. 
Ignoring the Committee for the Convocation of the Congress, the republic or district trade 
union leaderships convoked the conferences and assemblies by themselves. They then took 
on the responsibility of educating delegates and collectives in the following weeks to bring 
them closer to the materials available on worker self-management as a way for compensating 
the exclusiveness and haste of the conferences and assemblies. This must have been why the 
Rad article remained openly critical: that was an instruction for trade union activists and 
functionaries in the time left before the Congress to correct mistakes. The positive note 
remained that workers across Yugoslavia were for the first time discussing the issue of 
worker self-management as a whole.318 Indeed, Pavlovic had based his breakdown on reports 
from Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia, while Cazi reported on the situation in Croatia and ‘a 
comrade from Montenegro’ spoke after Cazi.319 320The latter duo did not speak at length or add 
much. Cazi mentioned instances where workers put forward their own candidate against the 
official one and won. SKJ candidates still swept the board, though, winning in ‘99%’ of 
cases. The problem in Montenegro proved to be the inactivity of the SSRNJ, despite a 
meeting held specifically over the issue of its under-involvement.321
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Thus, while the trade union apparatus too was defective, the SSJ leadership was clearly aware 
of this, although it implicitly blamed the SKJ and SSRNJ for the lack of political direction. 
Moreover, its focus on what it might have described as technocratic deviation echoed its 
previous hostility to the more skilled layers and the government’s inclination towards them. 
The SSJ evidently felt that no one provided a voice for the mass of workers and saw itself 
having to step up to the challenge. Hence the shrill tone of its public criticism of the 
organisation of the Congress: the SSJ desperately wanted the Congress of Workers’ Councils 
to go beyond the economic worldview that it feared sections of the government were 
capitulating to and knew it had to put its own house in order to achieve success. Whatever 
happened with the Congress, moreover, an increasing frustration, in both organisational and 
policy terms, was emerging within SSJ ranks with the party-state.
The Congress o f Workers ' Councils o f Yugoslavia
The Congress itself convened in Belgrade on 25-27 June 1957. Its immediate impact, as most 
contemporaries and historians have argued, was largely symbolic. The proceedings were 
designed on every level to impress and were highly formal. Just as the preparations had been 
more ceremonial than methodical or mass in character, so the functioning of the event itself 
and its reporting in the press aimed to induce enthusiasm and impress on the participants and 
public alike several key principles and goals. First, the press carried the pictures and texts of 
Tito’s and Salaj’s address to the 1,745 delegates who packed the trade union buildings off the 
Square of Marx and Engels.322 Of those, a total of 432 got to speak,323 while 1,350 proposals
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from workers’ councils flooded the Congress floor,324 over the six full sessions that followed 
the opening speeches. The media carried summaries for every day of the Congress. The 
sessions or workshops themselves were relatively evenly split and dealt with the economic 
framework of self-management; the relationship between the workers’ councils with other 
institutions and organisations; the economic activity of the workers’ councils; organisation 
and method of work of workers’ councils; labour relations in the economy; and the training 
of producers for managing their enterprises.325 Each session had a lead off by a prominent 
cadre of the party-state or the mass organisations, while ministers and functionaries attended 
and spoke from the floor. Greetings from foreign delegates punctuated proceedings in the 
breaks. Finally, the Congress ceremonially voted on its resolutions, set down decisions on 
further work, and heard the closing speech from Salaj.326 *Participants left the proceedings of 
this ‘to history as yet unknown parliament’ to enter the plateau of the square ‘excited and 
convinced that that had been one of the most magnificent ever occasions, and that it had been 
an exceptionally fruitful agreement of the representatives of worker self-management’.
Beyond the pomp and ceremony, the Congress tried to lay down some of the shared common 
understandings of the future direction of self-management and largely steered clear of 
potential controversies. The resolution of the Congress necessarily contained significant 
ambiguities, compromises and downright platitudes as a consequence. In the words of one of 
Yugoslavia’s best-known historians: ‘Basically, what was sought was the liberation of the 
enterprise from state control, through a change in the mode of the formation and distribution 
of their income, and the more objective determination of their responsibilities to society. The 
ideological-theoretical view went ahead of real changes. Nevertheless, the question of deeper
324 ibid.
325 D e leo n  and M ijatov id , Kongres radniikih saveta, 7 8 9 -7 9 0
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changes to the system (which included expanded reproduction, planning, the market and 
prices, the foreign exchange mechanism) was not considered. The state still disposed of three 
quarters of investment funds.’328
There was an unresolved tension at the heart of the project. Part II of the resolution 
encapsulated it in the economic sphere. In four points, it promised a more free determination 
of income such that the pay of individuals should be determined by their work; the realisation 
of a level playing field between enterprises; the strengthening of the autonomy of the 
enterprises such that freedom to decide on income would be proportional to productivity; and 
further specialisation and association of enterprises.329 How the third principle could be 
reconciled with the first two, even on the terms of the fourth, remained obscure. Parts III and 
IV only served to deepen this source of tension. Part III complicated the relationship between 
the enterprises and organs of state as it emphasised the need for greater démocratisation of 
the workplaces but greater control by the organs of social self-management. Whether control 
could be reduced to supervision or implied active intervention remained obscure but the 
proposal for commune revenue to depend on personal incomes provided incentives for the 
latter tendency.330
Part IV in arguing for a more rational plan of production appeared to be more decisive than 
most sections in its echo of the government line that workers’ councils had to prioritise skills 
and technology but contained the potentially contradictory demand that greater income 
differentials should be calculated according to both skill levels and productivity attained. 
Whether legislation should relate productivity to skills or to the difficulty of the tasks of each
328 P etranovié . ¡storija Jugoslavije, 3 4 3 -4 4
D e leo n  and M ija to v ié , Kongres radnickih saveta, 6 6 2 -6 6 3
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individual producer was an issue that was once again fudged.331 32 Part V dealt with 
democratising the workplace but inexplicably contributed to the confusion by speaking of the 
need to introduce uniform norms in order to allow freer distribution of income within 
enterprises. Part VI acted as a manual for running a workers’ council. It concentrated on 
enhancing the remit of the councils to decide on matters vital to the functioning of the 
enterprise but for managing boards to perform the executive functions for the councils.333 
Parts VII and VIII recommended respectively the further development of technical education 
and the foundation of a scientific centre attached to the government for monitoring the work 
of the system.334 The latter decision appeared to go against the spirit of the Congress which 
was about the autonomy of self-management from the government. This was indeed a point 
Salaj had felt it necessary to justify just weeks before the Congress amid calls for the election 
of an executive body to oversee the implementation of Congress resolutions.335
With every proposal qualified and every policy constrained, the resolution risked that its 
moderation be confused with indecisiveness. That would have chimed badly with the fanfare 
accompanying the event. Yet the Congress went down in history as a landmark of the 
‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’. Real moves towards change were apparent in the documents 
despite and the bold tone of discussions accompanied frankness about the need for judicious 
progress. Indeed, the debate over the wage system had not yet gone public so it was difficult 
to ascertain just how deep differences over policy indeed were. Moreover, since the trade 
unions had published a set of theses in the run-up to the Congress,336 in the same issue of the 
paper as their criticisms of the preparations of the Congress, and since these had represented
331 ibid, 6 6 7 -6 6 9
332 ibid, 6 6 9
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very much the line that predominated on the conference floor, no apparent signs of friction 
surfaced. Participants very much represented those who had reason to support the SKJ: 
almost half had participated in the Communist-led Partisan movement in World War Two, 
more than half held positions as presidents or members of the managing boards of workers’ 
councils, more than half again held official positions in the unions, qualified and highly 
qualified workers comprised close to 57 percent and those who worked in administration 
almost 39 percent of delegates, and roughly 40 percent hailed from enterprises employing 
more than 500 workers.337 Their contributions furthermore frequently manifested reform 
sympathies and buoyant self-confidence.338 If they did not depart from the contradictory 
script, this was because the contradictory script spoke to their experiences. Those workers 
chosen directly from enterprises, moreover, had to submit their proposals to the councils 
before the Congress, which indicated broad acceptance of the line among the higher echelons 
within workplaces.339 In all, the Congress for all its shortfalls undoubtedly impressed its 
participants and reinforced a shared sense of purpose in regard to the coming period of 
reform.
The subsequent claim, then, that the Congress represented the triumph of the reform forces 
was largely correct. The delegates might not have thought through all the issues to the end or 
voiced all their problems, let alone the problems of rank-and-file workers who had 
predominantly kept silent in the larger pre-Congress assemblies, but they clearly lived the 
experience of worker self-management and placed their faith in their leaders. In that sense the 
Congress had proven a spectacular success. Later idealisation of the Congress as laying down 
a marker for much more radical reform than came to be implemented for several years more
337 D e leo n  and M ija to v ié , Kongres radnidkih saveta, 7 3 2 -7 3 5
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has not proven particularly persuasive. For the Congress had provided a relatively concrete 
action programme for legislation, agitprop and mobilisation but also a contradictory 
programme. Its detection of problem areas was in no small part due to the concerns of those 
involved in production but also the obvious success of the SSJ in that it had managed to 
widen the scope of the discussion in its final pre-Congress weeks. It would in fact be the 
tensions in practice that resulted from the implementation of this contradictory programme, 
and the significant departures from the programme on the part of the government, that would 
provoke a damaging debate and the semi-paralysed evolution and implementation of policy in 
coming years. This became most acute in relation to the wage debate in the second half of 
1957 and the reaction to the strikes of early 1958.
From the Congress o f Workers’ Councils to the Strike ofTrbovlje: July 1957 -  January 1958
The timing of the conference to coincide with the seventh anniversary of the enactment of 
self-management in the Federal Assembly also coincided with the ninth anniversary of the 
Cominform resolution. In part, the Congress constituted a manifestation of the ‘Yugoslav 
Road to Socialism’ in defiance of, and as a mark of renewed ideological confrontation with, 
the USSR. Radio Free Europe’s Evaluation and Research Section of the News and 
Information Service noted in relation to Tito’s speech opening the Congress, with its obvious 
anti-Soviet tone: ‘the workers’ councils system has everywhere become the hallmark of 
greater or less independence vis-a-vis Kremlin...One of the first measures taken by the 
liberated Hungarian workers was to create workers’ councils. One of the first measures of the
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Soviets after crushing the Hungarian uprising was to abolish the workers’ councils. The real 
meaning of this fact is well known to TITO, and he intends to exploit it to the utmost.’340
Indeed, foreign relations remained the main preoccupation of the Yugoslav Communists for 
the latter part of 1957. This continued to leave the space more open for contestation over 
policy at the helm. A shift occurred in government policy as the balance of forces in the wage 
debate tipped in favour of Mijalko Todorovic against Tempo. The exact reasons for this 
remain frustratingly difficult to ascertain. Tempo had spent much of 1957 on an international 
tour of thirteen countries in Asia and Africa looking for trade possibilities.341 He claimed in 
his memoirs that he was unhappy with the draft of the wage bill and other changes to worker 
management that began to reach the press in the second half of 1957 and that he resisted them 
as head of the trade unions until a meeting ‘at Kardelj’s’ sided with him again later in 
195 8.342 The trade unions certainly took an oppositional and increasingly frustrated stance on 
the issue in public siding with Tempo, albeit not by name. For the first time since the ouster 
of Zujovic and Hebrang around the Cominform events, there appeared to be serious 
contestation over industrial policy that involved clearly factional activity. These only came 
into full swing after the first labour strikes and only came out in the open in the recession of 
1961-1962. Nevertheless, their operations became evident and crystallised around the wage 
debate in the latter part of 1957.
All actors agreed that the system needed to pass from profit-sharing to income-sharing. 
Moreover, the evolution of Yugoslav wage structures in the late 1950s was subject to much
340‘ C on sid eration s B eh in d  T ito ’s S p e e c h ’, 2 7 .6 .1 9 5 7 , O pen  S o c ie ty  A rch iv es. A c c e sse d  e lec tron ica lly : 
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academic interest from economists. An I.L.O. report summarised, somewhat schematically,
the basic novelties of the system that would take effect from 1 January 1958:
‘The current system differs from those that preceded it in two important respects. 
Firstly, the whole of the income is available for distribution without there being 
any ceiling on the remuneration of workers in any particular undertaking; it is for 
the collectives themselves to decide what share of the net income should be 
retained in the undertaking for direct investment, although they may be subject to 
certain obligations in this respect [namely, the reserve fund]. Secondly, the 
remuneration for the work of the members of the collective is regarded as an 
operating cost; it is considered to be simply the part of the undertaking’s income 
which is received by the workers after payment of other costs (operating expenses, 
taxes, reserves, allocations for investment, etc.). The undertaking no longer pays 
“wages”; nor does it have any “profits” but only a residual income, which it shares 
out as a remuneration for labour.’343
Such a system was revolutionary in theory because it meant that workers were free to plan the 
year ahead on the assumption that whatever income the enterprise earned, minus taxes, they 
could dispose of freely. This contrasted with the profit-sharing system where legal 
obligations existed for all manner of enterprise expenditures as proportions of income with a 
fixed proportion going to bonuses to wages at the end of the business cycle. The lack of 
wages in the new system symbolised the disappearance of wage labour but also raised 
uncomfortable questions about what would happen to the workers of those enterprises that 
failed to compete on the market.
It was around these two issues that the government and the trade unions began to disagree 
profoundly. Both appeared to accept that the system was in transition and that all manner of 
transitional restraints and controls needed to be in place. Characterising either side as being 
clearly reformist and the other conservative would have necessarily done both an injustice. 
Indeed, each tried to present itself as being more avant-garde than the other. Fundamentally, 
the government took a less adventurous approach to maximum wages but wanted to unleash
343 International L abour O ffic e , Workers ’ Management in Yugoslavia, G eneva: International L abour O ffice , 
1962
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the market on stragglers. It projected a steep progressive tax on income that restricted 
incentives and settled for a fixed low minimum personal income across industry based on the 
previous year’s average wage tariffs as effectively a starting salary for the year to be 
supplemented at the end of the business cycle.344 The unions criticised this saying that the 
new system would impose a de facto ceiling on personal income not much above the rate for 
the preceding year for the more successful enterprises and in its re-introduction of a minimum 
wage by the back door leave workers in less efficient enterprises making less than their 
previous earnings.345 Instead, they posited a flat system of taxation that would be less 
inhibitive of high wages but also argued for a higher guaranteed minimum wage, tax breaks 
for less efficient firms and higher taxes for gains earned on account of monopoly 
conditions.346 *This system in turn evidently saw higher earnings and higher consumption as 
the incentive, even if the cost would at least temporarily be significant state control and 
subsidy of the economy. Much of their proposal would be taken on in the wage system of 
1961.347
During the autumn of 1957, the debate got heated in part because the trade unions felt that by 
effectively abdicating on the less technologically advanced enterprises the government had 
dramatically departed from the resolution of the Congress of Workers’ Councils that creating 
a level playing field was a precondition for collective incentives to kick in for efficient 
enterprises. This became obvious at the meeting of the October presidency of the SSJ, which 
was meant to coincide with the end of the discussion period.348 The SSJ fought for and 
attained an extension for the discussion period. More than that, Veber spoke for the majority 
on the presidency when he argued that the progressive tax burden was an inadequate and
344 ‘K orak ka veóoj st im u la c iji’, in Rad, 4 .IV .1 9 5 7 . 5
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inhibitive way of dealing with unevenness in industry, as well as regulating the relations 
between enterprises and communes.349 350Todorovic responded for the government that from the 
standpoint of the economy, it mattered little where productivity rises came, from human or 
non-human labour, and that the new system did not privilege wage rises above all other 
factors. He nonetheless pleaded for the unions not to derail the law and accept that the 
government was open to technical changes; there was no disagreement in principle.
Here again emerged the difference between the wage increase and cost cutting schools with 
the obvious implication that government had made principle concessions to the former school 
but that the latter school still sought to maintain overall supervision over the system even 
within the framework of the new. This probably overlapped with the division between those 
who sought to overcome the international debt trap by technological modernisation that 
necessitated imports of machinery and exports to pay off the loans used to purchase 
machinery, and those who sought to cut imports, particularly of agricultural goods, in favour 
of higher domestic consumption. The former would tend to favour labour-saving inducements 
while the latter would prefer capital-saving inducements.351 The unions clearly fell into the 
latter category while the balance in the government had shifted towards the former. Since the 
dramatic change had followed the June EC when Tempo reported on foreign trade and debt, 
this must have formed the backdrop to the change in tack. Tempo was a known liberal, 
however, and when he had addressed the unions at the earlier plenums of the year, he had 
argued for labour-saving practices. His own manoeuvres on the issue therefore remain 
unclear and might have been motivated by personal opportunism or even government 
opportunism. That may become clearer following further research of government papers.
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All the same, what did emerge in the following month was increased debate in the press 
between these schools with Rad responding on 4 November to an article that appeared on 23 
October Borba?52 The article in the trade union paper attacked the author of the SSRNJ paper 
for ‘one-sided discussion or one-sided comments’. Namely, when the latter had spoken to a 
work collective that feared it would lose out according to the new system, she merely pointed 
out that the new system would leave 23 billion dinars more to industry, while in the first eight 
months of 1957 alone, households had had 8 billion more in income. Such an attitude served 
to illustrate that the other side did not pay enough attention to the potential chaos that 
collapses of supply networks and consumption would provoke for the whole economy should 
insufficient attention be paid to the trade union case. Rad kept producing discussion articles 
making the same points in every issue through the autumn.
The presidency of the SSJ then met again in mid-November having familiarised itself with all 
the materials.353 This time it tried to calm the atmosphere down by spending more space in its 
newspaper address explaining that it would accept the deal as it agreed with it in principle, 
yet it still insistently affirmed its case for changes to certain technical details. Namely, it now 
argued that an effective minimum wage set by time of work would increase incentives to 
cheat the system and re-affirmed its belief that an income divided in two parts was still a 
hangover from the previous wage-system. It went further to press the case for a state subsidy 
for the guaranteed minimum wage in those industries that would lose out according to the 
new system. Once again, it expressed its opposition to the progressive taxation system as a 
brake on productivity rises and called for careful oversight of the economy and the market, of
353 ^ec n^ostrana d isk u sija  ili jed n ostran i k om en tari’ in Rad, 4 .X I .1 9 5 7 , 11
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prices and state stabilisation of the same, ‘tariffs, import coefficients, etc’.354 The difference 
in tone if not the cessation of the incessant barrage had resulted from concessions that 
suggested that the minimum wage rates would now be calculated at three instead of just one 
level to vary across industries and that certain tax rates could be changed in the direction of 
trade union suggestions following further negotiations.355 356While more disagreements arose, 
particularly over whether pensions should be determined by wage levels or skill levels, 
determination of income by wage and skill levels was a notable absence in the debate. 
Indeed, a certain compromise had been reached to use a uniform system with nine separate 
skill and qualification categories across all industries. Workers carried a workbook where 
level of skill and experience on the job determined the classification for blue-collar workers 
and the level of education and experience for white-collar workers. The Administrative 
Secretariat for Labour Relations in the commune administered the programme.357 The extent 
of collusion between enterprises and local authorities was long after a debated issue but had 
momentarily been eclipsed in the second part of 1957 as the trade unions took the fight to the 
government on several higher instances. With the economy still booming, the union assault 
appeared to no one strange: the government had patiently listened, conceded ground and 
involved the unions in comradely fashion to the very end. The Federal Assembly spent 
December passing the legislation that would transform the economy from the ground up.
To the heads of the state, Party and mass organisations, occupied with economic legislation 
and geopolitical manoeuvre, the strikes in January came like a bolt from the blue. Yet the 
warning signals had been coming not just from the malfunction of the transition belts but
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from the miners of Trbovlje themselves. The Yugoslav sociologist Neca Jovanov provided a 
documented account of the leadership response to the strike at Trbovlje. He drily noted that:
‘In the resolution of the economic problems of the mine, especially the wages of the miners, 
all the political and state factors had been involved at the level of the mine, municipality, 
district Trbovlje and the republic of Slovenia. For almost a year delegations from the mine 
and the municipality of Trbovlje visited state and political institutions seeking help in the 
resolution of the economic problems of the miners. The federal union and individual political 
and state functionaries from Slovenia who held political and state office in the federation 
were particularly involved. In its inability to take any further action in regard to the low 
wages in the mine, the mine union committee collectively resigned. Doing so, it was lodging 
a protest but it also wanted to absolve itself of the responsibility for the lack of solution to the 
economic problems of the miners. The strike was used as a last resort, since all the 
interventions with the state and political organs had not yielded the expected results.’
The immediate cause of the strike was the fact that the mine could only pay out the 
equivalent of half a monthly wage to the miners as a bonus at the end of the year, while 
almost every enterprise in the district had been able to pay out a full bonus.358 59 With their 
living standards falling for the sixth year in a row, the miners had decided to strike: only 
some 200 had refused to stop work out of a total of 4,241.360 The strike only lasted three days 
in mid-January. Miha Marinko, a member of the EC CC SK of Slovenia, negotiated on behalf 
of the authorities, offering 30 percent more. The workers knew that the workers’ council had
358 Neca Jovanov, RadniCki strajkovi u Socijastickoj Federativnoj Republici Jugoslaviji od 1958. do 1969. 
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decided to pay out 50 percent and gave Marinko a hard time.361 Finally, all the state 
institutions involved caved in and administratively raised coal prices at the mine by 13 
percent, compensated all the local actors for the losses incurred, and provided the workforce 
with shoes and protective gear.362 This only encouraged another strike at nearby Zagorje ob 
Savi several days later which ended in similar fashion. A whole series of emergency union 
and Party meetings to calm the situation down followed in Slovenia until the end of 
January.363 The Party leadership duly began to fracture for the first time since the Djilas case 
and certainly more deeply than at any time after the 1948 split. Standing for the forces of 
order, Rankovic decided that the legacy of the Sixth Congress needed to be challenged. He 
would duly make this clear at a Plenum at the start of 1958.
Conclusion
The argument of the chapter is a departure or at least a shift in relation to the historiography, 
which identifies the removal of Djilas from all his official functions in early 1954, as the 
most significant political development of the stale mid-1950s. While the removal of Djilas 
had certainly been disorientating, it appeared not to have been the main cause of the general 
confusion in party ranks that lasted throughout the 1950s. Indeed, every year, the 
Organisational Political Secretariat gauged the threat from ‘djilasovstina’ but, in an extended 
meeting of early 1957, insisted that workers rejected abstract discussion of a ruling 
bureaucracy and démocratisation, with only intellectual circles attempting to organise around 
known ‘Djilasites’. Instead, the threat to the leadership appeared more serious from potential 
pro-Soviet elements, as workers consistently expressed preference for wage levelling. Even 
when livid with the government over worsening living conditions in 1955 and 1956, workers
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begrudgingly admired the country’s apparent independence in the Cold War setting. The 
leadership consequently heaved a sigh of relief when the party line over Hungary prevailed 
on the shop-floor as popular enterprise assemblies met to discuss the issue. Workers, it turned 
out, were critical of domestic policy but distrusted the Soviet intervention in Hungary. The 
events of 1956, then, both struck fear into leading Communists in Yugoslavia but also 
provided them with a convincing narrative to keep discontent directed through official 
channels.
The pace and direction of reform then duly accelerated after 1956. This had in part resulted 
from a dire economic situation that would not have tolerated stasis. Until that point, the SSJ 
had represented in concentrated form the contradictions of the period. Workers, in public or 
through their trade union representatives, vented their frustration with their subordinate 
position in an economy which had begun to grow considerably. As Dyker puts it, ‘the annals 
of industrial sociology teach us that industrial workers normally assess their own [emphasis 
in the original] production achievement in terms of output -  and indeed find it difficult to 
cope with a situation in which high investment in those terms is not matched by 
correspondingly high earnings...’364 Without an effective method of containing anger from 
below or absorbing it in layers between the state apex and the population, it could only be 
expected that the Yugoslav leadership would seek some way of dividing the only 
constituency they appeared to fear as a block to their ambitions. Workers’ councils, therefore, 
had the ironic function not only of empowering layers of workers within the workplace but 
legitimating the turning of one workplace against another as they competed on the market, in 
order to raise overall productivity. This represented an approximation towards a labour 
market to complement the Yugoslav Communists’ ambition of playing catch-up on a world
364 Dyker, Socialism, Development and Debt, 60
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scale. The new system of income sharing came to be directly linked in official discourse with 
the balance of payments deficit.
Nevertheless, the amphibiousness of the trade unions, rooted in the working class and in 
power, transformed the market-oriented mobilisation around the Congress of Workers’ 
Councils and after that around the new five-year plan and the new wage system into another 
challenge to Communist authority. This strengthened conservative and centralist elements in 
the party-state for the first time since 1948. Through the period, although the market reform 
coalition had been dominant, its political foes had metamorphosed in response to conditions 
in the country. In the first period, a radical wing arose from within the reform movement, 
only to semi-consciously transcend the boundaries of the system and turn to liberalism and 
eventually the West. In the second period, union populism in addition to major economic 
imbalances made it difficult for the market reform wing to regain control of the shop-floor, 
leading to a slow departure ftom the hybrid system of the mid-1950s in terrain defined by 
resistance from below. In the third period, the market reform wing just managed to avoid a 
Hungarian scenario in Yugoslavia but encountered a new foe in the return of the revanchist 
centre reluctant to let go of its long-held privileges and certainties. With the self-management 
sector still struggling to make an impact on the political scene, the market reformers would 
have to look elsewhere for a base from which to overwhelm the centrist reaction following 
the strike of Trbovlje.
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Chapter 3 -  Workers’ Self-Management, the Market, and the Return of the National
Question
It was the strike in Trbovlje, rather than the recession of 1961-1962 that ‘acted like a 
chemical precipitant on a Yugoslav political establishment within which evanescent factions 
on specific issues had formed and dissolved for...years without clear or enduring divisions’,1 
and that created a factional atmosphere in the SKJ, which lasted until the removal from all 
posts of Kardelj’s arch-rival for succession, Rankovic, in 1966. This chapter concentrates on 
the formative period of the faction fight from the extended Executive Committee meeting in 
February 1958, following the Trbovlje strike, to a second such meeting in spring 1962, 
following the open conflict resulting from the recession, and the Fourth Plenum in 1962, 
providing a fraught compromise that plagued the SKJ until 1966. The sheer complexity of 
events, bewildering array of actors, and unavailability of key documents make an assessment 
of the entire factional struggle difficult within the framework of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
observers have frequently taken the political summits of 1962 to be a turning point, albeit 
without agreeing about which wing had taken a decisive step forward: put simplistically, the 
reform wing under Kardelj or the conservative wing of Rankovic?2 Various variations also 
exist over how to interpret the exact character of the groups, the former being generally taken 
as more liberal, market-oriented, democratic and decentralist, the other more conservative, 
administrative, autocratic and centralist.3
1 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 112
2 Pronouncing for Rankovid, Carter, Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia, 13-14, and Lendvai, Paul Lendvai, 
Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans, Anchor, New York, 1969, esp. 187; 
pronouncing for Kardelj, Shoup, Communism and The National Question, 210 and Biland2id, Historija 
Socijalistidke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 294-295; Rusinow argues Tito changed his mind frequent y 
between the factions but ended up on the side o f  Kardelj, Yugoslav Experiment, 123
3 For the classic statement, see Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 4.
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Despite the publication of the materials of the Executive Committee meeting of 1962 in the 
late 1990s, observers outside the former Yugoslavia continue to refer to the ‘rumours 
circulating that “Serbs and Macedonians were at pistol point” and that there were “threats by 
Slovenians to secede”.’4 By contrast, post-Yugoslav historians with access to the documents 
take a more sanguine view, arguing Tito moderately sided with the reform group and 
weaving the leadership debates at the meeting into the narrative which has come 
predominantly to be seen as the struggle between centralisation and decentralisation.5 While 
it is undoubtedly true that this was the overall trend, this chapter re-interprets the formative 
stage of the faction fight in terms of the mobilisation behind the market reform coalition’s 
manoeuvres against the emerging conservative faction, contributing to the understanding of 
the nature of political conflict over the entire period in several important ways.
First, the chapter notes that both factions were more diffuse than the centralisation- 
decentralisation binary suggests. The reform inclination appeared to include all those who 
resisted statist economics in favour of at least three variations: decentralised markets, a single 
market, and redistribution without centralism. This did not necessarily exclude political 
centralism. The conservative inclination also appeared more diverse, certainly containing 
political centralism, but also economic centralism, integral cultural Yugoslavism, and even 
Serbian nationalism. Second, the chapter locates the dynamics behind the move from central 
or federal initiative to initiative with significant and unauthorized regional dimensions in the 
failure of either side to win a swift and decisive victory, as much as any programmatic 
preference by either side for the one or the other principle. More specifically, it argues that 
the relative weight of the actors in the market reform coalition changed. The unions
4 Shoup, Communism and the National Question, 210, cited in Swain, Tito, 141 
On respectively the Slovene, Croatian and Serbian variations on the theme: Bo2o Repe, ‘Utrinki iz Bliinjega 
Leta 1962’, in Teorija in praksa 26/11-12 (1989), 1498-1511. And 27/1-2 (1990), 224-231 ; Du§an BilandZié,
Hrvatska Moderna Povijest, Zagreb: Golden marketing, c l 999, 33-51; Ljubodrag Dimié, Istorija srpske 
drzavnosti, Srbija u Jugoslaviji, Novi Sad: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 2000- 2001,367-375.
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proceeded as the battering ram for market reform until 1962 but the republic government in 
Slovenia became its bastion after the Executive Committee meeting failed to break the 
deadlock. This signified the waning of an all-Yugoslav actor at the expense of a regional one 
within the market reform coalition. The unions in fact faced decentralisation themselves as 
part of the conservative attempt to weaken the all-Yugoslav basis of the reform coalition. 
That in turn contributed to the weakening of the political power of the centre, and implicitly 
its diffusion towards the less developed republics, surely an unintended consequence of the 
conservative stand in the federal centre. Third, and concomitant, this chapter suggests that the 
leadership saw economic centralisation and continued political centralism as a position 
acceptable temporarily for everyone. Thus, the account presented here de-privileges 
personalities in the struggle, especially the part played by Tito, whose role was as often that 
of the arbiter as that of the reluctant reformer or frustrated conservative.
It is difficult to reconstruct this process in detail given the abrupt discontinuation of archival 
materials for the Socialist Alliance and the trade unions in 1959-60, the lack of governmental 
materials, the paucity of meetings of central Party bodies, and the undoubted fact that much 
of what occurred in this period continued to play out via informal paths rather than formal 
channels. The chapter therefore emphasises the contrasts between the position in 1958, 
especially at the meeting following the Trbovlje strikes, and 1961-1962, the latter 
reconstructed largely on the basis of the extensive discussions of the Executive Committee. 
Cursory reconstruction of policy towards the shop-floor from these materials and secondary 
sources serves to suggest that this issue became subordinate to the wider struggles over 
development policy. The focus, therefore, moves decisively upwards, as, in this period, self­
management became the watchword for the reform coalition, from the unions to the Slovene
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leadership. Its connection to the world market, by way of the Slovene reform wing in 
particular, came to be ever greater.
Part I  -  The Strikes and the Beginning o f the Faction Fight
The Executive Committee met to discuss the Trbovlje strike on 2 February 1958 in expanded 
setting attended by republic leaderships as well.6 Despite an overall atmosphere demanding 
they maintain a composed air, the leaders of the party showed jittery nerves. Their meeting 
concluded with a decisive vertical restructuring of party-state affairs but behind the scenes 
there was a sense of lack of clear direction. This had in large part resulted from the 
leadership’s neglect of the domestic front for almost a year and a half. In the meanwhile, a 
division of labour had reinforced different interpretations of reality and certain tendencies 
began to group together in ways that they had not done before. Rankovic felt confident that 
he could impress his party-oriented view on affairs and to a considerable extent the letter 
drafted by the Executive Committee for all its organisations at the Plenum bore the imprint of 
his thinking. In fact, his intervention at the Executive Committee meeting followed closely on 
Tito’s and it was he who read out the conclusions of the meeting at the end. Yet his position 
did not command hegemony in the SKJ leadership. Everyone agreed on the need to re­
establish top-down political methods in the coming period but some speakers emphasised 
economics more than politics. While the resolution and letter only spoke of political issues, 
the personnel changes decided shortly after and the overall tone of the historic Seventh 
Congress months later resoundingly reinforced Kardelj. Beneath the surface, the divisions 
exhibited at the Executive Committee began to deepen.
6 AJ 507-III/7, ‘Stenografske beleSke sa proSirene sednice IzvrSnog komiteta Centralnog Komiteta SK 
Jugoslavije odriane 6. februara 1958. godine u Beogradu’
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One of the rising stars of Yugoslav politics, a teenage partisan during the Second World War, 
a reformist in the 1960s, and later a disgraced co-leader of the ‘Croatian Spring’ in 1970- 
1971, Miko Tripalo, noted the divisive atmosphere around the Trbovlje events in his 
memoirs:
‘The conflict with Rankovic, although of a principle nature, was not freed of 
elements of the battle for succession. The two closest collaborators of Tito were E. 
Kardelj and A. Rankovic. They did not speak to each other for long periods of 
time, except on official business. The hierarchical jealousy between them was 
easily noticeable. When I was at Rankovic’s during the famous strike at Trbovlje,
Tito called him by telephone and spoke to him. Rankovid commented on their 
conversation thus: “Right, when something needs to be explained theoretically, 
then comrade Bevc (as they often called Kardelj) is here, but when it is necessary 
to dirty one’s hands, you go Marko [Rankovic’s nom-de-guerre]!” Tito had asked 
Rankovic to personally take charge of the “pacification” of several thousand 
miners in Trbovlje.’7 *9
Indeed, the asides between Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic at the meeting of the Executive 
Committee made it explicit that they had discussed profusely in preceding days and that they 
disagreed on the interpretation of events. Tito certainly shared the general consensus that 
politics needed to be reaffirmed. He was careful to strike populist notes in criticising the state 
of affairs, pointing out that he did not accept that the problem was economic, given economic 
growth in the preceding year, but rather political. Higher bodies had to take responsibility 
since they did not provide clear guidance, pay close attention to the field or react quickly 
enough to problems. Tito combined elements of top-down control of party and state work, 
administrative and populist measures like the abolition of bonuses for directors,10 and 
democratic and populist measures to press the directors and local bureaucrats from below,11 
in an evident appeal to the highest and the lowest orders to sandwich those in between. Tito 
even adopted the words of the Trbovlje miners, pointing out he was not for wage equalisation
7 Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko Proljece, Globus, Zagreb, 1990, 69-70 
AJ 507-111/75, ‘Stenografske beleSke sa proSirene sednice IzvrSnog komiteta Centralnog komiteta SK
Jugoslavie odr2ane 6. februara 1958. godine u Beogradu’, 1-3
9 ibid., 13-14
10 ibid, 9
" ib id , 5,10-11
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but the workers were correct: ‘All our stomachs are equal!’12 He nonetheless addressed 
Rankovic in an obvious continuation of a conversation from before the Executive Committee 
meeting:
‘I would not, Marko, want to say that we had not been fortunate in calling the 
Party the League of Communists...But what can we do, that’s how it turned out. 
Maybe that is what created interferences and confused many people. Yet, right 
now comrades, in the phase of the decentralisation of social [self-]management, 
the complexity of tasks and responsibility of Communists are now greater than 
they were before the war, during the war or immediately after the war.’13
Instead, what was necessary was the strengthening of the party from below, a shake-up of the
unions, and the continuation of selective administrative measures in the economy ‘which may
last a few more years’,14 for it was wrong ‘to idealise the law of value’:15 if France could try
people for price hikes and England could directly and indirectly control prices, there was no
reason for the Yugoslavs to be different, Tito concluded.16
Rankovic followed soon after. His own tone was graver than that of most speakers, 
simultaneously accusatory and defensive. Calling the events of Trbovlje ‘serious warning’ 
which ‘should make us reflect deeply on our entire work’,17 he still refused to accept that the 
party had failed; it had been the Sixth Congress that had caused disorientation whose traces 
could still be felt despite improvement.18 Instead, he asserted it was abnormal for comrades to 
pass laws and expect these to be implemented: in not so many words, he had used Yugoslav 
code to accuse those in the state apparatus of ‘bureaucratism’. It was the lack of a line in 
important issues that caused wandering.19 This then prevented decisive action against
12
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bureaucratic behaviour from below.20 Too many comrades, he intimated, were becoming 
acclimatised to the state apparatus and were forgetting the party: at the level of government, 
the federal assembly and the republics. Tito interceded to affirm support throughout.21 2
By contrast, Kardelj spent much time setting the Party in a broader context, without ignoring 
the need for reasserting politics and the Party. This could not but be disagreement with 
Rankovic. Kardelj began by recounting and criticising the Slovene Party’s response to the 
strike, given that as a Slovene he had addressed the Slovene Party’s Executive Committee, an 
intervention Tito had praised, perhaps in order to signal his support for Kardelj. All the 
same, he argued that the strike had been a symptom of a wider and deeper problem. Kardelj 
said about the Sixth Congress, to begin with, ‘[i]n the conditions of that time, under the attack 
of the Cominform and Stalin, a confrontation with our preceding weakness could not be 
postponed. Nevertheless, it is a fact that even after, when we gained experience and 
frequently understood correctly what needed to be done and saw where the weaknesses in the 
new system were, we were too slow...to organise according to the experiences we gained in 
our work.’23 Here, the blame was on the subjective rather than objective nature of the reform, 
a swipe at Rankovic. Kardelj went on for most of his speech to discuss issues other than Party 
weaknesses, although he did, towards the end of his speech, emphasise that he agreed with 
‘what comrade Tito and comrade Marko said’ about the Party.24 The thrust of Kardelj’s 
speech was certainly centralist but in the broader sense than the Party. He argued that 
bureaucratisation had beset the process of démocratisation, such that it amounted merely to 
decentralisation of bureaucracy and demagogy;25 he lamented that bureaucratisation in the
20 ibid., 28
21 ibid, 29-32
22 ibid, 2
23 ib id ,50
24 ib id ,62
25 ibid, 52
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centre and the periphery also caused chauvinism, saying secret service reports had it that 
Slovene officials in Ljubljana accused Kardelj of centralism and Serb officials in Belgrade 
accused him of Slovene nationalism without Communists reacting;26 he thought the Federal 
Assembly should look more downwards than upwards;27 he favoured stronger central control 
of finances;28 and he contradicted Tito that bonuses provided good incentives but could be 
easily controlled by administratively imposing ceilings.29
Kardelj also signalled continued struggles in the self-management sector. In the course of 
discussion of the new system, Kardelj argued that in the new income model, where workers 
would get to decide how to use enterprise money before the state could tax it away, the 
unions played a more important role in the struggle for socialist consciousness than they did 
before.30 312Even as Tito had lambasted the union leadership for acting like a second Executive 
Committee, Kardelj said that the union cadres had to be second best only to Party cadres. 
Their task was to smooth out the inaccuracies in the system, to find where anomalies created 
disparities in wages, as between old and new mines that had caused older collectives to be 
paid less than new collectives based on ‘peasants workers’ because taxes on new machinery 
allowed for the disparity, which had caused the explosion at Trbovlje.33 The Committee took 
no decision in that regard but it signalled what the unions would end up doing and frequently 
in tension with the party-state apparatus.
26 ibid.,54-55
27 ibid., 59
28 ibid.,60
29 ibid, 62
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Most of the rest of the discussants did not appear to take sides explicitly, even though 
differences had come to the fore in the inner leadership. Most agreed that political control 
needed to be strengthened. Still, some level of difference in nuance occurred at first. 
Speaking early, Croatian strongman Bakaric, sometimes credited with being the strategist 
behind the reform coalition,34 agreed that too much attention was being paid to economics 
and not enough to people. Bureaucratic cliques were forming locally and showing disdain for 
workers and higher government alike.35 Bakaric even mentioned there had been a strike in 
Zagreb as well but that it had been dealt with even before it had reached the republic 
leadership. He explained that the economic situation was improving making it difficult for 
major political problems to arise.36 Veselinov, although apparently more conservative and 
worried about foreign cultural influences,37 contradicted Tito arguing that bonuses had 
proved useful in agriculture and industry, that the system functioned but that the subjective 
factor was to blame for problems.38 Stambolic, a Serb like Veselinov, citing Kardelj’s 
recently re-published pre-war magnum opus on the Slovene national question,39 argued that 
despite all the problems with localism and chauvinism, it would be wrong to underestimate 
the dangers of centralism.40 Tito did not let Marinko from Slovenia get away with too much 
criticism of the lower echelons, though, demanding more self-criticism of the republic 
leadership.41
On the other hand, the leaders that Tito did push into speaking later on emphasised openly 
conservative stances. Djuro Pucar from Bosnia averted to the national question:
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‘I would like to turn in a few words to that which comrade Tito has drawn our 
attention, namely to the stance of the Slovene comrades in regard to certain 
decisions of the Federal Executive Council and its apparatus. At the last meeting, 
comrade Marinko suggested that at one of the following sessions, the question of 
the relations between the republics should be considered, that our brotherhood and 
unity was under question. Comrade Marko stood up against that stance, that it is 
not like that, that it is an exaggeration, but it was not decided we should not have 
this meeting. Nevertheless, it has come to such a meeting today. I believe there are 
reasons why the comrades in Slovenia are putting this problem to the fore, but 
these reasons are not clear to me even today.’42
Djuro Pucar went on to argue that the Slovenes had been against the Five-Year Plan and the
budget, which they felt squeezed them hard, they were reluctant to come to various meetings
claiming they were arrogantly dealt with, and now there had been a strike: ‘that which
occurred at Trbovlje was at the very least tolerated or viewed as benevolent’.43 He then went
on to accuse the federal government of often being too economically oriented and not looking
at the political effect of its policies, with a conference of city representatives arguing with
Kardelj that housing benefit should not be dropped, only to be ignored.44 He concluded that
government needed to be more people-oriented and flexible.45 Speaking just after Djuro
Pucar, Lazar KoliSevski, from Macedonia, similarly attacked over-reliance on economics and
implicitly attacked the Slovenes. He stressed the bad situation in several hundred Macedonian
enterprises, where wages were not regularly paid or were paid at only three fifths of the rate,
and where the workers were only inheriting the bad investment decisions of before, but also
echoed Djuro Pucar over housing shortages.46 He explained: ‘I think that in a certain way in
this situation and generally in our economy the theory of autonomism by our economists has
contributed [much]. In that regards is also the absolutisation of the law of value. I think this
has repressed the subjective factor...’47 Both Djuro Pucar and Kolisevski emphasised the
42
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popular reactions to various policies or shows of wealth by local bosses or officials.48 
Kolisevski even challenged the idea that elected officials should be paid high wages since it 
turned potential candidates into careerists.49 Similarly, when Tito berated Djuro Pucar over 
cadre policy and inability to impose discipline on the apparatus, saying ‘there is no authority’, 
Djuro Pucar retorted that union positions had no prestige, hence no one went to take a union 
position, even for money.50 Material incentives, then, could not simply substitute for moral 
incentives even after the passing of the mass mobilisation campaigns in 1953.
The lone, at time shrill, voice of the idiosyncratic Tempo also stood out in the Executive 
Committee. He asserted that he alone had been warning of catastrophe since June during 
preparations for the five-year plan and that the problem was too little economic expertise 
rather than too much.51 His speech largely backed administrative measures to keep non­
productive expenditure and imports generally down for fear of the worsening balance of 
payments problem,52 he railed about lack of incentives for skilled workers but too much for 
directors,53 and he called for more political accountability and discipline from the centre.54 
This could have been confused for a conservative speech, yet its focus on the problem of 
labour productivity singled Tempo out as a maverick. He was clearly frustrated by the turn of 
events and in his memoirs he argued that the income sharing system was too hamstrung to 
succeed but that it had been devised in his absence.55 It was also around this time that the 
leadership must have been thinking about personnel changes and perhaps Tempo had sensed 
he would be moved. His memoirs certainly showed a level of disorientation in that regard.56
48 ibid, 85, 89-90
49 ibid., 93
50 ibid, 85
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52 ibid, 66-73
53 ibid, 72-73
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55 Vukmanovie Tempo, Revolucija koja teie, 222-216
56 ibid, 319-322
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All the same, his stance on the Executive Committee and his appointment not long after to 
head the trade unions promised to intensify the fissures so clearly opening at the top of the 
SKJ.
The Executive Committee issued a Circular Letter following the meeting. Its focus was 
conservative: populist and political. Observers did not detect the impromptu appearance of 
the national question among the leaders. Indeed, that element had been only one in a plethora 
in the debate, suggestive of potential flash points in the future. The immediate period was, 
however, defined by the spirit of the Circular Letter, which took on somewhat more of a 
public role than several preceding Party Plenums. Its thrust was against bureaucratism, from 
above and below, but it attacked the latter, which was more pronounced.57 It attacked 
technocratism and the belittling of political work, yet it argued that socialist democracy 
demanded greater political ability and responsibility.58 This did not sidestep the organs of 
workers’ self-management. The letter continued that ‘[i]n many enterprises individuals or 
managerial groups undermine self-management, decisions are taken arbitrarily, whether by­
passing the institutions of self-management, or with their formal agreement, criticism is 
suffocated, workers who criticise are mistreated by being sent from errand to errand, or by 
being fired.’59 Leading officials were guilty of being ‘insensitive to the life of the people’.60 
While the economy would solve some of these issues in the longer term, local leaderships had 
the obligation to soften the blows of market imperfections on the masses.61 The Letter also 
condemned the appearance of privileges, corruption and cronyism.62 It continued that central 
controls would occur to check up on local governments but also urged unions to fight from
57 AJ 507-III/75,4
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below for correct wage policies, deformations to which were causing ‘justified’ anger.63 
Localism and chauvinism, too, made the list of negative phenomena.64 Moving on to the 
Party, the Letter argued that the educational role instituted by the Sixth Congress was 
understood one-sidedly and Communists needed to learn teaching by example. Disciplinary 
measures were on the horizon for those who misunderstood.65 The last section enumerated 
again all the measures the Party needed to take from top to bottom to ensure the Letter made 
its way into the life of the organisation.66
The Letter was a signal that business as usual was over. Duly, the Party press started a 
campaign around the Letter and ‘[a] rash of expulsions from the Party was accompanied by 
much public confessing of error, ostentatious giving up of automobiles, removals from swank 
apartments, reconsideration of pay schedules and unhoarding of funs stashed away for 
questionable purposes. The Federal Executive Council issued additional regulations strictly 
defining who could use automobiles and for what, and the Federal Wage Scale Commission 
began an inquiry preliminary to issuing a uniform criterion for wages’.67 This array of 
initiatives greeted the spring Congress of the Party raising greatly its profile and the aura of 
expectation surrounding it.
Delayed by the events surrounding the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the October 
Revolution in Moscow, and the international tensions arising from the Yugoslav refusal to 
sign the Soviet-sponsored Declaration, the Seventh Congress of the SKJ punctuated the 
prospective social plan for 1957-1961 but acted as its belated inauguration. As most 
manifestations of its nature, the Congress projected positions that carefully equilibrated the
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balance of forces in the leadership. The Tito-Kardelj tandem continued to set the overall 
direction but was nevertheless cautious not to antagonise the group vocally coalescing around 
Rankovic in the wake of the first labour strikes that had broken out at Trbovlje just months 
before the Congress. As much of the material had been prepared before open tensions had 
erupted on the Central Committee, the task of codifying the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ 
had in fact faithfully reflected the overall tendencies prior to the outbreak of the first post-war 
strike wave. Perhaps the bold declaration at the end of the new Programme adopted at the 
Congress best encapsulated the confidence and pride of the SKJ leadership: ‘[njothing that 
has been created should be so sacred to us that it cannot be transcended and superceded [sic] 
by something still freer, more progressive, and more human.’68
There had indeed been and continued to be reason for optimism. Economic growth had 
accelerated following the brief recession of 1956 and would continue until late 1960. In fact, 
the second five-year plan would be completed one year ahead of time. Living standards rose 
with consumer goods production improving in quantity, diversity and quality.69 *Despite a 
general lag and inefficiency in utilising financial aid from the budget, the underdeveloped 
republics received investment amounts equal to or possibly exceeding the planned rates. 
Increasing numbers in industry showed an interest in worker councils and participated in the 
organs of self-management, worker councils met more frequently and considered an ever 
more sophisticated range of issues, and rank-and-file responses to party-state initiatives 
became more affirmative and stable.71 Problems, however, continued to simmer under the 
surface. A strike wave took off in 1959 with 150 strikes occurring in the country, and 
although this number fell to 105 and 106 in 1960 and 1961, the number reached its peak in
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1962 with 225 workplaces experiencing stoppages.72 73Most involved anger pertaining to 
wages. Thus, growth continued to be positive but uneven, providing the terrain for the 
continuation of the viability of the combination of economic and political methods in the late 
1950s.
Part II - Self-Management Economics, the Politics o f Mobilisation and the State
Following the February 1958 meeting of the Executive Committee, the gulf between the 
Kardelj and Rankovic camps only continued to grow. This did not immediately become 
obvious, however, since the positive trends in economic growth made it appear that 
disagreements could be pursued without significant implications for the everyday 
administration of the country. The SKJ leadership therefore began to ossify and rarely met. 
The Central Committee met only three times between 1958 and 1962. The Executive 
Committee met somewhat more frequently to discuss issues relating to national minorities, 
the organisation of a party school, foreign affairs, the recession and the first draft of the new 
constitution that would be adopted in 1963. Only then did the extended meeting in spring take 
place with its divergence of opinion. It was, meanwhile, as part of the reconstitution of the 
party apparatus that occurred at the Seventh Congress, the reorganised Organisational 
Secretariat that began to play an ever more active role in daily SKJ activity. It held 57 
meetings in these years under the leadership of Rankovic who was its secretary. The official 
party history identified the Organisational Secretariat as the centre of the conservative 
faction. The Committee continued to direct the party in top-down fashion, which was in the 
spirit of Rankovid’s repeated attacks at the February 1958 EC meeting on the legacy of the 
Sixth Congress. The conservatives were widely known to regret the confusion provoked by
72 Jovanov, Radnicki Strajkovi, 96
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Tito’s phrase in 1952 calling for ‘the withering away of the party’. With the SKJ their rock of 
legitimacy, the conservatives placed an increasing emphasis on politics and democratic 
centralism to attain their goals. Indeed, the number of full time staff in the mass organisations 
in this period roughly doubled from 6525 to 12826 paid workers.74
The conservatives appeared in this regard to find a moderate ally in Tito, who also 
maintained a significant attachment to the SKJ as a unitary actor on the political scene. 
Nevertheless, Tito was much less ambivalent about the reform programme than has hitherto 
been appreciated. He in fact spoke from reformist positions at the Seventh Congress just 
months after the first showdown between Kardelj and Rankovic on the Executive 
Committee.75 This was the case in the spheres of both politics and economics. Despite 
lamenting the Djilas deviation as symbolic of the disorientation caused by the change of 
methods decided at the Sixth Congress, Tito emphasised the need to continue to see socialist 
democracy as the central gain of the period.76 More than that, economic change remained a 
priority despite the hiccups associated with the wave of strikes sparked by Trbovlje. Two 
issues in particular came to the fore: the nominal shift from production to consumption as the 
driver of economic policy, and the shift from heavy to light industry and agriculture. Indeed, 
careful compromises had inspired the five-year plan such that the changes in the structure of 
investment away from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture had inspired a popular 
belief that the 1957-1961 plan had been considerably tailored to the interests of Serbia.77 Still, 
before turning to agriculture, Tito spoke of coming challenges to industrial policy in tones 
that that had a reformist ring to them:
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‘But in our industrial production there are still many weaknesses, such as: idle 
capacity in new factories and the tradesman-like production of some of our 
modem enterprises, which greatly increases the costs of production; the resistance 
on the part of some enterprises to cooperate with other related enterprises on the 
basis of co-operation; slow reconstruction, expansion and modernisation of old 
enterprises; the still insufficiently efficient solution of the new wage system, 
which has a de-stimulating effect on the productivity of labour. If we seek from 
our workers that they raise the productivity of labour, then we have to accept that 
that does not depend on them alone. Someone has to create the conditions for 
them, and that depends on us, ourselves.’78
While Tito certainly spoke in terms general enough to be palatable to all, mixing the 
reformist and conservative messages, this statement clearly took the side of the reform wing 
on the wage issue. Since there had been an open split between the trade unions and the 
government regarding wage tariffs and their application, Tito’s explicit dissatisfaction with 
the state of affairs was a coded go-ahead for the trade unions to initiate a guerrilla war against 
the state-driven tariff system in favour of their own model. The concrete disagreement 
revolved around whether job description or skills qualifications should determine the new 
tariffs on the basis of which the minimum wage would be calculated. The former, according 
to the unions, left too much space for misuse through misclassification. The whole point of 
the reform had been to tie ever more closely rises in wages with rises in productivity. Duly, 
the unions won the round by the autumn of the same year as the majority on the Executive 
Committee agreed that qualifications ought to form the basis for the tariffs and thereby 
legitimated the intransigence of the SSJ.79
Wider issues were at stake, however. One historian identified the major dividing lines when 
he noted that despite income sharing becoming the principle according to which worker 
councils decided remuneration in an enterprise, in conjunction with the unions and local 
government representatives, the minimum wage and progressive taxation limited the scope
78 VII Kongres saveza ¡comunista Jugoslavije, 61 -62
79 AJ 507-III/81, ‘Zapisnik sa proSirene sednice IzvrSnog komiteta CK SK.J odriane 23 septembra 1958 godine u 
Beogradu, Beograd, 25 septembra 1958’, 12
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for the new system to change the behaviour of work collectives. Whereas in theory, work 
collectives could pursue profit maximisation, in practice taxes recouped substantially higher 
income gained by a firm on the market. The SSJ proposed a new tax system which ‘should be 
limited to (1) the existing capital tax on the book value of “socially owned” fixed and 
working capital, at variable rates by economic branch, (2) a turnover tax designed exclusively 
to appropriate income based on monopolistic positions, (3) a rent to be paid for privileged 
access to scarce natural resources, and (4) proportional rather than progressive taxes levied 
against net income to finance public administration, defence, the health service, education, 
etc.’80
With this began a long struggle which ended in 1961 with another compromise that proved 
unworkable. Some inkling as to the extent of the divisions at the top had emerged from the 
memoirs of the Tempo who spearheaded the reform effort from within his new base in the 
trade unions where he succeeded Djuro Salaj.81 The man Rusinow had described as ‘an eager 
primitive spirit and self-confident economic illiterate’ became also the man who turned the 
trade unions into ‘the first essential, if seldom recognised, ally of the liberal faction in the 
Party and then its nascent critic and even potential rival.’82 Historians have treated his 
autobiography with reservations83 but his overall account appears to have been borne out and 
in fact superseded by the archival evidence, even though gaps and doubts remain about 
particulars.84
80 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 116
81 Vukmanovii Tempo, Revolucija koja teCe, 326-329
82 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 115
83 Markovii, Beograd, 21
Rusinow clearly relied on the memoir in his account o f the period but quoted it sparingly. Yugoslav 
Experiment, 116-117
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The minutes of the long-secret extended meeting of the Executive Committee in spring 1962, 
and particularly his own speech,85 confirmed the main thrust of the allegations Tempo made 
in his memoirs about the support that Tito and Kardelj gave him during the struggle for 
reform,86 as well as about the existence of a Serbian faction in the SSJ leadership led by 
Dragi Stamenkovic that obstructed his efforts.87 Only his allegation of a direct clash with 
Rankovid after a meeting of the EC (presumably in 1958) did not receive direct confirmation 
anywhere.88 The stenograph therefore revises considerably the role of Tito in particular in the 
reform effort by confirming his reformist as opposed to his alleged conservative preferences. 
More dramatically, the trade unions emerge as the key dynamo of change and the force that 
compelled the nascent conservative wing to begin to coalesce and come out in the open.
The stenograph of the meeting, though, is not the only document that unhinges much of what 
Tempo hinted at. For the changes that he instituted in the functioning of the trade unions 
contributed decisively to the growing success of the liberal reform wing in the SKJ. By 
strengthening vertical decision-making at the same time as harnessing the drive of wider 
groupings and forging new alliances through opening the structures of the SSJ, and 
converting the SSJ more permanently into a shadow policy-making forum, Tempo 
transformed the trade unions into a two-track operation that acted as both a transmission belt 
for the SKJ and also as a dynamo for new social forces entering the political sphere from 
below. This accelerated the process of giving elites at lower instances of the party-state 
greater autonomy to effect change without having to resort to regional power games, direct 
political activity or independent organisation that would in effect have challenged the rule of
85 The stenograph o f his first intervention at the extended meeting o f  the EC in March 1962 made this clear: AJ 
507, III/88, 14-16.111.1962, 48-80
86 ibid., 52-56
87 ibid., 53-54
88 The allegation can be found in Vukmanovid Tempo, Revolucija koja tede, 337
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the SKJ. The trade unions then began to revamp the body politic before the new constitution 
adopted in 1963 sanctioned greater freedom of action through official state channels.89
The archives reveal a structure that began to change substantially as it pursued a two-track 
approach. Tempo on the one hand insisted on stricter efficiency in the whole apparatus of the 
unions and regularised meetings of the presidency and secretariat. He nevertheless 
subordinated them to ever more frequent ‘consultations’ between the presidency and wider 
actors that included the state, economic institutes, representatives of self-management 
institutions and trade union officials over economic, political and social strategy.90 These had 
existed before 1958 but now became regularised and began to more systematically branch out 
of trade union structures. Even though a variety of questions came to be tackled by these ad 
hoc consultations, held roughly once a month, issues surrounding tariffs and the minimum 
wage dominated 1958,91 internal trade union matters cluttered 1959,92 and economic co­
operation and integration of economic enterprises rose to prominence alongside the commune
89 Hondius, Yugoslav Community o f Nations, Chapter 7. Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 5.
90 He signalled the change at the Fifth Plenum of the CVSSJ in late 1958, AJ 117-16-43, ‘V Plenum, 7.X. 1958 
BGD’, and popularised it at the much-cited (at least among Yugoslav historians) Fourth Congress o f SSJ in 
early 1959.
All but one meeting in this year discussed wages as the central problem, echoing the SSJ decision not to abide 
by government policy. Duly, these meetings involved largely various levels o f the trade union bureaucracy. AJ- 
117-23, ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja sa predstavnicima republidkih veda i centralnih odbora sindikata-u vezi nekih 
pitanja iz oblasti tarifne politike -  odrZanog 8. aprila 1958 godine’, ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja u Centralnom vedu 
SSJ odrZanog dana 12. maja 1958 godine’, ‘Stenografske beleSke sa savetovanja u Centralnom vedu Saveza 
sinidikata Jugoslavije o zadacima sindikata, strudnih privrednih udruZenja i komora u sprovodenju jedinstvene 
tarifne politike, OdrZanog 21 jula 1958 god. u Beogradu’, ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja u Centralnom vedu SSJ 
odrZanog 31 oktobra 1958’, ‘ Zapisnik sa savetovanja u Centralnom vedu SSJ odrZanog dana 20 novembra 
1958’, ‘Stenografske beleSke sa sastanka Kultumo-prosvetne komisije CV SSJ sa pretstavnicima centralnih 
odbora sindikata, odrZan 27. novembra 1958 u vezi sa opisima, nomenklaturi i klasifikaciji zanimanja radnika i 
sluZbenika u privredi’, ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja Centralnog veda odrZanog dana 18.XII.1958 godine’, ‘Zapisnik 
sa savetovanja sa pretsednicima centralnih odbora u Centralnom vedu SSJ odrZanom dana 29.XII.1958 godine’.
The new, so-called ‘complex wage’ system came to be discussed at the end o f 1959 at a joint consultation that 
brought together SSJ and FEC officials: AJ 117-24, ‘Zapisnik sa zajednidkog savetovanja Centralnog veda i 
Sekretarijata za rad Saveznog izvrSnog veda odrZanog 18 demcebra 1959. godine.’ O f the remaining eleven 
consultations, seven dealt with union organisation or activity on the ground, three with following wage patterns 
and one posed issues regarding self-management, the union-organised system o f education for workers and the 
functioning o f the union newspaper Rad.
243
in I960.93 These problems very much indicated what the overall priorities for the reform 
wing of the party-state were in the self-management sector during this period. All were stages 
in the development of an industrial system that would be responsive in terms of its internal 
organisation and overall position in the economy to stimuli emanating from market 
mechanisms: the first set from 1958 and the second from 1959 revolved around linking ever 
more closely productivity and wage rises, while the 1960 set of drives denoted a continued 
attempt to reverse the atomisation of industrial production characteristic of the 1950s in order 
to form economies of scale that could compete on the world market: a priority that continued 
to intensify through the 1960s.94
On the other hand, Tempo pursued the reduction of unproductive state expenditure by 
holding a series of plenums to discuss issues like savings and more stimulating wage systems 
in the state sector,95 and the rationalisation of the social security system and healthcare 
benefits.96 Since the five-year plan for 1957-1961 had foreseen the reduction of public 
spending as one of the ways of keeping up productive investment to substitute for imports 
that burdened the balance of payments deficit, the trade union pursuit of rationalisation in the 
public sector and focus on productivity-enhancing strategies in the productive sector very 
much stayed within the boundaries set by the SKJ. Yet it also indirectly challenged the 
conservative forces whose subtle campaign to decrease wage differentials within workplaces
93
A major meeting addressed by federal ministers and Edvard Kardelj himself occurred at the start o f the year, 
attended by dozens o f  delegates from the federal union structures, industrial unions, local union branches, 
economic units, federal and republic ministers: AJ 117-25, ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja u Centralnom vedu SSJ 
dana 24.11.1960 godine’. Two further meetings later in the year concentrated on the role o f  the commune form 
o f municipal government, the latter again addressed by major figures: ‘Zapisnik sa savetovanja CV SSJ 
odrZanog 6.IX.1960 godine’, and ‘Stenografske beleSke po pitanju daljeg razvoja komuna, odrianog 12.XI.1954 
godine kod Potpretsednika Saveznog izvrSnog veda Druga Edvarda Kardelja’. Only a further three consultations 
occurred during that year, one dealing with the role o f trade union in the underdeveloped areas and focusing on 
efficient use of resources and aid, a second dealing with a new law on labour relations and a third on university 
workers.
94 Lydall, Yugoslav Socialism,
95 AJ 117-17-45, ‘II Plenum CVSSJ 9.XI.1959, Beograd’
AJ 117-18-48, ‘Zapisnik i stenografske beleSke sa V plename sednice Centralnog veda SSJ, 15.VI.1960 god. 
Beograd’
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and between workplaces rested on their ability to portray the reform wing’s interpretation of 
the party line as being in essential contradiction with some of the stated aims of the 
‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’. These fundamentally included the balanced development of 
the productive forces, the levelling out of regional differences and the realisation of the 
socialist maxim ‘to each according to his work’. The trade union agenda therefore amounted 
to an attempt to force the pace of change to such an extent as to make any return to the 
conservative programme too costly to contemplate.
Thus, the twin-track strategy of involving wider forces to push the income sharing principle 
as far as possible on the one hand and on the other hand to use the trade union apparatus to 
enhance the functioning of the public sector represented a significant contrast with the 
conservative methods embodied in the Rankovic’s power base in the Organisational 
Secretariat of the SKJ. The trade union method involved building open coalitions between 
various actors, creating from below momentum for challenges to the state machine and 
appearing more in tune with the openness of self-management culture than the secretive and 
top-down methods of the conservatives in the party apparatus. Yet this challenge also strove 
to stay within the boundaries of the party line and claimed its authority from the turn made in 
1956 which made any direct assault upon the reform project by the conservatives near 
impossible.
The momentum created by the trade unions in the period 1958 to 1960 clearly succeeded in 
laying the basis for the 1961 ‘mini-reform’, in which the minimum wage was in theory 
abolished and a simpler and less prohibitive form of taxation introduced,97 but did not break 
the power of the conservative faction. Both had a plausible interpretation of the party line and
97Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 119
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the efficacy of the reform process. It was the recession of 1961-1962 that opened the way for 
either interpretation of the way forward to decisively reconfigure the constellation at the top 
of society. Again, it was the wage system which lay at the heart of the debate. Conservative 
economists crowed that their warnings about the dangers of excessive liberalisation of the 
wage system leading to inflation appeared on the facts collected by official statistics to be 
substantially true: the rate of investment had had to increase at a greater rate in order to 
maintain the same levels of growth as before and the altitude of personal income not only 
made this impossible but in fact put additional pressure on prices.98 This attack on the reform 
programme elicited several lines of defence from market reformers. The trade unions once 
again led the way but developed a distinct position within the reform camp.
It is difficult to reconstruct this process in detail given the abrupt discontinuation of archival 
materials for the trade unions in 1959-60. Nevertheless, the stenograph of the extended 
Executive Committee meeting in spring 1962 reveals the weight that the trade unions carried 
as a result of their new course under the leadership of Tempo. It was indeed the SSJ chief 
himself who practically took the first floor following the opening speeches by Tito and the 
new head economic policy-maker Mijalko Todorovic on the political and economic situations 
respectively. It was his intervention that provoked angry reactions from the floor and set the 
tone for the following three days. It was the trade union apparatus therefore that had played a 
significant role in pushing the divisions on the Executive Committee out in the open.
Tempo chose to accept the conservative challenge to the reform programme head on by 
defending the income sharing system in industry. He in fact raised the stakes to the maximum 
by throwing the gauntlet down to those who disagreed with him, accusing them in effect of
98 See Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, Chapter 6.
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being Soviet-style state capitalist revisionists and bureaucrats who wished to turn the clock 
backwards against self-management:
‘[W]e had organised the system of the distribution of profit -  which was 
characteristic of our system until recently, and even the system from 1957 had 
elements of it, as does the current system, of which I shall say more later -  in a 
way that opened wide the possibility for enterprises to operate irrationally. That 
system exists in Poland, only it’s more rigid. They have in every enterprise a rigid 
plan of production in terms of range and quality [of products]. Then, in relation to 
that plan of production, they fix the wage fund on the basis of technical norms and 
tariffs. Thus, they determine the wage fund, production, price and distribution.
And the worker is nothing more than a wage labourer; he receives a wage 
determined from above. They [the Poles] now have problems of their own. Every 
year they have to change norms and tariffs and they change them with great 
problems, since the economy is dynamic [ziva], while they have to implement 
norms and change tariffs. That form of worker management is characterised by a 
proportion of the profit that is realised being left with the enterprise to dispose of, 
of which they can disburse one wage among the workers, and the rest they have to 
give for the standard, flats, etc. We [in Yugoslavia] have consciously gone against 
this. We did not wish to implement that [system].’99
That mode of posing the question was indeed consistent with the formulations used in the
new Programme of the SKJ adopted in 1958. Moreover, the SSJ chief began to systematise
the link between the state apparatus and the conservatives. He subtly accused them of the
cardinal sin of methodically breaking party discipline by using the state apparatus to go
against the party leadership and the party line: a mortal threat for a group largely based in the
SKJ apparatus. Tempo went on to characterise the resistance to reform as the advocacy of the
Polish model:
‘Indeed, from the initial period, we have certain experiences and it is not an accident that we 
turned to the income sharing...What did the trade unions do? We used the whole of 1958, we 
in the trade unions, in order -  and let present comrades confirm it -  to find out what the 
minimum wage was. How is it to be determined? Is it by way of tariffs? Is it by way of 
norms? What is it? Because, if we don’t have that, we don’t know what we are sharing. This
99 AJ 507-111/88, 50-51
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discussion lasted a whole year. The trade unions did one thing. The state did another. That’s a 
characteristic which, I have to say so, I don’t know...Moma Markovic, who was minister of 
labour isn’t here. He, the [government], the enterprise, everything was moving in the 
direction of promulgating tariffs and norms and for the minimum wage to be determined in 
that way. The unions said in advance that that would not work...And because the thing took 
4-5 months, the enterprises worked on it, the [government] worked on it, the state 
administration worked on it, everything was mobilised and then we came to comrade Kardelj. 
Comrade Plavi [Mijalko Todorovid, minister of economy], Moma Markovic, etc, and then it 
all fell in the water...Why? Because we had experience for several years that that wouldn’t 
work, that we can’t decide norms and tariffs for the enterprises, that we had not managed it 
when we had 35 economic ministries with 500-600 or 1000 employees in the administrative 
period. We could not do it and they can’t do it, look, in Poland, they can’t do it in the Soviet 
Union and they are having clashes along the same lines...We then had three more meetings. 
At the meeting with Kardelj, it was the same people again: Mika Spiljak, Plavi, me, Moma, 
Kardelj. And at each of these meetings we finally condemned the minimal wage, that that is 
impossible, that we have to seek a different solution along the lines of the trade union 
proposals. That was the conclusion.’100
It was then, Tempo noted, that the episode described in his memoirs came to pass, when 
Borba interviewed him on the wage system but then published an authoritative piece by 
Todorovic, the deputy president of the Executive Council in charge of economic affairs, in 
which the latter contradicted the line agreed at the meetings with Kardelj. Dragi Stamenkovic 
accused Vukmanovic Tempo in the secretariat of the SSJ of contradicting government policy, 
getting the support of Sekic and the abstention of Romic during the voting, which
100 AJ 507-III/88, 52-53
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Vukmanovic Tempo interpreted as ‘the three Serbian cadres’ voting against him.101 Again, he 
complained to Tito and sought arbitration from Kardelj, who backed him, before the issue 
came to the Executive Committee at the end of 1958. This is presumably the September 
meeting at which the SSJ line prevailed: income sharing was the main principle to re-order 
the wage system and the equalisation of the conditions of production would be necessary for 
the success of that programme.102 Nevertheless, nothing moved on this issue during 1959.103 
Indeed, Vukmanovic Tempo in his memoirs alleged that he had to withdraw opening the 
issue at the Fourth Congress of the SSJ in spring of 1959, despite the fact that he had the 
support of Tito and Kardelj. This was in all likelihood due to the belief prevalent in 
government that the economy needed a level of stability before further reforms were 
passed.104
Since the five-year plan was nearing completion a year early, the moment appeared 
propitious for further changes in mid-1960. The changes that eventually came were moderate 
and half-hearted but plagued by continued factional infighting. Kardelj called yet another 
meeting in mid-July at which he, Tempo, Spiljak, Moma Markovic, Todorovic, Gligorov and 
‘others who worked on it [the economic system]’ agreed that a new system had to be put in 
place in time for the start of the next five-year plan in 1961 and that all the experts had to be 
called back from leave to work intensively on the changes.105 Rusinow appears to have been 
well informed about developments at this stage because he describes accurately and pithily 
what followed: ‘Joint commissions of leading figures from the trade union organisation, the 
Federal Economic Chamber, and/or economists’ associations were formed on two occasions 
to prepare concrete proposals. Both times, however, and despite apparently firm support for
,01 ibid, 53
102 ibid, 54
i b i d ”  55104 See Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment., 117
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the project of Kardelj as vice-president of the FEC, the mandates and composition of these 
commissions were abruptly dissolved.’106 Vukmanovic Tempo detailed much of the 
commotion and again emphasised the involvement of Kardelj and Tito.107 At one point, he 
recounted how he went to complain to Tito, who was hunting, but he could not remember the 
name of the place where they met, so Tito assisted him: ‘Dobanovci.’108
Tempo continued and claimed Tito had supported him which Tito did not deny.109 Despite 
Tito’s alleged interventions, however, obstruction continued even after the ‘mini-reform’ of 
1961 in which the minimum wage was in theory abolished and a simpler and less prohibitive 
form of taxation introduced.110 Tempo pointed in rambling fashion to how experts all too 
frequently manipulated statistical data to slow reform: ‘this apparatus formulates our policy, 
since it now gives us our statistics, it formulates them and on that basis we decide our policy 
and it’s clear, everything will consequently go upside down.’111 This had a clear political 
background: ‘Therefore, I am posing the question, why has the apparatus allowed for the 
whole year to pass with nothing getting done on these issues, and now claims with its 
analyses the following -  and I am just quoting, these are people who have responsible 
positions in our apparatus: -  Guzina who is at the head of the plan, Kiro Gligorov at the head 
of the economic directory -  “Decentralisation means the lowering of the rate of 
accumulation. Second, decentralisation means a change in the structure of 
investment.”...What does that mean in essence?...That means let’s opt for the Polish system. 
Exactly that which they had written in their analysis which we had rejected at the meeting
106
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with comrade Kardelj, exactly that.’112 Not a single step could be taken, according to the 
trade union boss, without resistance arising from within the state apparatus against what was, 
after all, the party line.
After detailing modes in which the ‘mini-reform’ was only partial, Tempo insisted he had no 
confidence in all the committees and subcommittees introduced to deal with the issue.113 In 
answer to Tito’s query why that was the case, Tempo explained that the dominance of 
specialists made him doubt anything would change in relation to previous experience. An 
important exchange followed in which Tito asserted that ‘people who do not wish to execute 
policies decided from above should be sent to some other task’ and then, turning to ‘one of 
those present’, he uttered the admonition that ‘it had been wrong to prejudice the result by 
forming commissions before we finish the job here [in the Executive Committee]’.114
Such words from Tito signified significant support for the trade unions. Tempo, who was by 
now clearly overstepping his allotted time, exploited his advantage to the full by outlining his 
alternative economic vision. Tempo certainly came across as an original strategist in his own 
right who was spearheading the liberal faction but also quite distinct from it. His major 
contention was an attack on the position that blamed the recession on rising worker incomes. 
While statistics broadly supported the idea that wages had risen faster than productivity, 
Tempo attributed this trend as much to the distorted reporting of biased elements in the state 
apparatus as to real movements in the economy. Any blanket move to freeze wages was ‘to 
follow the example of the English; England is not mentioned but, roughly, the Conservative 
government is going for a [wage] freeze and the same tendency is visible here.’115 Instead,
"2 ibid.
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the strategic task he proposed as an alternative rejected cuts in personal consumption and 
called for wage rises to be tied to productivity, while savings could be made through cuts to 
public spending as well as an increase in rational investment in productive capacities, above 
all in agriculture, in order to minimise imports.116
This position had great appeal for the liberal faction but showed some independence from it. 
Namely, Tempo’s proposals expressed distrust of both the federal state and of the republic 
leaderships, placing faith instead in the worker collectives and the market (‘normal 
tendencies, economic tendencies’).117 As Tito had already shown his support for the attack on 
the federal bureaucracy, Tempo concentrated his fire for waste on republic leaderships’ 
meddling in investment projects. He attacked the Montenegrin construction of political 
factories and energy projects, an attack that Tito appeared to appreciate, commenting ‘now 
you’ve got to the heart of it [sad si cacnuo u sfrar]’.118 Having attacked the leadership of the 
republic of his own provenance, Vukmanovic Tempo felt he could criticise the Croats and the 
Bosnians for duplicating capacities, earning disapproval from some participants: ‘Osman 
[Karabegovid, head of republic government in Bosnia], please, don’t look at me like that’.119 
This tirade would probably not have been popular among the less developed republics as it 
concentrated on waste as an emanation of misdirection of development funds gained from the 
more developed regions. The clear implication of the argument had been that any potential 
alliance between the federal state and the less developed republics would be a block to the 
development of the country. For the yardstick that economic development had to be judged 
against was international competition, and the trade union chief declared disbelief at the lack 
of progress in the approach to foreign trade in economic policy-making despite ten years of
116 ibid, 72-80
117 ibid, 74
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discussions and implored the use of economic instead of administrative tools to solve the 
most important problem facing the country: the current accounts balance.120
Tempo therefore supported market reform to the very core but also helped shift the terms of 
the debate in substance if not yet in words: he chose to emphasise in essence ‘de-etatisation’ 
at the expense of ‘decentralisation’ as the dominant process in the pantheon of ideals 
embodied by the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ and he did so in order to achieve the move 
reformist demands from easily denoted territorial undertones towards an involvement of 
wider social forces that could open wider possibilities for the transformation of the Yugoslav 
body politic. Rusinow perceived this subtle change in the reform programme but dated it to 
the mid-1960s and attributed it primarily to reform heavyweight Bakaric.121 Yet the issue of 
centralism had plainly arisen at the turn of the decade not just in ideological terms but in 
practical-political realities. While it also might indeed have been Bakaric who would later 
forge the alliances of the 1960s and arm them with a clearer ideological repertoire, he had 
ready-made elements to choose from and the trade union push had obviously made their 
contribution difficult to obviate. That notwithstanding, the ensuing debate made it 
questionable whether the de-etatisation vision in itself provided a concrete strategic 
alternative to decentralisation. In fact, there appeared to be no sense for how these tendencies 
interrelated and no action programme to overcome contradictions between them. The SSJ had 
been the battering ram against conservative positions but neither it nor the rest of the reform 
bloc had given any serious thought to how the step beyond centralism would be realised. That 
may explain their reticence to take the decisive leap there and then. Without it, structural 
reform and any worker-based Yugoslavism would remain prisoner to various attempts to find
120 ibid., 72, 75-77
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a compromise with the conservative wing, even though no workable compromise appeared 
desirable to participants of the debate.
The Executive Committee between centralism, oligocentrism, polycentrism and ‘the world 
division o f labour’
Indeed, the unity of Yugoslavia became a major issue of discussion at the Executive 
Committee. Dijana PleStina in her landmark study of regional development in Yugoslavia, 
based in large part on interviews with policy-makers, aptly described the main dualism that 
divided the reformers and conservatives:
‘Thus, the conflict between those who stood for an increase in self-management 
and those who opposed it was, above all, a conflict over perceived economic 
interests. It was potentially more explosive as the economic repercussions of 
decentralisation and increased role of the market would be felt differently in the 
various republics and regions, according to their different levels of development. 
The historical polarization between the developed northwest (Slovenia, Croatia 
and Vojvodina), which stood to gain from the liberalization and market-oriented 
economy, and the less developed southeast (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, 
Kosovo and Montenegro) which stood to lose by it, with some in Serbia seeking 
their interests parallel to those of the less developed, threatened to make economic 
decentralization a political issue of exploitation of the “poor developing 
periphery” by a “greedy developing center”.’122
This position is widely accepted in the historiography and serves as the basis for differing 
interpretations over the exact reasons and timing for the turn against Serbia by the less 
developed southeast that fundamentally allowed for the passing of the 1965 reforms and the 
removal of Rankovic from the leadership in 1966. The dominant view always involved an 
attempt to show how a particular shift at any point in time pushed a reluctant Tito, ‘who was
122 PleStina, Regional Development, 63
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in his heart a centralist of the old school’,123 and whose authority was critical to any decisive 
turn, to back reforms.
Much of this perspective is based on the erroneous understanding of Tito’s positions shaped 
in particular by Paul Lendvai’s influential account of his time in Yugoslavia.124 According to 
Lendvai, and many contemporary foreign commentators, Tito’s speech in Split in May 1962, 
which followed the extended EC meeting, represented the high tide of conservatism. The 
president’s call for ‘a uniform socialist culture’, the eventual result of which was ‘to switch 
the sympathies of party leaders of the less-developed regions away from the centralist to the 
liberal camp’,125 inaugurated a period of ascendancy for the Rankovic faction with the Serb 
leader awarded the position of vice-president.126 According to Plestina herself it was the split 
in Serbia among conservatives (represented by Rankovic) and reformists (represented by 
Todorovic), as well as the conservatives’ overconfident approach epitomised by Serbia’s 
appropriation in 1964 of the decentralised funds of formerly federal banks based in Belgrade, 
that decisively shifted the smaller republics.127 Her en passant assertion of the piecemeal 
continuation of reform throughout the early 1960s rested on her presentation of Tito as a 
reformer, which in turn probably owed much to the post-1966 historiography inside 
Yugoslavia itself. By contrast, recent scholarship has added the dimension of the renewed 
Tito-Khrushchev attempt at reconciliation, prompting Tito throughout the 1960s to remain 
close to Rankovic in the hope that the victory of reformist forces in the Kremlin would bring 
about closer relations with Moscow and a looser and more acceptable version of the 
Communist bloc for Yugoslavia.128
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The minutes of the extended meeting of the EC in 1962 suggest that Tito was concerned 
about Yugoslav unity but that he entertained a vision of integration based primarily on the 
economic concentration and centralisation of the self-management sector, not on a statist 
model. His attachment to the SKJ as a centralised apparatus might have conditioned his 
desire to maintain a compromise with Rankovic but it did not place into question his 
reformist credentials. If anything, the subsequent moderation of reform probably had as much 
to do with Tito’s care not to alienate the less developed republics as to his clear desire to 
maintain the SKJ as a centralised political actor. Yet there appeared to be a contradiction 
between the maintenance of cohesion in the party leadership on the one hand and the ability 
of the party to take decisive moves on the other. This spelt dark times ahead for the party. 
The tone of their meeting made it obvious that the participants understood this. Subsequent 
moves by the leadership signalled the ascendance in economic policy making of the reform 
wing even as apparent promotions of conservatives to high political office occurred as well. 
A new equilibrium emerged by the time of the July Plenum which indicated the continued 
upper hand of the reform wing. That compromise could only be fully understood on the 
background of the EC debate, for which reason this section involves significant modification 
of the historiography.
Indeed, the Executive Committee met in 1962 on the back of significant threats to Yugoslav 
cohesion that foreshadowed the problems that emerged after 1962. Tito delivered the opening 
speech and dramatically referred to national divisions in the government itself, posing the 
question: is our country still capable of keeping together, to not disintegrate?’129 Tito blamed 
the republics above all for this situation: ‘decentralisation with us among some of our leading
129
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people takes on ever more the character and meaning of disintegration’.130 Tito rattled off a 
series of incidents that called for a summit of the highest body of the SKJ. Indeed, both he 
and Rankovic referred to divisions in the government along national lines,131 the Slovene 
delegates refusal to vote for the economic plan for the year 1962 because of their opposition 
to the tax on extra profit,132 controversy in Serbia about the allegedly unfavourable situation 
in which the Cyrillic script found itself,133 clashes between Slovene and Serb intellectuals 
Pirjevac and Cosic,134 chauvinist outbursts in the cultural sphere,135 struggles over autonomy 
in Serbia over the position of Vojvodina,136 and problems of control over party publications 
between the centre and the north-western republics.137 Tito also emphasised how disunity had 
led to disloyal competition between export companies, which had apparently lost the country 
credits and tarnished its reputation among its non-aligned friends.138 His initial emphasis, 
therefore, did indeed fit into an attack on decentralisation and not against the central state. 
This was neither a temporary tactical manoeuvre nor a strategic volte-face. Tito’s vision was 
broader as his later interjections and interventions would show.
Even so, amid the circumstances, it was not strange for the debate to polarise between those 
who saw ‘subjective’ or political issues as the major cause for the problems in the country, 
and those who blamed ‘objective’ or economic factors. The former elicited an abstract call 
for central party control over a chaotic and atomised apparatus, while the latter implied the 
need to agree to and implement an economic model that replaced central planning. Since Tito 
had apparently put emphasis on the former, speakers who explicitly or implicitly cited
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politics as the defining issue in their contribution usually gravitated towards a conservative 
worldview and appealed to Tito’s authority. They were a minority and almost exclusively 
representatives from the south-east of the country: Rato Dugonjic,139 Osman Karabegovic140 
and Djuro Pucar from Bosnia,141 Aleksandar Rankovic,142 Dragi Stamenkovic, 143 Bobi 
Radosavljevic,144 and Svetislav Stefanovic Ceca from Serbia,145 and Blazo Jovanovic from 
Montenegro.146
Those who emphasised economic issues, by contrast, tended to be reformers. Some of them 
concentrated on politics but openly backed further changes to the economic system. This 
group included north-easterners but was not exclusive to them: Svetozar Vukmanovic 
Tempo147 and Veljko Vlahovic hailed from Montenegro,148 Miha Marinko,149 Edvard 
Kardelj,150 and Sergej Krajger were from Slovenia,151 Mika Spiljak,152 Jakov Blazevic,153 
Zvonko Brkid154 and Vladimir Bakaric all came from Croatia,155 and Milentije Popovic from 
Serbia.156 Key Serb cadres Milo§ Mini6,157 Petar Stambolic158 and Jovan Veselinov159 tried 
not to tackle the controversial issues head-on: Minic argued in favour of greater political 
centralisation and of greater economic integration but without impinging on self-
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management; Stambolic talked of strengthening the federal centre but also of including the 
republic centres more in federal issues, all the while asserting the need to compete on the 
world market; and Veselinov was careful to argue against Serbian nationalism and suggest 
that everyone should tackle their own nationalism. The Macedonian delegates, Aleksandar 
Grliôkov160 and Lazar KoliSevski,161 had a complicated approach that leaned simultaneously 
in both directions and communicated a constructive openness to complex solutions. The 
Montenegrins by contrast appeared mired in local issues and were roundly criticised by 
conservatives and reformers alike.162
Further to these general tendencies, factional debates revolved around several axes and were 
not necessarily compatible even within camps. This was perhaps clearest in terms of the 
different understandings of the role of planning within decentralisation. Among the north- 
westerners, in particular Bakaric and Krajger, a combination of what the influential Yugoslav 
economist Biéanic termed ‘oligocentric’, ‘polycentric’ and ‘open’ concepts of economic 
development prevailed.163 The first concept rested on the administrative division of 
Yugoslavia into six republics, such that ‘each republic should develop its own territory and 
that each should influence the development of Yugoslavia as a whole...[t]he aim is not to 
isolate each republic...but...to have the most open policy possible, so that each republic takes 
into account the behaviour of the others.’164 The second concept took planning to be a 
complex system worked out from below variously by arrangements that included worker self­
management organs, the banking system, professional organisations and chambers of 
commerce, and organs of local government.165 The third presumed a broader context that
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suggested that development took place ‘within the framework of a larger system of regional 
or world economic relations’.166
Speakers from the north-west combined these concepts on several levels. To begin with, they 
admitted that greater reliance on the market had implications on regional balances. Indeed, 
Bakaric, the leading Croatian figure, expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo in the 
planning system, claiming that pre-war planners in the economic institutes did a better job 
than contemporary policymakers,167 yet intimated that devolution of policy-making to 
enterprises functioning according to the ‘law of value’ had to be specifically thought through 
in order to prevent the richer regions exploiting the poorer ones in the Yugoslav context.168
Krajger, head of the Slovene government and soon to become chief of economic policy in the
federal government, felt he needed to go further in order to respond to charges of Slovenian
exceptionalism. He began by stressing economic necessity before explaining why indeed a
level of exceptionalism was necessary. Economic necessity had to begin from an
international position, he argued, and complained that Yugoslavia was more autarkic than the
Soviet bloc, with trade with the outside world accounting for only 10 percent of GDP.169 Yet
the world market was the key for the success of the reform of the system:
‘Namely...if we wanted to transfer to a system of distribution of income, we 
needed to put our enterprises in such a way that they could operate with material 
accounting, that they had to worry about the commercial results of production. We 
could not do so until we open our markets, for as long as our market is closed, as 
long as our economy can use an overly protected position, a monopoly position, it 
can realise any price, it can attain on the domestic market any amount of super­
profit, which allows the enterprises to indulge in this rampage with personal 
incomes etc.’170
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From this, he concluded that Slovenia took a different position on the plan since it saw 
questions of production and not consumption at the centre of getting out of the crisis. Yet, 
only one Slovene delegate in the Federal Assembly voted against the plan. Slovenia had not 
rejected the plan but had in fact changed its ‘form’ in dialogue with federal ministers and 
officials.171 More than that, the Slovene position was to substitute imports from western 
markets with eastern or non-aligned markets and ‘we went for the maximum mobilisation of 
our forces’ to find export markets for goods normally sold domestically.172 Such a 
mobilisation could only be achieved locally and it was no accident, for Krajger, that 
investments coming from the centre achieved least results: most work collectives still thought 
in terms of production alone but empowering local actors to deal with expanded reproduction 
increased their interest in issues beyond production. With a more efficient system, Slovenia 
could contribute to tackling the central question of the balance of payments deficit, which 
was beneficial to all of Yugoslavia: ‘our position may look like a republican one but we 
understood our entire development policy as a Yugoslav one’.173
Milentije Popovid, the main architect of the recent reforms and general secretary of the 
SSRNJ, presented a different approach to planning. His approach presented state intervention 
as a temporary and exceptional necessity in the circumstances of the recession but the ideal 
remained in the self-management sector conducting itself along market lines.174 The 
immediate task, however, lay in the renewal of the political system in order for it to take into 
account changes in the economic situation: ‘This crisis is biting not because we are today not 
as good as we used to be before -  at least it would be possible to speak...of personal 
deformations on account of practicism, bureaucratism, etc -  but because our development
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continually and every day poses political questions and because yesterday’s administrative
and economic problems are today often becoming political questions. Economics is becoming
politics. We have not organised ourselves in the federation to solve these issues.’175 While
Popovic did not wish to be drawn to provide criteria according to which the plan ought to
function, he did see the federal organs as the paramount locus for decision-making. Instead of
confusion and competing centres acting autonomously, he argued for democratic centralism:
‘Certain political conditions have emerged in which we, who sit in the Central 
Committee, when we discuss among ourselves, say that we are a federal or 
coalition Party, or that we have a united Party in which there are different bodies 
with their own responsibilities. That is what we are talking about and it is here 
that have to make changes...only one thing is certain about what needs to be done, 
which Pera [Stambolic, soon to be Premier] talked about, we have to strengthen 
the political organs on the federal level, that they should begin to work, to live and 
make decisions. That is one thing. And the other thing is that these organs should 
turn to those political and theoretical questions which arrive every day and to 
which we do not have the answers.’176
Such a mode of hypothesising the role of the federal centre, with its reference to Stambolic, 
appeared to dovetail with Tito’s obvious leanings towards reform, and preoccupation with 
political unity and efficacy in new conditions. It echoed the position of the other Serbian 
speakers but much more firmly presented the hierarchy of priorities, placing state 
intervention and the unity of the federal centre in the service of the rounded development of a 
self-managed economy. Since time was a factor, Popovic reasoned that state intervention to 
lift the economy remained the first task, that a new mode of deciding on the mode of state 
intervention had to closely follow and that a return to full reform would follow later. 
Subsequent events would show that this position prevailed in the short term.
A third variant came from Aleksandar Grliikov, head of the Macedonian government, whose 
intervention sharply contrasted with both the north-western and reform-Serbian positions as a
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consequence of the fact that he represented one of the less developed regions. Indeed, the 
position of the Macedonian delegation could not be clearly delineated as reformist or in 
favour of decentralisation. The central committee of the Macedonian party was reputed to be 
deeply divided over reform in the 1960s. It in fact responded positively, alongside the 
Montenegrin party, to a co-operation initiative launched by Serbia and Rankovic himself in 
the mid-1960s. The seeds of both centralism and decentralisation existed in the Macedonian 
position and, indeed, the mid-1960s pact with Serbia did not on the face of it count on the re­
assertion of central state power but on inter-republic co-operation to counter north-western 
domination.177 Nevertheless, federal intervention in investment projects as well as 
development strategies that could assess the optimum investment patters in primary industry 
from the perspective of the balance of trade deficit remained attractive to the most slowly 
developing republic in Yugoslavia.178 At the same time, the central question for GrliCkov 
remained not an either-or approach but rather what optimal combination of planning methods 
could be attained through mutual dialogue. He expressed the Macedonian preference for 
decentralisation of agricultural policy as a way of opposing uniformity in forms of production 
and in policy (‘the development of plum-making’ or the ‘development of grape-production’ 
he said cynically, alluding to the national fruits of Serbia and Montenegro) that emanated 
from the stronger republics.179 That indicated a further tendency inherent to decentralisation: 
protectionism within the federation. Conversely, the Slovene approach sought 
decentralisation not in order to prevent outside influences but rather the obverse, to gain from 
the republic’s competitive advantage in Western markets.
At times the conservatives expressed great alarm about these threats and the debate got out of 
hand. This occurred early on in the meeting when Dragi Stamenkovic exchanged words with
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Marinko, accusing him of dissembling regarding Slovene intransigence in the Federal 
Assembly in relation to the federal plan: ‘Here, comrade Miha Marinko is the secretary of the 
Central Committee of Slovenia [sic]. He spoke here of the productivity of labour and reward 
according to labour. How am I to understand that he has not spoken about the big principle 
issues which have been raised here? Is he not in agreement, so he speaks about secondary 
things, or is it that he agrees but has said nothing of it here? I see we are going nowhere...the 
polemic just is not there.’180 When Marinko explained that he had spoken for a short time on 
just one important issue but that he could not deal with all issues, Dragi Stamenkovic asked 
again why the Slovenes opposed the federal plan, only to get the response that Marinko felt 
he had said something on a substantive issue and asked Dragi Stamenkovic to go beyond 
abstract calls for unity and say something substantive himself.181
Seemingly, it was not just Dragi Stamenkovic who found the situation in the SKJ scandalous. 
Of the seven speakers who followed Tito and Todorovic on the first day, four were 
unequivocal conservatives and only two explicitly identified themselves with the reform 
wing. By the second day, the clear conservatives made up only four of the fourteen 
interventions, although another three could be seen as leaning towards them, and the 
reformers had four adherents, albeit two had already spoken the day before. On the third day, 
the reform wing predominated with eight of the twelve participants before Tito finally spoke 
again. The conservative wing by contrast had only one speaker on that day before Tito had 
addressed the meeting with his concluding remarks. Rankovic had chosen to speak early on 
but his contribution was comparatively mild. His focus as in early 1958 was on the state of 
the party and he did not comment in substance on the economic issues. Nevertheless, the 
important contention that Rankovic made indirectly and subtly focused once again on the
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continued laxity of the party apparatus from the top down: the issues of 1958 had apparently 
been understood by the party as something to be stormed through and then gradually 
forgotten as time went on.182 Not only did he believe another letter was necessary to rectify 
the recidivist tendencies on the part of the lax membership but he also noted, as in 1958, that 
the leading forums of the party at the level of the republics rarely met and had developed 
localist interests which prevented them from acting as Yugoslavs.183
Rankovic was clearly implying that all the negative anecdotes Tito had brought up, and that 
he was about to relay himself, represented an insidious negligence on the part of leading party 
figures. There was not enough democratic centralism in the party where a line would indeed 
be proclaimed after a democratic debate and then uniformly executed. There was just not 
enough outvoting in party forums, contrary to the claims from a Bosnian delegate, and there 
was too much consensus building, which in effect allowed inadequate compromises that 
sanctioned everyone to do as they pleased since the formulations were so general. The party 
had instead become indolent to negative phenomena.184 He then got concrete and accused the 
Montenegrins of allowing too much leeway to their municipal leaderships. Serbia, too, had 
experienced problems as the autonomist forces in Vojvodina threatened the unity of the 
republic.185 Rankovii’s later ridicule of Pirjevac and of the accusation that Yugoslavism 
implied an attack on the republics served as a sophisticated and sarcastic commentary on 
accusations against Serbian hegemonism; it was clearly Serbia which endured threats to its 
existence as a republic.186 The Serbian strongman also laid into the Croatian leadership. He 
asked who if not Brkic and Bakaric should know that about the damaging debate between the 
federal party and the Croatian party over control of the publication of Borba in the Latin
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script from Zagreb. Yet they had claimed not to know when confronted.187 *The Slovene party 
leadership too had tolerated similar shenanigans over the funding and control of the party 
journal Komunist.m  In the context of heavy accusations over Slovene loyalty, this piece of 
information served only to show just how systematic their indiscipline was, in the view of the 
party conservatives. Rankovic recommended greater vigilance from the party centre to avoid 
disintegration and to recover the political initiative of the federation.189
Even as he made neither direct accusations against individuals nor any recommendations in 
relation to wider policy, the choice of language, theme and example when he addressed party 
issues spoke eloquently about Rankovic’s leanings and intentions. By implicitly raising the 
prospect of disloyalty to Yugoslavia, Rankovic could only cause doubt in the reform agenda 
as a whole. The ploy of innocent commentator using suggestive double entendre echoed the 
earlier Slovene intervention. While it was clearly as false as Marinko’s persona, Rankovié’s 
appeal to the primacy of the political had purchase with key actors including Tito. Moreover, 
it let other conservatives play different roles: that of the opponent of the confederalisation of 
the system as Rato Dugonjic portrayed himself190 or of the decisive defender of pre-war 
communist Yugoslav integralism as the formal chief of the security apparatus Stefanovic 
6eca attempted.191 Finally, it revealed both his strong hand in that the conjuncture allowed 
Rankovic to punch above his weight for the conservative agenda but it also reflected his 
weakness as he appeared to be desperate to encourage his potential supporters without in fact 
stepping out of the shadows as a contender for primus inter pares among Tito’s adherents.
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The othér contender for that role, Kardelj, was the first speaker on the third day. His patience, 
optimism and firmness contrasted with the prevailing mood and suggested that Kardelj felt 
secure. Recognised as the implicit leader of the reform faction, he flatly denied that the 
question of centralism or decentralisation amounted to the main issue. These, he contended, 
were symptoms of deeper problems. He forcefully argued that Yugoslavia had achieved 
much domestically and internationally because of the unusual stability of its leadership over 
twenty years which he put down to Tito’s role and the introduction of self-management. The 
threat to that stability came not from bickering over a ‘few billion’ which could always be 
found through careful budgeting but from the bureaucratisation of people in their own 
position, whether in government or in the republics.192 The question was not the resources but 
the dynamic in which no-one was prepared to approach the question from the position of the 
whole. Kardelj counselled the rotation of leading personnel since he felt he had been able to 
predict word for word the contribution of every speaker, proof of the extent to which attitudes 
had become predictable over a decade of occupying the same post.193 The immediate task 
was to create stable conditions and unity, including removal of individuals if relations had 
become impossible, so that instant measures to lift the economy could take place and create 
time for patient discussions. Still, this unity should not come at the price of negating the right 
of nations to self determination or of resurrecting Stalinist or bourgeois-democratic forces 
which had been quietly waiting in the wings. The line, which had brought Yugoslavia to 
where it was, had to continue: ‘we must stand firmly on our principle positions, on everything 
that is fundamental to our system and is our general, strategic line, and to struggle against all 
criticisms which would want to take us on a wrong turn.’194
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W hile his short-term proposals probably sounded reasonable to  m ost participants including  
Tito, Kardelj preached patience and prom ised inclusion  to the less  develop ed  republics. This 
he did w ithout conced ing  on the reform line: he explained that h is ow n  position  on the 
situation in the econom y, w h ich  w ould  not be solved  for several m ore years and necessitated  
large-scale d iscussion , took  the international as the starting point. S ince the w h ole world was 
m oving to integration, Y ugoslavia  could  not look to autarky or produce in order to substitute 
for imports but had to organise its econom y for exports. W ithout m oving  towards this, 
Y ugoslavia  w as lo st .195 Each region had to understand that integration in the world econom y  
w ould be beneficial in the long  run, so the im m ediate future, by w h ich  he meant a period  
spanning a decade, ought to be the operative concept: ‘w hether a spec ific  problem  o f  a 
republic or a region w ou ld  be so lved  this year or next or in  the five  years’ tim e’ w as ‘all the 
sam e’. 196 That claim  could  not have gone dow n w ell and show ed Kardelj to be m uch m ore o f  
the reform hardliner than he appeared. H is prom ise w as fundam entally that o f  inclusion  rather 
than o f  com prom ise.
A s such, it probably exacerbated tensions at the m eeting. Soon  after Kardelj had spoken,
B la fo  Jovanovic took the floor, d iscussed  in non-com m ittal fash ion the major issues o f  the
day and then com plained about the specific  problem s facing M ontenegro, regarding forestry
and energy in particular.197 Tito could  not contain h im se lf  and interrupted:
‘B la2o, I am  in total agreem ent. It is  just that I have not seen  anyone survey the 
w hole. Everyone says: one should keep this or that in  m ind, and then they veer o f f  
into their republic or other waters. They start w ith  things w e don’t have tim e for in  
today’s m eeting. Com rades, I do not see h o w  anything can com e from  this 
m eeting. I am  frankly disappointed at the w ay  things are going. I did not want this 
m eeting to be held in order to d iscuss the question o f  w aterw ays or an alum inium  
factory or any other factory. I wanted us to get organised because w e  are in crisis; 
it’s a subjective crisis, a crisis o f  ourselves. That is the core o f  it and this
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discussion is proving it. Comrades, excuse me for this outburst but I find it so 
hard to listen to this. It is impossible to endure this. Continue, Bla2o, sorry.’198
Following Tito’s intervention, the drama intensified. Three speakers took the floor to directly
or indirectly ask Tito to dissolve the leadership and turn to the party in order to co-opt a new
leadership. Macedonian Lazar Kolisevski was the first made the appeal:
‘The Executive Committee should be more active in all spheres. Practice has here 
shown with the case of Tempo - 1 am referring to the situation in the trade unions 
-  that it is not enough to discuss things in the Secretariat alone. The Secretariat 
can meet or not meet, we will be none the wiser...If today we need to use the 
authority of comrade Tito and take this to the membership of the League of 
Communists, I believe that would tarnish the reputation of the Executive 
Committee and the Central Committee. I believe that comrade Tito, if there is no 
other way out, should do it [go to the membership]. Lenin was once in the same 
situation and he availed himself of this right.’199
KoliSevski pointed out that he believed that the Executive Committee was united behind Tito
but that he felt Tito should have the right to act decisively if this was not the case. Minister of
People’s Defence Ivan Gosnjak spoke next and provided an explicitly centralist speech. He
complained that decentralisation had gone too far and that it could not in any case occur
without a united party. He then went on to address KoliSevski, to assert that the leadership
was in fact divided:
‘Comrade Lazo says: the Executive Committee has behind it the Central 
Committee. When a man knows everything that is going on...
LAZAR KOLI&EVSKI: Comrade Tito has behind him the whole Central 
Committee. And let him take the Executive Committee in front of the Central 
Committee. That’s what I said.
IVAN GO$NJAK: I am not of the belief that we all stand on one political, 
principle line. We do not, why deceive ourselves? I would even claim that 
comrade Tito does not have -  on that one principle line -  the Central Committee.
JOSIP BROZ TITO: I also think that.
IVAN GOSNJAK: Comrade Tito has the Party, the working class, but the 
members of the Central Committee -  on one principle political platform - 1 think 
he does not have them...I completely agree with comrade Rato [Dugonjic] that
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today in comparison with a couple of years ago, we have not taken a single step 
forward in the creation of one united state, one united community of peoples.’200
With the security apparatus lined up for centralism, it is not difficult to understand why Tito
resisted calls to dissolve the leadership: Gosnjak had started off his contribution by relaying
the unease of the army at news of the instability in the leadership.201 Yet it was probably
precisely for that reason that the reform wing kept pushing him to, as both a show of force to
the conservatives and as a statement of support to Tito. Even the last speaker, Bakaric,
repeated this call: ‘If I wanted to and if we wanted to dramatise this thing, then the only way
out would be for us to say: let us as the leadership dissolve ourselves and let the League of
Communists, which is a healthy organisation, give comrade Tito a mandate to appoint a new
leadership. Not just because we do not agree among ourselves but because we are unable to
find a way out.’202
After a further spat between Todorovic and Tempo,203 centring around personal incomes and 
their effect on economic performance, as well as on accusation and counter-accusation about 
the latter’s allegations earlier in the meeting, Tito calmed affairs saying everyone ought to 
look forward and then finally gave his own verdict on the affairs of the day. His tone had 
changed, as he admitted that he had spoken emotionally and knew that everyone was tense.204 
Thus he projected an optimistic vision. He began with the recognition that the leadership was 
divided. Yet he believed that its latent revolutionary spirit would lead it to the correct path 
and he insisted this had to come from the bottom down as well, announcing that the republic 
leaderships would have to renew their loyalty to the line in a series of meetings in the near
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future. The main issue, and Tito made a point of agreeing with Rankovic, was that the 
party had let matters slip: ‘The role of the League of Communists -  whether the federation, 
decentralisation or démocratisation are at issue -  is much greater than it used to be before, 
say, the Sixth Congress. That role is more delicate. The League of Communists must now 
work on the directing the course of our social development, it must do all that which it has 
not done until now, because that has been left to the various organs, federal and republic, and 
that has been abandoned, so things have gone in the wrong direction.’206 He lamented that the 
federal leadership had come to be seen as a gendarme among the republics but he insisted that 
‘we are for Yugoslavism and we must be for it’.207 In this sense, Tito confirmed everything 
he had set at the outset of the meeting.
205
At this point, however, he began to change tack. He admitted that for the preceding period, he 
had had substantial doubts about his own position, the position of his comrades and the 
direction of the country, in a passage worthy of lengthy quotation since it clarifies much 
about Tito’s role:
‘It is said that at difficult and great crossroads, that which is not ripe and 
revolutionary enough falls out of the car of the revolution. But our revolution 
continues. It would be miserable for old revolutionaries to begin falling out of the 
car and for us to raise our hands in the air, to raise our hands from the troubles in 
which we find ourselves. As far as I am concerned -  I am speaking honestly and 
openly -  I have for years, and particularly the last two years, been undergoing a 
struggle with myself. What should I do? I can see some things are not going. 
Allow me comrades, I have spoken many times of the issues you have spoken 
about. That has been written about too; letters were sent, warnings came up about 
some things, but that did not become the flesh and blood of the League of 
Communists in the sense that it continued further unabated...and this discouraged 
me...And I am the General Secretary of the League of Communists. I have great 
responsibilities. And when you have great responsibilities, then the question is 
posed: can you continue in this way? You have responsibility but that which you 
suggest or demand is not implemented, and things in fact go in the other direction.
So should you be in your position? Maybe you do not fit according to your 
qualifications the current phase of the evolutionary process of society, as some
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people have said: he has got old, not got old, but has obsolete ideas; good for the 
war but after the war...it is necessary to find new people. There has been much of 
that, comrades, and I must emphasise once more that there is still a lot of it about.
I don’t agree with that. I don’t agree with that because I don’t want to, on the basis 
of various speeches etc, I don’t want to give up [bacim koplje u trnje], I’ve 
decided to fight. I believe most of you will be in favour of what I think, and I 
think what the majority among you favours. We want to safeguard our socialist 
community, we want to protect the heritage of the revolution, we want to 
eliminate that which divides us, and we want to seek out the paths that unite us.
And I am still capable of that.’208
Tito had here clearly identified that he saw the period Yugoslavia had embarked on as a
turning point but wanted to take a majority with him. He also appeared to be responding to
the calls for him to dissolve the leadership and appoint a new one by suggesting he did not
think that necessary. He believed the majority to be with him despite all the nuances that
divided them but, by formulating it the way he did, Tito had also left the door open to those
who disagreed to find a place in the new course. This would become obvious in that Tito then
went on, first, to imply that he had the confidence of the party as a whole and did not fear the
security apparatus. Second, he spelt out his support for the reform project. Thus, on the
former, Tito expounded on the virtues of the League of Communists before responding to
GoSnjak’s earlier warning in the name of the armed forces in coded terms:
‘Comrades, I follow the international situation. For example, in Burma general Ne 
Vin has for the second time had to take power in his hands so as to get rid of 
corrupt elements in the government. The army as the most progressive element 
had to intervene. We have the party, which has to do the same. While our Army is 
the defender of our heritage towards the outside. Surely we will not use the Army 
to maintain our unity. It is the Communist Party which is the factor that ought to 
do that.’209
That was indeed an oblique threat that Tito, as supreme commander, could use the army to 
clear out the political scene but the phrasing was such that it indicated to GoSnjak that it was 
Tito to whom the army answered. The context of the quoted passage, the confidence
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expressed in the party, gave these words their double meaning: Tito had the confidence of the 
army and could use the army but he stood with the party and preferred to use it.
That served as the ouverture to Tito’s explanation of what he thought the party should be 
used for: economic reform. He spoke at length again about the need to attain unity on 
economic matters and implored the republic leaders present to counter emanations of disunity 
in the country.210 He again announced a series of meetings that would include the republics to 
plan for future economic development as agreement was particularly important in a 
‘multinational’ country.211 While he agreed some immediate measures were necessary, Tito 
came out in favour of the reform wing that had sought a clearing out personnel in the federal 
administrative apparatus: ‘Let’s take people from the republics. Surely, we have people who 
grew up with practice, who know things and have had experience, and know some theory. 
And sure, if they don’t know everything, it is better that they err because of lack of 
knowledge than that we should have a hard-boiled, persistent bureaucracy which comes to us 
in the Federal Executive Council to read out lessons, to all of you who sit there, and you like 
pupils with your hands on the desks listening to them, listening as some people like Guzina, 
or whoever, reads their lectures to you! They are our servants, they should be executing the 
political line we have set in economic policy, not dictating to us.’212 Tito in fact upped the 
ante: ‘I demand that we begin as soon as possible with the reorganisation of both the planning 
institute and...of our other institutions, and not just for planning but of the chambers as well, 
and whatever else has been developing in anarchic fashion. Huge apparatuses, brother, gulp 
down billions from our funds, the accumulation which our working people create by their 
sweat but remain in hunger. I demand this as soon as possible...’213
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Having made clear his diagnosis of the problem, Tito went on to suggest the solution:
‘There is one more thing, comrades. If we give funds, we don’t have to distribute 
them from above. I am against that. We should cease once and for all with the 
practice of seeking funds here, and then sending them there, and between we have 
various banks and all sorts of other things, and something stays in each of those 
places but least gets down there, where it is necessary...We speak of 
decentralisation. Some comrades have said we have overdone it with 
decentralisation but I think that, at least in terms of material resources, it has not 
been overdone, but that we in fact still have centralist tendencies...it appears to me 
that we have been falling under the influence of various planners...we need to be 
done with these things.’2'4
Tito then ended with a plea for the little man, the lowly paid worker, and railed against the 
policies which had increased too much income differentials in the factories: a plea designed 
to appeal to both reformers and conservatives as Communists.214 15 Tito later regretted his pitch 
for unity. Careful readers of the historic Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in July 
1966, at which Tito deposed his long-time collaborator Rankovic from the SKJ leadership, 
noted Tito’s regret that he had not taken decisive action in the spring of 1962 against the 
conservative forces in the leadership, which had stalled market reform by several years.216 
This contrasted with rumours which had him indecisive for much of 1962: ‘Tito’s initial 
reaction, when he returned to the country and was confronted by the economic situation, had 
been to blame decentralisation of investment funds for the excess demand which had 
destroyed the boom and to opt for rigid recentralisation, but...he was then shown evidence 
that about 80 percent of investment funds remained under effective but financially 
irresponsible central control, despite formal decentralisation...he was therefore no longer 
willing to support the centralist position...’217 While these rumours presented the flip-flop as 
having occurred over several months in mid-1962, the evidence suggests that Tito certainly 
appeared to have shifted his emphasis over the three days in spring of 1962. Yet Tito
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appeared more hostile to political than economic decentralisation. His fear was political 
disintegration and he appeared to realise that the forces of reform and conservatism were 
finely balanced. He therefore in all likelihood sought to find a new equilibrium given that the 
old was clearly beyond reach.
From the Executive Committee meeting to the Plenum o f the Central Committee and Beyond
Tito’s performance on the day was a qualified endorsement of the reform agenda. The 
resolution drawn up as an internal statement represented a compromise document but one that 
had the deep imprint of the reform agenda. The first part of the resolution referred to the 
Letter of February 1958 and repeated many of its stipulations about political discipline. 
The second part of the resolution on the short-term economic measures reflected a more 
reformist bent: a more stimulating income system linked to productivity; state activism to 
reflate the economy and push exports as the means to overcome the balance of payments 
deficit and subordinate imports for that purpose; imposition of saving in personal 
expenditure; decrease in the rate of investment suggesting a more gradual path than 
envisaged by the more radical five-year plan; decrease in social and non-productive spending; 
ensuring liquidity; and cuts to federal spending and increases in revenue.219 The third part 
sought permission for the Secretariat of the Executive Committee to draft a letter to the 
various leaderships involved instructing them to act accordingly.220 The reform wing 
appeared to view the decisions as insufficient but also felt sufficiently emboldened to act. 
This became obvious two weeks after the extended meeting, the Executive met again to take 
stock of the meetings of the republic Executive Committees that met to discuss the extended
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March Executive Committee meeting.221 The federal leadership faced an apparent challenge
from the Slovene leadership. Rankovic, Tito, Kardelj and Vlahovic all criticised the Slovenes
along similar lines. Rankovic perhaps most eloquently summarised the issues:
‘It appears that the matter at hand truly is about a closing into “their” circle. He 
thinks that none of this will have a good effect on members and lower leaderships 
when they compare our Conclusions and the conclusions of the Executive 
Committee of the CC LC of Slovenia. It would be abominable if we got people in 
the situation where they decide and declare for one or the other. There is an 
impression that the comrades have not addressed phenomena and problems in 
their own republic [kod sebe]. They have not established their position on the 
adopted stances and shared problems. They have somehow taken on the role of 
defending from someone social self-management. If this implies the federal 
bureaucracy then it can equally be said that there is no less of that [bureaucracy] 
in the republics.’222
Tito followed and expressed surprise that Marinko and LeskoSek ‘did not see that because 
that course is opposed to the line of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’. Marinko 
and Leskosek disagreed. Both were adamant that the Slovene Executive Committee had 
expressed self-criticism and condemned nationalism. Marinko claimed that the Slovenes had 
not understood that their resolutions should parrot those of the federal Executive Committee. 
LeskoSek agreed and went further to suggest that in Slovenia the problem was too much 
looking westwards but saw no dangers in the resolution adopted by the Slovene Executive 
Committee. Marinko spoke again to add that much discussion had taken place about the need 
to renew the leadership with younger cadres.224 Kardelj felt it necessary to repeat the 
criticisms raised by Rankovic and Tito, asserting that practicism had prevailed among the 
Slovenes and that the party was demobilised, as evidenced by the lack of a single Marxist 
journal in Slovenia.225 Vlahovic rounded the criticisms off by asserting there was none of the 
sense of urgency in the Slovene resolution around the situation as there was in the other
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republics.226 The Executive Committee then decided to set up a meeting between the 
Secretariats of the federal and republic CCs in order to communicate its criticisms to the 
Slovenes and to work out a plan to rectify the situation. It also decided to circulate the 
resolutions to all the republic CCs.227 Further clarification on the situation requires research 
into the work of the federal Secretariat of the CC.
Nevertheless, the momentum that the reform wing had established was not significantly
weakened by the intransigence of the Slovenes. If anything, their activities did not appear to
unduly worry the leadership in the short term. The Executive Committee met within ten days
again to discuss the new constitution,228 which has widely been recognised as an achievement
of the reform wing.229 Tito delivered his famous speech in Split in the first days of May 1962
which served as the basis for the belief that the re-assertion of the party was tantamount to a
conservative backlash.230 Nothing could have been further from the truth. The EC reconvened
less than two weeks after Tito’s speech to examine the effects of the various resolutions and
Tito’s speech on mass work in all the republics.231 This revealed that Tito had not been
vacillating in his beliefs and in fact had begun to calm down despite frustration over
individual aspects of the process of getting out of recession. His response to claims from
republic leaderships that the Executive Committee letter and his speech had gone down well
in party ranks and in the workplaces confirmed this:
‘Comrade TITO concludes that, on the basis of these discussions and the 
information which has become known to him, the results hitherto of the reception 
of the Letter can be assessed as positive. He underlined that all those things 
presented in the Letter, as everything he said in his speech in Split, have a
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secondary, political character, since all those things he talked about would have a 
negative political effect unless we liquidate them. However, economics is the 
important thing -  the economic situation in the country. He believes that our 
planning system is not correctly built, that the world market was inadequately 
researched, and that our economic development and international trade has 
consequently not been arranged properly. He emphasised that this entire problem 
has to be taken very seriously, so that the best way to move quicker towards a 
new, normal way of developing our economy, much calmer and with fewer 
oscillations. If necessary, a group of comrades could be formed to study this 
problem in a Marxist way.’232
Further steps in the reform direction became evident as Tito felt compelled to argue that, 
while wild income differentials in firms should be brought down and wage increases awarded 
only for productivity increases, blanket reductions of consumption should not be 
countenanced since that would endanger recovery from recession.233 Yet the national 
question continued to loom large behind the veneer of stability. Kardelj followed Tito swiftly 
afterwards at the meeting of the Executive Committee to update on the situation in the 
Federal Executive Council. He posited that the subcommittees that Todorovic had promised 
in March would provide movement forward in planning in fact ended up unworkable: ‘In the 
commission, they ended up divided -  Slovenes and Croats on one side, as the more 
developed ones, the others on the other side. Therefore in order to get out of this situation and 
to resolve the problem, it is necessary to take a clear stance on the issues of backwardness 
and underdevelopment and the politics towards those regions, since that is the most frequent 
cause of disunity.’234
Indeed, the situation had got so serious that: ‘Now we have two different views. First, the 
system is to blame. Second, the plan is to blame. Some put in doubt our entire system, even 
the system of workers’ self-management[. HJowever, economic problems had their roots in
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the economics [by which Kardelj meant, the plan].’235 Just as in the March meeting, Kardelj 
insisted that he had been right about over-optimism in the previous plan and called for careful 
research before the next party plenum was called. Over the long term, therefore, he saw the 
role of experts on the rise and the re-organisation of the federal government as crucial to 
success. Indeed, reform forces retained control in the federal government with Krajger 
replacing Todorovic as economic chief and Stambolic replacing Tito as head of government. 
In the short term, though, Kardelj saw the need for moral stimulants to replace economic 
ones: ‘In relation to political work, it is noted that it is necessary to struggle for calm and 
optimism, to mobilise all forces for the rekindling of the economy, since a dose of apathy and 
lethargy had become noticeable.’236
This again echoed Tito’s use of political mobilisation as a constant but secondary approach in 
strategic terms but one that at opportune moments played an important role on a tactical level. 
The need for caution therefore reflected not just the requirements of national balances but 
also co-optation of forces from below for the reform effort. Workers’ self-management here 
continued to play a decisive role because it was identified with the economic strategies of the 
prevailing reform wing of the SKJ. An added moderating element to this concoction was the 
low level of party cadres, activity and organisation, to which the lengthy intervention from 
Rankovic attested to: maximum tactical flexibility could only be achieved by the leadership if 
the mechanism for executing complex manoeuvres was in a state to perform them. It was 
simply not, as new rank-and-file members showed a low ideological level; territorial 
organisations maintained abstract levels of analysis; the influence of political troublemakers 
(Djilasites and Cominformists) or state employees with their bureaucratic attitudes sowed 
confusion; the press often responded in wildly exaggerated campaigns, for instance attacking
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directors ‘frontally’ which could damage longer-term economic viability; a general anti­
authority feeling was spreading in the party as a result of the Letter; and because any change 
of heart in the rank-and-file would lag behind the leadership which would have to take time 
to find its own new line and reconcile differences in the coming period.237 Rankovid later on 
also suggested measures to restrict car use among officials to reduce political 
dissatisfaction.238
The necessity for institutional change also acted as a barrier for more decisive shifts in 1962. 
Kardelj detailed significant institutional reshaping of the economic edifice of the party-state 
as the second item on the order paper at the same meeting of the Executive Committee in line 
with what Tito had suggested in March. With minor revisions, his plan passed at the 
Executive Committee.239 Proposed changes to the trade union federation produced significant 
disagreement at the Executive Committee, however, providing a further obstacle to decisive 
change so soon after the leadership had taken the decision to intensify the reform effort. 
Tempo suffered his first reversal since 1958 when his elaborate plan to strengthen industrial 
branches at the expense of territorial branches, especially on the level of the republics, despite 
lukewarm support from Tito and Kardelj, ran into ferocious opposition from Pucar, Veselinov 
and Rankovic. Tito acceded to pressures to continue consultations over the issue, forcing 
Tempo to accept the need to go through further negotiations on the matter, something he 
plainly resented. He felt he had gone through proper procedure already and that the Bosnian 
and Serbian unions were stalling. The postponement of reform here, and its eventual 
derailment, was a manifest compromise to keep the conservative forces on board.240
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The party leadership soon decided to call an authoritative Party Plenum for July.241 Any hope 
for decisive breakthroughs would not have been realistic in the context of economic troubles, 
national divisions, institutional weaknesses, political divergence and the novelty of the 
situation. Moreover, Lendvai’s and Rusinow’s presentation of the Fourth Plenum as a point 
respectively of the upper hand of the conservative faction or of uncertainty amid Tito’s 
prevarication suffered from a misunderstanding of the context and balance of forces in the 
SKJ leadership. By this point, the five-year plan had been abandoned in mid-stream and new 
representatives of the reform wing had risen to prominence. Therefore, Lendvai’s contention 
that Rankovic delivered the keynote address, that few north-westerners spoke and that the 
two combined were a sign of the reformers’ weakness was superficial in the extreme. The 
fact of the matter was that Krajger who spoke on the economic situation, Minic who 
presented the plan for 1963 and Komar who spoke on agricultural policy all represented the 
reform’wing in their respective republics: Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia. The new head of 
government, Stambolic, had proclaimed agreement with the reform agenda at the preceding 
Executive Committee meeting too. He spoke at the meeting from reform positions, once 
again emphasising the priority of export industries.242 Finally, the resolution of the Fourth 
Plenum243 showed less of the alleged contradiction between the amalgamation of economic 
units and continued belief in political decentralisation. Such a set of conclusions formally 
followed as a matter of course from the proclaimed aims of, on the one hand, creating 
Yugoslav enterprises, a Yugoslav working class and a Yugoslav market, and, on the other 
hand, leaving more resources to decentralised credit agencies and local government bodies. If 
there was incoherence to these plans, it was certainly not in the realm of abstract logic.
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For the government policy agenda and overall direction adopted in the period of spring and 
summer in 1962 did not represent a qualitative departure from the ‘Yugoslav Road to 
Socialism’ as codified by the 1958 programme. Nevertheless, qualitative changes had 
occurred in terms of how planning would occur, how resources and people would be 
mobilised to achieve aims, and who would execute much of this policy. This was first of all 
visible in that the republics had begun to be actors in their own right, by way of their own 
party-state apparatus, its mass organisations and their organs of self-management. While 
before 1962, the national question had always been present in the forums of the federation, it 
had been federal institutional actors that had held decisive initiative in overall policy making, 
policy execution and mass mobilisation. This had been particularly obvious with the role of 
the trade unions in creating momentum for reform between 1958 and 1962. Even as the 
reform movement continued to hold the upper hand following the fateful meetings of early 
1962, its most dynamic element had in fact become the Slovene party-state leadership which 
effectively took its agenda independently to the rank-and-file in order to maintain the impetus 
for reform outside the divided federal party-state institutions. The reluctance of the federal 
leadership to punish the Slovenes in any way, and in fact the promotion of one of its leading 
figures to ministerial post at federal level, showed that action had paid off. With the federal 
institutions becoming weighed down by political debates, which relied increasingly on 
national bases of support, the focus for political actors began to slowly shift towards forms of 
activity that could guarantee them maximum freedom of manoeuvre. The advantage of those 
republican leaders who could present themselves as capable of relating best to the 
international market appears to have been decisive in ideological terms to their maintenance 
of hegemony in the leadership. Yet that came with a price. The resulting centrifugal pulls on 
the federation had become the dominant new feature of political life in the 1960s.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown this new dynamic from a novel perspective made possible by the 
availability of new archival evidence, in particular of the key extended Executive Committee 
meetings of February 1958 and March 1962. The chapter’s ability to show how the emphasis 
of the reform wing had changed in terms of mobilisation from one set of sectional-functional 
institutions to a different, national-territorial one, provides a new, social dimension to the 
understanding of the development of politics in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the chapter clarifies 
beyond doubt some of the gray areas of a key turning point in Yugoslav history and argues 
for a need to see 1962 as a milestone year. The impact of its argument that the reform wing 
had at no point lost its dominance and had the tacit support of Tito is to suggest that the 
dynamic of the factional struggle of the mid-1960s would have to be seen as a rearguard 
action by a weak conservative rump with its limited base in the federal state apparatus and 
some of the less developed republics attempting against the odds to stall a reform process that 
had received a significant new push in 1962. With the economic ‘great debate’ about to begin 
in public, launched in effect at the two congresses of professional economists in the winter of 
1962-1963, the body politic of Yugoslavia had indeed begun to decisively change in favour 
of more pluralism. The dominance of the national question in the development of state- 
society relations at such a crucial conjuncture, however, weakened greatly the possibility of 
new actors to take pan-Yugoslav positions, as the paralysis of the trade unions at the end of 
this process bore witness.
An examination of the failure of the attempt to create a Yugoslav market in the 1960s falls 
out of the remit of this thesis but the impact of the national question on the politics of reform 
in this early period forms the unavoidable background to any attempt to do so. The intention
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had clearly been there but the modes chosen to achieve it had set the odds against success. 
The process that followed in the 1960s is well captured by Susan Woodward in her review 
article on the major scholarship on that decade:
‘Top-level personnel changes occurred at the March 1962 meeting. But only when 
the diplomatic negotiations of the fall of 1963 sealed the commitment to the 
further liberalization of foreign trade and “territorialization” of defense in 1965 
(with their consequences for international alliances and domestic policies), could a 
party congress be called to enact the new party statute and mobilize the troops. 
Delayed until December 1964, the congress set the stage for what was now 
labeled “the Reform,” and for the constitutional amendments that followed...With 
federal investment resources gone, the principles of development assistance 
succumbed to the relative bargaining strengths among republics. Where once 
investment policy had been implemented by budgetary allotments or differential 
rates to accommodate multiple goals (as in tariff policy), the fate of the republics’ 
economies and revenue bases now depended on uniform rules (“objective” in the 
debates) for allocating money. Within somewhat flexible budget constraints, 
multiple objectives that could earlier be made complementary became 
increasingly incompatible.’244
That opened a new epoch in Yugoslav history with significantly different rules, actors and 
dynamics. It was only then that Yugoslavia opened to the world market, at least temporarily, 
in more consistent and systematic fashion in contrast with the compromises of the 1961 
reforms.245 Nevertheless, that ambition had clearly existed beforehand and its importance to 
every reform following 1958 was patent and explicit in policy debates at the highest level. 
This became particularly acute with the course taken following the decisions of the 1962 
Executive Committee meeting and Central Committee Plenums. As Diane Flaherty put it, 
‘[w]age policy complemented fiscal policy. In 1962 workers councils were given power over 
a larger share of net income (an estimated 47% in 1962 relative to 26% in the late 1950s). But 
not all changes were necessarily beneficial to enterprises. Fiscal decentralisation was to be 
accomplished on the expenditure side by the removal of subsidies to less ‘efficient’ 
enterprises. The principle of enterprise autonomy was to operate together with that of own
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responsibility for success or failure.’246 That had in fact been precisely what the reform wing 
had sought. In the words of Marinko at the extended Executive Committee meeting in 1962: 
‘We today nowhere in this country have a single enterprise which we can say we forced into 
liquidation because it is not profitable...We will not thereby be able to go for international 
competition...It is necessary for credits to obligate [the borrower] much more and for the 
fulfilment of obligations for credit granted to be fulfilled both in time and in sum, and in so 
far as it is not fulfilled, the collective which has taken on such investments, should bear the 
consequences’.247 To achieve these goals, the reform wing used the Slovene republic 
apparatus as the successor to the trade unions, to act as the battering ram for the world market 
in Yugoslavia, reigniting the national question for the first time since 1945.
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Conclusion
The re-opening of the national question in Yugoslavia in 1962 did not make the country’s 
disintegration or the ensuing war three decades later inevitable. Indeed, the reform movement 
despite its perennial advantage never won a complete victory. Even after the removal of 
Rankovic in 1966, similar oscillations between, and combinations of, centralisation and 
decentralisation, economic and political emphases to policy, market and mobilisation, 
material and moral rewards, gradualism and radicalism, elitism and populism, pedagogical 
and exhortative forms of persuasion, persuasion and coercion, participation and mobilisation, 
continued until the 1980s.1 No simple deduction can therefore be made from the initial 
decade and a half of the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ to the rest of the Communist period.
Nevertheless, this thesis sheds new light on the conflicts of the 1950s and provides tools for 
the reinterpretation of political conflicts in later periods of Yugoslav history. It does so in 
several ways. First, by viewing the elites and the lower echelons of the party-state as the 
transmission belt of the pressures of the world economy on the workplace, following the 
country’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc, this thesis shows that the imperative to accumulate 
and to catch up with the advanced industrialised states intensified the tendency towards 
conflict from the bottom up.2 Second, and complementary, by concentrating on policies 
towards labour and situating politics firmly within resulting state-society conflicts, refracted 
from the shop-floor upwards through the various echelons of the party-state, this thesis opens
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the door to understanding Yugoslav politics from, among others, the standpoint of class 
struggle.3 Third, the thesis demonstrates that struggles over development strategy interacted 
with struggles for roots in social constituencies, within and sometimes beyond the boundaries 
of acceptable political discourse. These overlapped with geopolitical pressures, with 
deviations from the dominant market reform wing of the bureaucracy leaning West and the 
conservatives seen as potentially leaning East, with the majority in favour of non-alignment. 
Fourth, having failed to decisively defeat each other in the politics of the federal apparatus, 
the two wings refrained from unleashing the forces of class struggle, opting instead for safer 
routes to attaining favourable policy resolutions. These would result in the slow demotion of 
pan-Yugoslav actors within either coalition and ultimately in a retreat into the safest 
legitimate source of social roots and territorial-functional power in the multinational 
federation: the republic-based apparatuses, assets and work collectives.
The International Dimension and the Shop-Floor
The thesis demonstrated these trends over three different periods, thus verifying their more 
than transitory character. The preference for external aid to alleviate the pressures of 
domestic accumulation for development over self-reliance became clear in such diverse ways 
as the struggle against Hebrang in 1946 amid the belief gradualism would retard development 
and jeopardise Soviet credits to finance an ambitious programme of industrialisation, the 
opting for the market-oriented income-sharing system after 1956 to cope with American aid 
moving from grant to loan basis, and with the choice of deepening the export-orientation of
3 Much debate exists over how to characterise the social formations and ruling elites o f  Eastern Europe. See for 
a brief overview David Lane, The Rise & Fall of State Socialism, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Cambridge, 1996, 
Chapter 7. This thesis certainly provides a prima facie to argue that they constituted a ruling class presiding over 
bureaucratic state capitalism. For more, see Tony Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia, London: Pluto Press, 1974, 
Chris Harman, Class Struggles in Eastern Europe 1945-83, Bookmarks, London, 1988, and David McNally, 
Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist Critique, Verso, London: New York: 
1993
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the economy as the response to the recession of 1961-1962. This certainly presents a level of 
continuity across the period. Nevertheless, the forced choice to turn West rather than East 
changed the mechanisms by which external aid could be utilised.
In relation to labour policy, this manifested itself in an orientation towards greater use of 
market mechanisms. The relationship was not always direct but became ever more so. The 
first symbolic departure from preferring moral to material incentives occurred after the break 
with Stalin but as a result of internal strains rather than Western credits. The thesis therefore 
showed that the mass mobilisation characteristic of the period before 1948 accelerated in 
1949 to forestall collapse but in the process blunted the party-state’s instruments of 
persuasion and for development, a process slowly reversed only after Western credits began 
to flow in 1952. Meanwhile, the introduction of workers’ councils in 1950 represented the 
dual nature of the times: the democratising tendencies of mass mobilisation and its 
concomitant structural failure to develop an intensive rather than extensive productivity drive. 
The Communists erected a new gradualist economic system around worker management that 
tried to link more closely wages and productivity, using the system of accumulation and 
funds. The process of market reform proceeded unevenly, as shown in the middle chapter of 
the thesis, with a retreat from the more adventurous but faulty AF system to the more 
controlled profit-sharing mechanism of 1954-1957. The return of economic growth in this 
period did not however lead to peace on the shop-floor. City-country imbalances led to food 
shortages, causing massive worker resistance, taking multifarious forms falling short of open 
confrontation like strike action, to the imperatives of state-backed management. It is likely 
that foreign credits both facilitated this central imbalance in the economy and dampened its
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worst effects on the shop-floor, making credit continuation indispensible to the Yugoslav 
leadership even when aid switched to loan basis.4
It was the imperative to return loans in international currencies that thenceforth required 
greater reliance on market incentives for increasing labour productivity. Changes to the wage 
system adopted in 1958 registered this ambition. Greater reliance on the market only 
exacerbated shop-floor tensions but anomalous taxation rates that penalised those with older 
machinery and plant created additional administrative distortions to the reform programme. 
While intended as a redistributive measure in the preceding period to raise industry in less 
developed regions, this policy now caused dissatisfaction in the reform camp as it acted as a 
brake on the industrial modernisation of enterprises with more skilled collectives and 
dampened the impact of reform on the balance of payments deficit. It also provoked the first 
labour strike, which ignited a wave of stoppages over wages, variously in response to 
administrative and market measures alike, across republic borders.5 This meant that the 
situation was more volatile with every market reform. The shift towards income sharing in 
1958 therefore suggested that, whereas before struggles had developed over what amounts 
central funds would release for whom, as seen in the opening chapter, the differential impact 
of uniform central regulations would cause more dynamic conflicts over policy, a process 
analysed in the closing chapter. Despite progress for the market reform wing with an even 
more liberal shake-up being adopted in 1961, stalemate in the centre strengthened centrifugal 
pulls on the federation by 1962. This comparatively strengthened horizontal struggles 
between republics at the expense of vertical struggles between the state as employer and the 
working class, which had been the prevailing conflict of the profit-sharing years.
4
According to Dyker, US aid and loans significantly improved the Yugoslav ability to import production 
inputs, maintain a high investment ratio and run a substantial deficit on the agricultural balance o f  trade between 
1953 and 1959, thus easing supply pressures to cities at a time o f rapid urbanisation. Dyker, Socialism, 
Development and Debt, 42-43.
5 Jovanov, Radnidki strajkovi, 95-102
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Market, Mobilisation and Political Conflict
Political struggles, then, developed on the terrain of state-society conflict but were not 
reducible to it. The leadership had to be attentive to the potential geopolitical expression that 
opposition could take, lest challenges arose to its chosen developmental path. Moreover, 
clashes were understood in ideological terms. Ideology played an important role in that it 
often defined what concrete social forces were preferable allies during various phases of 
development but also in regard to what social forces deviationists could ally with. All the 
same, while the geopolitical and ideological aspects of the political process have received 
ample commentary in the historiography, their connection with social struggles has not. This 
thesis emphasised this connection throughout, showing that Party leaders analysed the social 
struggles underlying the Hebrang case in 1946 and 1948, the Djilas affair in 1953-1954, the 
fear of the Hungarian scenario in 1956, and the changes of 1958 and its aftermath. As seen in 
the first chapter, Hebrang’s demise took place at a time when radicalism was the order of the 
day. This reflected the leadership’s desire to move towards industrialisation at a faster pace. 
By accusing Hebrang of ‘state capitalist’ deviation and refusal to move ‘forward’ towards 
NEP, the leadership implied not only that Hebrang misunderstood objective economic laws 
but also that he was soft on the state apparatus and that he had no faith in the popular masses. 
Hebrang’s later siding with Stalin against Tito provided a further element to the ideological 
narrative of the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’. The Yugoslav Communists expected centralist 
forces to look to the USSR for support.
Similar concrete analysis of social forces developed around the removal of Djilas but 
provided a contrasting pole to the potential pro-Soviet axis in Yugoslavia. This time, the fear
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was that excessive radicalism and populism would play into the hands of a coalition uniting 
opportunist elements of the party-state apparatus, corrupted by the market, emboldened 
privateer elements in industry and agriculture, and the remnants of the bourgeoisie. With the 
AF system producing irrational economic results, workers appeared desperate enough to fall 
behind criminal or populist directors, whatever the cost to the community. The second 
chapter of this thesis showed that the leadership believed that the populism of the press and 
intellectuals, who looked to Djilas as an authority, would unwittingly raise expectations 
among workers, which the state could not satisfy. That would only legitimate anti-systemic 
elements in the eyes of the work collectives. Djilas’s close relationship with Western social- 
democrats, especially the British Labour Party, moreover, appeared to prompt his challenge 
to single-party rule. The Central Committee feared that that would be a rallying call for all 
potential pro-Western sympathisers. Djilas himself appeared not to dismiss that constituency, 
which made him all the more perilous and resulted in his dismissal from high post.
Indeed, the twin dangers to the revolution of ‘bureaucratism’ that, ‘developed to the full’, 
represented ‘the restoration of state capitalist relations’, and ‘anarchist and pseudo-liberal’ 
attempts, by weakening the state, to ‘undermine the very leadership role of the socialist 
forces’ and ‘prepare the way for the antisocialist forces’, both came to be written into the 
Party programme in 1958.6 They had come to represent the paradigm through which the 
dominant section of the leadership viewed most subsequent challenges to its rule.7 
Nevertheless, the further complication arose when lower echelons within the party-state 
apparatus embarked on their own initiatives. This was more difficult to define and appeared 
to preoccupy the leadership on more subtle levels than open political confrontation within the 
SKJ apex. The trade unions embodied the major representative of this trend through most of
6 Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, Kultura: Beograd, 1958, 115
See the ground-breaking Jovi6, Jugoslavija, Drzava koja je  odumrla
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the 1950s, only to be displaced by the republic leaderships towards the beginning of the 
1960s.
The analysis of the role of the unions in the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ is perhaps the 
major contribution of this thesis. The unions most concretely reflected the ambitions of the 
party-state in the sphere of industrial relations. Their privileged access to the shop-floor and 
the organs of worker management also made them sensitive to rank-and-file moods however. 
This combination makes them indispensible to an understanding of the power relations 
between the state and the working class, an insight that has totally escaped the historiography. 
Yet they were not simply Janus-faced but relatively autonomous actors within the party-state. 
The unions at several junctures challenged the policies of the party-state leadership, most 
notably during 1949, from a position of strength as a consequence of the democratising 
tendencies of the mass labour mobilisation of that year; during the mid-1950s, when union 
rank-and-file apparently adapted en masse to the pressures of the shop-floor against 
management in times of scarcity; and finally as part of an elite-driven but autonomous and 
divisive campaign for market reform of the wage system in 1958-1961. While limiting their 
rebellions to particular policies, the unions used their autonomy to take up in varying degrees 
the interests and demands of their immediate constituents to carve out a better position for 
themselves. Being the organisation most organically linked to both the working class and to 
workers’ councils, the SSJ constantly sought to enhance the role played by its constituents 
since that would strengthen the SSJ itself. The unions thus pushed for more worker 
involvement in the functioning of self-management in 1949, 1953-1955, and 1957, and their 
leaders often clashed openly with economic policy-makers in Party and SSRNJ forums from 
the standpoint of the interests of workers. As shown, this not infrequently bore results, 
intended and unintended, as unions forced changes to legislation or raised expectations of
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change in the workplace, sometimes causing the party-state serious trouble. This became 
clear in the middle chapter of the thesis in the run-up to the strike in Trbovlje.
The Party leadership finally decided thereafter to install a more reliable, technocratic and 
liberal leadership in the unions to make them a more pliant tool. Judging by the strike wave 
that developed in 1958-1962, and its expression entirely outside official structures, the unions 
did not wholly succeed in establishing themselves as the trusted organ of the rank-and-file. 
This had not been the intent, however. In fact, the unions embarked on a campaign to widen 
the proportion of social income at the disposal the self-management sector, which amounted 
to an endorsement of the market reform goal taken up by the leadership majority after the 
Hungarian crisis in 1956. Both the way they went about getting that goal and articulating 
their demands, however, continued to pose a challenge to the stability of the party-state. Even 
though they evidently had the tacit support of Tito and Kardelj, the unions’ open campaign 
against conservative desires to move slowly on wage reform caused the fractures opened by 
the Trbovlje strike to widen. Indeed, at one point, and at the behest of Dragi Stamenkovic, 
Rankovic and Tito, Tempo had to withdraw part of his address to the 1959 SSJ Congress 
where he called for the unions to have the right and duty ‘to form their own positions on all 
social matters’.8
It is instructive in order to show the importance of the insight for later periods in Yugoslav 
history to temporarily pursue the unions beyond the remit of the thesis. Despite the constant 
setbacks for Tempo, including his relative marginalisation by 1961-1962 in comparison with 
the Slovene wing of the reform movement, his activities continued to pose both an advantage 
and disadvantage for the reformers through the 1960s. Tempo later claimed that, during the
* See Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 117
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struggle against Rankovic, Tito backed union attempts at creating a ‘second Central 
Committee’ in 1964, quoting Tito to the effect that ‘If those people charged with the task 
cannot create [a Central Committee], then you [in the Unions] do it!’9 All the same, once 
Rankovic was removed, the perennial union obsession with making the organs of self­
management work in the interests of the collective gripped and toppled Tempo. His renewed 
campaign against management and in favour of the blue-collar workers in late 1966 soon left 
him without his post in the unions and he was slowly eased out of the leadership of the Party 
as well.10 His successor Du§an Petrovi6 Sane ‘ [a]t the Sixth Trade Union Congress in June 
1968...came into open conflict with the majority of the delegates over the issue of open 
balloting, but was elected to the TU presidium at the bottom of the list, with only 816 out of 
1,261 votes. His subsequent re-election as president was due to the unqualified support he 
enjoyed from the party organization.’11
While Rusinow’s celebrated history of the elite conflict in Yugoslavia stands out for 
registering the key role unions played in domestic politics in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
based largely on Tempo’s memoirs, his account still presents this episode as an aberration, 
perhaps largely explained by Tempo’s personality.12 Yet while unions consistently played a 
leading role in reform Communist movements in the 1960s elsewhere in Eastern Europe, no 
serious analysis of their role in the reform process has hitherto been attempted for the 
Yugoslav case.13 This thesis has shown that Tempo’s time at the helm was exceptional only
9 Vukmanovid Tempo, Revolucija koja tede, 429
10 ibid, 407-501, Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, 337
11 ‘Biographies o f  Trade Union Leaders in Eastern Europe’, 17.5.1973, Open Society Archives,
Accessed electronically: http://www.osaarchivum .Org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/l 14-3-134.shtml [Date
accessed: 10.04.2011
12 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 4
Although see Carl. F. Lenkowski, Trade Unions and the Socialist Market-Economy of Yugoslavia. See also 
Alex Pravda, “ Industrial Workers: Patterns o f  Dissent, Opposition and. Accommodation’, in Rudolf L. Tokes, 
Opposition in Eastern Europe, London: Macmillan [for] St Antony’s College, Oxford 1, 1979. More generally: 
Alex Pravda and Blair A. Ruble (Eds.,), Trade Unions in Communist States, Boston; London: Allen&Unwin, 
1986
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in that his leadership proved more capable than that of his predecessor Salaj, and that the 
circumstances politically were temporarily propitious for the unions. Nevertheless, even 
Tempo succumbed to the same tendencies that characterised much of the leadership in the 
1950s. While it is not clear that the causes for this behaviour were identical before and after 
1958, there is certainly a powerful case for understanding the role the unions played as to 
some motivated by pressures from below as well as by the populist desire to harness 
pressures from below to attain goals set by union leaders themselves.
From this standpoint, the demotion of the unions in 1961-1962 within the market reform 
coalition and of Tempo himself from positions of authority in the later 1960s becomes 
indicative of the leadership’s reservations about manipulating forces from below. The unions 
were clearly a double-edged sword for the Party majority in that they called for the greater 
proportion of social income to go to enterprises but also busied themselves with internal 
distribution of income in the enterprises. While there was relative agreement that promotion 
of skilled workers against management was the correct policy, the danger was that union 
leaders would take up the cause of the less skilled, as did indeed transpire with Tempo. Thus, 
Tempo’s rebellion contained the seeds of workplace democracy and centralised radicalism, 
which transcended the dichotomy predicted by the 1958 Party Programme.14 If the unions 
carried the seeds of a different, worker Yugoslavism, then the constant watch over, and 
purges of, their leadership prevented the unions from developing even a basic syndicalism. 
Their decentralisation in 1964, moreover, all but ended their role as an all-Yugoslav actor.
Finally, the relegation of the unions is instructive about the ideological framework of the 
leading forces among the Yugoslav Communists. While the Hebrang and Djilas cases
14 Tempo later resurfaced during MiloSevid’s ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ as a keen supporter. See Jovid, 
Jugoslavia, Driava koja je  odumrla, 400-401
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illustrated what role different classes should play, the case of the unions defined the limits of 
that role. The Party’s inability to defune a stable role for the unions throughout the post-1948 
period and its constant tendency to temper the influence of the unions was suggestive of its 
continued discomfort with its own purported class base. When they resorted to intensifying 
political methods, as in 1958, the Yugoslav Communists were careful to subordinate these to 
economic reform and political stability. Elitism, technocracy, persuasion, gradualism and 
correction of local abuses continued to be the emphasis. Periodic campaigns served more to 
re-establish vertical capacity to direct local activists in an ever more decentralised and 
complex setting. This may in part explain Tito’s consistent reluctance to push Rankovic. The 
SKJ played an invaluable role in a context that Tito felt was in constant flux. He emphasised 
the need for politics at every juncture and distrusted the rising technocracy that accompanied 
much of the market reform package. This later came to the fore in the conservative 
retrenchment following the Yugoslav 1968.15 16
The ascendancy of the republics, registered towards the end of the third chapter, added the 
final layer in the levels of political mediation discussed in this thesis. Facilitated by the 
market reforms of 1958 and 1961, this development has never received sufficient study in its 
initial phases as most accounts tended to concentrate on developments after 1962.'6 That 
open intimations of factions at the republic level first appeared in EC discussions after the 
strikes in Trbovlje, though, showed just how much the unleashing of class struggle for 
political ends caused uneasiness at the top. The mass mobilisation of 1949 for economic ends 
had caused lingering problems for most of the 1950s in terms of industrial relations. Any hint 
of its potential use in inter-republic relations caused dread. No one explicitly stated that they 
saw in Trbovlje the spark for a national conflagration but the highly moralistic tones struck
15 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, Chapter 8. See also: NebojSa Popov, Drustveni sukobi -  Izazov 
sociologiji, ’Beogradskijun’ 1968, Javno preduzeCe, Sluibeni glasnik, Beograd, 2008.
16 Burg, Conflict and Cohesion., Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, Cohen and Warwick, Political Cohesion
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against the Slovene leadership hinted that fear of the national question combining with forces 
from below did exist.
While the much clearer and more explicit discussion of the national question in the EC in 
1962, moreover, brought forth more bitterness than panic, it did not prevent the continued 
bullishness of the Slovene Party. This was so important that contemporary gossip brought 
alleged Slovene separatism into Western historiography but its illumination through the 
archival evidence suggests that the Slovene Party had reason to be pleased with its 
interventions. Slovene historians have indeed .studied the ascent of the Slovene liberalism in 
the republic and federation in the later 1960s but their attention was more on its achievements 
and failures in office than its formation as a tendency.17 Certainly, the tendency towards 
domestic mobilisation to attain federal goals suggested that the heritage of the period 1958- 
1962 was more sinister on a deeper level in that it created the precedent not simply for 
defence of territorial assets but also for displacing conflicts to the federation. What Kardelj’s 
role in this process was, and what perceptions of the Slovene attitude in the other republics 
might have been, though, remains a mystery. That it would have received at least informal 
discussion in leading circles and informed policy over the 1960s is certain and poses 
important intellectual and research challenges for historians. Rankovic’s claim that the unity 
of the Serbian republic was in danger certainly foreshadowed later Serbian unease with 
constitutional reform, particularly in 1974.18 The part Slovenia’s export prowess played 
during the crucial months of 1962 in reigniting the national question, moreover, is an 
important indication, elucidated in the last chapter of this thesis, that no comprehensive
17 See for example Bo2o Repe, ‘Liberalizem ’ v Sloveniji, Ljubljana: RO ZZB NOV Slovenije, 1992; and Bo2o 
Repe and Jo2e Priniii, Pred dasom: portret Staneta Kavdida, Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2009. The latter is a 
biography o f a trade union functionary who subsequently held high government office and showed liberal 
tendencies. He was not an exceptional unionist in that regard in the late 1960s. See Rusinow, Yugoslav 
Experiment, 227
18 Again, see Jovii, Jugoslavia, Drzava koja je  odumrla, Chapter 3
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treatment of the national question is complete without an assessment of its basis in the market 
and geo-politics in this crucial period.
Wider utility
This thesis has shown, then, that the external market was definitive of the development 
strategy the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ pursued from its inception. The world market 
shaped decisively the re-ordering of economic, social and political life after 1948. Particular 
reference to policy towards labour unlocked several hitherto unexplored avenues of 
understanding politics under the self-management system that complement the 
groundbreaking works of Susan Woodward on a number of levels. By presenting a narrative, 
told primarily through an examination of the activities of the highest forums of the party- 
state, to explain the passage from a command-and-control system to a variant of regulated 
market economy with worker participation in which two economic-political schemes 
remained locked in tense yet complementary fashion, this thesis overcomes the gap in 
Woodward’s account of the rise of the Slovene model. It does so by establishing the intention 
of, and then charting the progressive approximation towards, the achievement of economic 
openness through the 1950s. This is important in that it overcomes the major criticisms of 
Woodward’s work laid out in the Introduction of this thesis. First, it provides counter­
arguments to claims that Woodward’s critique of mainstream accounts of the political 
economy of Yugoslavia falls at the first hurdle by never reaching its point of departure in the 
1960s. Second, it shows that the international system strengthened massively those elements 
that sought the continuation of the Slovene model at two different crisis points, in 1956 and 
1961-1962, suggesting the primacy of the international system over its adherents, and the 
comparative weakness in turn of its official opponents.
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While space does not allow for an elaboration or assessment of Woodward’s contribution to 
the debate on the collapse of Yugoslavia, which is certainly recognised as substantial, this 
thesis shows that some of her assumptions about later periods, especially around the need to 
concentrate on systems and policies as opposed to solely elites, can fruitfully be applied to 
the 1950s even when she failed to do so. Moreover, Woodward’s structural analysis is widely 
criticised for ‘slighting...political leadership’.19 The major contribution of this thesis was to 
use Woodward’s insights but to shift attention from the causes of unemployment as in her 
account to view instead the impact of the* clash between international capital and the 
Yugoslav shop-floor on the various institutions of the ‘Yugoslav Road to Socialism’ that 
mediated this relationship. By doing so, this thesis not only reinterpreted the struggles of the 
1950s but provided a mode of extrapolating to later political struggles.
Without further research, it was difficult to claim more than intriguing prima facie 
suggestions for re-interpretations and further research. Perhaps the insight with most 
originality and utility provided by this thesis regarded the trade unions. Explaining the failure 
of the working class institutions to reach a level of autonomy promised in the self­
management system by reference to the systematic attempt to prevent them attaining a 
political perspective through the 1950s and the early 1960s is of value to formulating the 
background for the alienation of workers from their institutions and wider society during the 
1970s.20 That in turn helps explain the violent extra- and anti-systemic clashes of the 1980s. It 
could further be posited that the illumination of the struggles arising from the shop-floor and 
their demobilisation and displacement by inter-republic struggles in the 1950s and 1960s also
19 Lampe, The Journal o f Economic History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), 725
20 Neda G. Novakovid, Propadanje radnicke klase, Materijalni i drustveni polozaj radniöke klase Jugoslavije od 
I960, do 1990. godine, Rad, Beograd, 2007.
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re-ran the basic dynamic of the extreme and concentrated struggles of the 1980s.21 Something 
of this was also foreseen with some bitterness by Tempo himself in the concluding passage of 
his memoirs. In recounting the hostile media response to his campaign in defence of the blue 
collar workers suffering under the intensified market regime, Tempo did not conceal his 
impression that the revolution had been betrayed by its own leadership: ‘Turning to the 
criticisms of Ekomomska politika, I said more in jest: “‘The fire of income’ does not impact 
equally on all members of the collective! Workers find themselves in the middle of that fire, 
while the administration is on the edges.” The Sarajevo paper Oslobodenje carried a 
caricature on that subject: in the middle of a great fire there is a worker, and I am pushing the 
official towards the fire...he is putting up resistance...he is addressing me and angrily 
shouting: “And you, comrade Tempo?!” The caricaturist said no more! But I would 
nevertheless add: “Yes, us too!”‘22
21 This is brilliantly reconstructed by Jake Lowinger, ‘Economic Reform and the ‘Double Movement’ in 
Yugoslavia: An analysis o f  Labor Unrest and Ethno-nationalism in the 1980s’, PhD Diss, Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore, Maryland, 2009
22 Vukmanovid Tempo, Revolucija koja tece, 500-501
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